Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

The Hungarian leaders came to play an important role in drafting the final communiqué. The Soviets had originally proposed to itemize in detail the tasks and obligations of the Czecho slovak leaders in the communiqué. Because this would have constituted a blatant interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, it was unacceptable for the Hungarians. During a break at the close of the meeting, Prime Minister Jeno“ Fock told the Czechoslovak delegation that a communiqué of this sort might have disastrous consequences for the Prague leaders and that they must on no account allow that to happen. Drahomir Kolder felt that mentioning all these points in the communiqué would be tantamount to a death sentence for all of them. Kádár, the master of compromise, insisted that at least mention must be made of the discussion of these points in the course of the negotiations “for if we don’t mention that, the world will make fun of us for not having discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia at this juncture.” Dubček signaled his agreement to the communiqué mentioning that the KSČ had informed the other parties about the situation in their country. Then Brezhnev entered and announced that a new text was being drafted in which Czechoslovakia was not mentioned. The Hungarians said they had just struck a compromise with the Czechoslovaks. Thus the final draft of the communiqué was written by a Soviet-Czechoslovak-Hungarian “ad hoc committee.” 43

The meeting in Dresden fell short of reaching its aims. Despite the “fraternal” parties’ warnings, the Czechoslovak leadership failed to halt democratization and attempted to paint the whole process as a renewal of socialism. In a manner that was actually rather naïve, they continued to believe that this was not going to endanger the position of the Communist Party.

In view of the latest developments, Brezhnev summed up his assessment of the situation in a conversation with Kádár on 16 April: “We are about to lose Czechoslovakia.” He hinted at the necessity for the fraternal parties to meet again in secret very soon to discuss the situation; this time without the KSČ. Kádár signaled his readiness to attend this meeting. However, as he sensed that the handling of the crisis was about to undergo a drastic qualitative change, he demurred that “he could not envisage discussing [the Czechoslovaks’] fate in their absence.” 44

In spite of Kádár’s doubts, this undesirable situation materialized very soon, and at the Moscow meeting on 8 May the only option left to the Hungarian party leader was an attempt to convince his comrades that the present Czechoslovak leadership only needed sufficient support in order to get the situation back under control. However, the representatives of the other parties who had assembled in Moscow saw the situation as indisputably counterrevolutionary and the KSČ leaders as incapable of consolidating it. From this date onward, the idea was gaining ground that consolidation through political means was to be achieved by “healthy forces” seizing power internally. Kádár acknowledged in his statement that there was rampant anarchy in Czechoslovakia and that this fact was being exploited by antisocialist forces. The leadership was weak, divided, and unable to control state or society. There was, however, no doubt that it was engaged in a two-front struggle. This was to be welcomed, and there was no alternative in any case. He called the KSČ’s Action Program a “big zero” because it could be interpreted at will either as a defense of socialism or as its abandonment. What it meant depended on what people wanted to read into it. So the situation was indeed dangerous, but counterrevolution had not yet gained the upper hand in the country. 45Kádár therefore proposed that in assessing the situation simplistic schemata should “be replaced by societal analyses, by the analysis of necessities.” To illustrate the point he was trying to make, he chose examples that cannot have been to the Soviets’ or any of the others’ liking, for he appeared to caricature the simplifications endemic to the Eastern Bloc: “For instance, if you call Mao Tse-tung and his clique insane, Castro a petty bourgeois, Ceaus¸escu a nationalist, the Czechoslovaks crazy, you have not actually done anything to deal with the underlying problems.” 46After that, he emphasized that “the struggle would ultimately be decided in Czechoslovakia, in the party, by the working class, by the people. This sets out clear boundaries for our actions: to do everything on the one hand to make a communist solution to this difficult situation possible and on the other to do nothing that might give comfort to our enemies.” 47He was certain that there would be those that advocated a military solution, so he closed with a plea for restraint, saying that he, too, was in favor of using military maneuvers as a means to exercise pressure on both the Czechoslovak leadership and on the people, yet “the problem cannot be solved by military means alone; the political issues are too complex for that.” He used a curious example to illustrate that point: “One should bear in mind for instance that Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary in 1956 and that it was their deployment that served as a pretext for the counterrevolution.” 48He was trying to make the others, most notably Brezhnev, understand that there was an enormous difference between the stationing of Soviet troops and their deployment to restore order, and that the latter could easily backfire.

In this speech, Kádár did no less than rewrite history, at least for the benefit of those who were present, by fundamentally reinterpreting the causes of the “counterrevolution” that had officially been diagnosed in December 1956: the mistakes of the Rákosi-Gero“ group, the treachery of the Nagy group, and the disruptive and destructive influence of internal and external reactionary forces. What he was actually saying amounted to a claim that the intervention of the Soviet troops, whose aim had been the restoration of order following the outbreak of the armed revolt on 23 October, had caused the escalation of the revolution and of the anti-Soviet freedom struggle. This assessment of the sequence of events is indeed borne out by the latest research. 49Through this interpretation, Kádár was indirectly blaming the Soviet Union for the consequences of the revolution of 1956.

Kádár was soon given an opportunity to play again the role of mediator that he had assumed from the beginning: he was asked to influence Dubček. The visit of the Czechoslovak leaders that had originally been planned for March finally took place on 13 and 14 June, and a delegation consisting of party and government representatives left Prague for the Hungarian capital. 50In order not to leave anything to chance, Brezhnev telephoned Kádár on the previous day and urged him to help Dubček understand “the dangers that are threatening the KSČ, socialism and himself.” If they wanted to count on Soviet support, then the least they had to do was get the mass media under their control and detach and distance themselves from the revisionist group. 51After the Moscow meeting of the “Five,” this visit had something of a demonstrative character anyway, which was further enhanced by the renewal for another twenty years of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the ČSSR and the People’s Republic of Hungary. In public, Kádár assured the Czechoslovak leadership of his support for their efforts to consolidate the situation. In private, however, he sounded a note of warning. The Hungarian experiences of 1956 showed that it was necessary to curb democratization and to draw an unmistakable line against deviations and hostile tendencies; otherwise, the party was bound to lose control. Dubček replied in a selfconfident vein: