Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

After the loss of Albania in 1961 and Romania’s policy that was increasingly independent of Moscow, the Soviets were getting nervous. 14Since the early 1960s, the Chinese had been trying to foment discord within the Lager . Although Beijing’s efforts in Europe as well as in the Third World were unsuccessful, problems facing the Soviets did not evaporate. 15With the increasingly disturbing developments in Czechoslovakia—groups who were asking for the revival of the multiparty system and voices who were talking of the Little Entente, a prewar grouping of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia—danger for Moscow in the ideological and geopolitical realm was still acute. 16All three Eastern European countries were Socialist. Two were members of the Warsaw Pact, but only Prague was vital in the military considerations for the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was nonaligned and outside Moscow’s orbit. Taking into account the positive impressions Americans had of Yugoslavia, the liberalization in Czechoslovakia, and the independent attitude of Romania, one could expect Washington to be interested in the further liberalization of those countries. As it turned out, because improved relations between Moscow and Washington occurred at a time when the USSR was becoming its approximate equal and the United States was in crisis, the existence of a peaceful environment in the buffer countries between the West and the East turned out to be much more important to the United States than supporting liberalization in Eastern Europe. 17

For the Yugoslavs, the 5 January change in Prague was something they had been anticipating since the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. János Kádár, the Hungarian Communist Party boss, stressed at the session of the CC in June 1968 how Belgrade, although not revisionist and not for the counterrevolution in Prague, was supporting developments there in the same way as in Hungary a decade ago. Tito’s final goal, Kádár concluded, was to see these developments fully approach a “Yugoslav type of socialism.” 18During the mid-1960s, reforms and decentralization of the economy were undertaken in several eastern countries, including the notoriously Soviet-subservient Bulgaria. 19Hungary was cautious enough to avoid using “Yugoslav terminology,” but in a report written by Kiro Gligorov, the vice president of the Yugoslav government after his April visit, Hungarian hosts were stressing “similarities of their reform, with ours and Czechoslovakia’s.” 20Although Dubček and his allies immediately stressed how no changes in foreign policy were to be expected, many politicians in the Lager were unhappy with the developments in Prague, including Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov, as were others in Berlin, Warsaw, and Bulgaria. 21Reforms in and of themselves were, of course, not problematic, but those with the hint of Yugoslav revisionism, especially if conducted by the Soviet-dominated Socialist country, were.

If the Yugoslav example was inspirational for Dubček, it was observed from far and not followed closely. Bilateral cooperation between the Yugoslav League of Communists and the KSČ in the first half of 1968 was nonexistent. Although agreed upon in early February 1968 and despite Czechoslovakia stressing how an exchange of experience was essential, until mid-July none of the agreed upon visits were realized, and all were postponed until the second half of the year. 22On the state level, however, the Yugoslavs were asked to advise their Czechoslovak colleagues on different foreign policy and European issues. Marko Nikezić, state secretary for foreign affairs, was invited to visit Prague in mid-May. 23Shortly after him, Kiro Gligorov and Marin Cetinić, representatives of the Federal Executive Committee, also paid a visit to Prague. Gratitude for the Yugoslav support was always stressed, but both teams could report only on the numerous possibilities for undertaking cooperation in many fields. 24Still, cooperation remained cautious, more friendly than deep. Probably the Czechs and the Slovaks were unwilling to show any connection with the Yugoslavs, in order to avoid provoking the Soviets.

Tito, however, did a lot. Issued an invitation to visit Moscow while in Japan and Mongolia in April 1968, Tito had agreed to pay a short visit to the Kremlin where he met Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksei Kosygin, Nikolai Podgornyi, and Andrei Gromyko at the very end of April 1968. 25Brezhnev harshly criticized the situation in Prague. Antisocialist elements, foreign influences, restoration of capitalism, and a revival of the bourgeoisie were all at work in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leader stated. 26Tito’s opinion was totally the opposite: their Czechoslovak comrades were capable of controlling the situation. The only thing they needed was brotherly help. Probably some unfriendly elements existed in Prague, but the Communists in charge were not counterrevolutionaries. 27Tito even recalled his own experiences from Čenkov in 1912. In his opinion, it was unlikely to see the counterrevolutionary forces overwhelming the working class who possessed as glorious a tradition as the Czechoslovaks had. Brezhnev was annoyed by Tito’s comments. He cut the Yugoslav leader short, saying how in his country developments similar to those in Czechoslovakia existed: 28

In Socialist countries there are questions that are general and common. If our destiny is connected in a joint effort of building socialism, it is natural to be interested in your developments and vice versa…. We are worried whether you will be able to fulfill your own goals. As you see, we are asking all these questions and someone might see this as an interference [in your interior affairs]. But we are sincere and doing this with pain in our soul.

Tito’s reaction to the words that later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine was harsh. The Soviet leader was, as always, negotiating with a stick and carrot in his hands. Brezhnev asked Tito to talk with Dubček in order to influence him not to be overtaken by liberalism. A few weeks later in the spring of 1968, the secretary general of Tito’s office, Vladimir Popović, had directed all employees to observe the situation in Czechoslovakia with particular care. A special meeting for the Yugoslav ambassadors in Eastern Europe was organized by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Relations on 24 June. Dubček was described as progressive, striving toward greater democracy within the Bloc. 29The Yugoslavs were to support Dubček unconditionally. In the light of the recently begun maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact countries (without Romania) in Czechoslovakia (22–30 June), the Yugoslavs’ decision to support Dubček was significant. 30

The Yugoslav ambassador in Czechoslovakia during 1968 was Trpe Jakovlevski. For being one of many middle-ranked party and state officials with no previous diplomatic experience posted in one of the East European capitals, he did his job rather well. 31On 10 July 1968, Minister F. Vlasak informed the Yugoslav ambassador how the Soviet troops had entered the Czechoslovak territory and refused to withdraw. 32Only one day later, on 11 July 1968, Slavik, a member of the Secretariat of the CC KSČ, had informed the Yugoslavs of the conversation between Dubček and Brezhnev. Dubček declined the invitation to participate in the multilateral meeting of the Communist parties in Warsaw, ignoring letters from Sofia, Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, and Moscow (3 July) advising him to attend. 33On 12 July 1968, Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs Jiří Hajek informed Jakovlevski that bilateral meetings in Czechoslovakia should include both the Yugoslavs and the Romanians. Therefore, he was, without previous consultations, asking whether Tito would be ready to pay a visit to Dubček although it was not his turn to come on a state visit. 34Jakovlevski’s answer was positive. After expressing his gratitude, Hajek tried to explain why bilateral relations between the two countries had to have such a low profile. Since the Soviet Union was interpreting developments in Czechoslovakia as being inspired by Yugoslavia, as stated by Andrei Gromyko, with the goal of forming one of the new models of socialism and nonalignment, Prague was very cautious not to behave in a way that supported such an opinion. Nevertheless, it must be clear to Belgrade, Hajek said, that nonalignment had never been an option for Prague. 35Hajek did not fear direct military intervention from the USSR because the Soviets had no forces in Czechoslovakia on which they could rely. The importance of Tito’s help was stressed several times. 36On 14 July 1968, secretary of the president of the Czechoslovak Assembly J. Smrkovský asked Yugoslav ambassador Jakovlevski for Tito to send his letter to the “Five” in Warsaw. 37After the meeting in Poland on 14 July was over, a joint message was sent to the Czechoslovaks. 38For János Kádár, the Hungarian leader, that was the point when he, allegedly, gave up. Dubček, in his opinion, took the same road as Imre Nagy in 1956. 39The two leaders met in Komarno on 13 July. Only one day later, Tito received a message from Jakovlevski based on his conversation with Smrkovski about how Kádár was ready to oppose an already planned intervention. He did not know by then or was deliberately avoiding information that Dubček was almost crying while watching his Hungarian ally change sides. 40