Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

At the time of the invasion, Josip Vrhovec, a journalist at Vjesnik , a leading Croatian daily newspaper, but soon-to-become an ideological czar of the Croatian Communists, was with his family in Prague. Leaving Czechoslovakia proved to be tricky. Czechs were changing and replacing road signs to make the Soviet advance more difficult. However, many of the common people in small towns and villages were eager to help people driving Yugoslav cars get back home. Some, seeing Yugoslav license plates, were yelling at the drivers not to forget them, to tell the world what had happened in Czechoslovakia. 63

The hottest activity was on the Brijuni Islands. As soon he received news of the invasion, Tito summoned leading politicians from all parts of Yugoslavia. 64Also invited were the vice-premier of Czechoslovakia, Ota Šik, State Secretary Hajek, and two other ministers and high party and state officials from Czechoslovakia. All were depressed and scared, but allowed to continue with political work as part of the legal Czechoslovak government. 65During the day, a note on the conversation between the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Belgrade with Deputy State Secretary Mišo Pavićević was delivered to Tito. The Yugoslavs were informed about the Soviet ambassador in the United States Anatolii Dobrynin’s conversation with the U.S. president Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Probably the Soviets’ position, which stressed how no “state interests of the U.S. or any other country” were to be endangered by the “fraternal” intervention of five countries in Czechoslovakia, garnered significant attention. 66What the Yugoslav leading politicians probably did not know was how almost indifferent President Johnson’s reaction to Dobrynin’s message was. Johnson had promised to study the paper, immediately changing the conversation to the arms control talks. 67Tito had opened the emergency joint session of the presidency and the Executive Committee of the CC of League of Communists of Yugoslavia by saying how a public demonstration must be made, and it was! The very next day, Mijalko Todorović Plavi, secretary of the Executive Committee of the CC League of Communists of Yugoslavia ( Savez komunista Jugoslavije or LCY) addressed 250,000 people in Belgrade. During his speech, he used a phrase which eventually became quoted relatively often. The “most glorious flag of world communism,” muddied in 1948, has now fallen. 68Tito, who was addressing the gathered delegates on the Brijuni Islands, repeated that there were no reasons for the intervention because West Germany was not threatening Czechoslovakia, and socialism there was not endangered from within:

The case here is not only Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact it is about us. We are the real opposition to the Soviet leadership with our internal development, with our determination not to allow interference in our internal issues. It is understandable; an attack on Czechoslovakia does not mean that one day we might not be attacked, too. 69

On 23 August 1968, the party CC met in Belgrade. Before his comrades had a chance to say anything, Tito stressed that the news from Czechoslovakia had made him dizzy. 70Later that day, he met Bruce Elbrick, the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia. 71The purpose of the “occupation of Czechoslovakia” was to undermine the Socialist development based on the democracy, Tito concluded. Aware that Yugoslav-Soviet relations would not stay as good as they were, Tito was clear-minded regarding how global considerations this time were much more important for the Yugoslavs, which was why Yugoslavia would stay firm on the position of independence, equality, and noninterference. 72If relations between the Socialist countries were not based on equality, how could they ask for equal treatment from the capitalist countries, asked Tito. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Marko Nikezić was more direct in his conversation with the U.S. ambassador a few days later. He reminded Elbrick of their conversation in July when the American had stated how Washington’s goal was not to complicate further the Czechoslovaks’ situation. At the same time, they were not ready to endanger relationships with their “big partner.” 73Closer negotiations between Moscow and Washington were positive, but not at the expense of the small and weak, the Yugoslav secretary concluded.

Less than twenty-four hours later on August 24, on the Romanian’s initiative, Tito met Ceaus¸escu in Vršac, Vojvodina. 74The Romanian dictator had informed Tito about the founding of the Patriotic Guard which was tasked with defending the independence of their “Socialist motherland.” Ceaus¸escu went further, asking whether the Yugoslavs would have allowed armed Romanian forces to occupy Yugoslav territory, if they were not planning on shooting at the Soviets if attacked. The Yugoslav leader had promised to receive only unarmed individuals or to disarm soldiers before they crossed the border. 75In the report given to the Soviets by the Hungarian diplomats in Belgrade, Tito was very depressed during the meeting. “The good atmosphere we had been creating for years, has suddenly gone,” Tito said. 76Moreover,

American Cold War policy brought the USA to isolation. The foreign policy of France had undermined the unity of the imperialist countries. There was a crisis in NATO. Socialism was a general tendency in the developing countries. There was a growing tendency to democratization in the Socialist countries. That has all changed now. The only side benefiting from this was the United States and reactionary forces. The root of evil is in the Soviet leadership. 77

The Soviets were, as always, unwilling to admit any mistake, which was part of how they suppressed the independence of other countries. As well as the Romanians, Yugoslav politicians were ready to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs were, nevertheless, determined to fight, but not to continue with their provocations. They were aware of the differences between the “Five.” As a matter of fact, the Yugoslav diplomats in Prague were informed of the same. Polish diplomat Stičinski, who was far from friendly when Dubček became the first secretary, had admitted that he was to defend the opinion of his government in spite of the “huge loss of prestige of all Warsaw Pact countries.” 78It was impossible to prove or disprove that counterrevolution was taking place in Prague. Certainly, there was no invitation sent to invade Czechoslovakia. Propaganda preparation was bad, and Radio Vltava horrible, Štičinski said.

On 31 August 1968, Tito was back on the Brijuni Islands. Ivan Benediktov, the Soviet representative in Belgrade, came to deliver his demarche protesting the anti-Soviet propaganda. Benediktov was cold and professional. His presumptuous way of talking and the information he shared about the mistreatment of Yugoslavs in Moscow had annoyed Tito. He was interrupting the Soviet ambassador, saying many undiplomatic things. The Kremlin was listening to Walter Ulbricht and Todor Zhivkov, rather than Tito. Lyndon Johnson was probably the only one happy with the intervention, Tito said to the Soviet ambassador. The Soviets were spreading “obvious lies” when talking about Yugoslavia. 79Sergei Astavin, head of the Fifth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, while complaining to the Yugoslav diplomats in Moscow about the harsh reactions from Belgrade, expressed his surprise. The Yugoslavs, he said, “were informed” of the Soviet intention to use troops in Czechoslovakia. 80

Belgrade was determined to resist. The Americans and the British were ready to help, at least to a certain extent. On 27 August 1968, Ivo Sarajčić, the Yugoslav ambassador in London, had approached the British authorities. If the decision was not to interfere in the Lager , what would be the policy toward the states outside the blocs, he asked? 81Only one day later, Sarajčić was approached by the former British Foreign Office boss George Brown. He wanted Sarajčić to inform Belgrade how any threat to Yugoslav security would be responded to in kind. He was clear that Britain would threaten with force all those who would dare to do the same to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav ambassador in the United States, Bogdan Crnobrnja, had approached Dean Rusk, the U.S. secretary of state, on 29 August with no particular requests to make, only stressing his country’s determination to fight back if attacked. 82The Western countries had promised to help Belgrade in the event of a Soviet military intervention. The “occupation of Yugoslavia or Austria would have a particularly serious effect on NATO interests and it follows from this that any threat to or attack upon either of these countries would create a tense political atmosphere,” said the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Defense Policy Staff in London. 83Dean Rusk even stressed how the eventual Soviet presence on the Adriatic “was of vital concern to the entire Western world.” 84There was a panic in Belgrade and on the Brijuni Islands for a few days. As soon as it became clear how firm the guarantees from the West were and how small the Soviet interest to intervene, big changes began to take place in Yugoslavia.