Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

On 12 March, Brezhnev took the “initiative” out of the hands of “mediators.” He was now saying that dangerous tendencies were becoming apparent in Prague that were spreading to the military as well and that this made a meeting necessary. At first, Gomułka was in favor of inviting Novotný and suggested Moravska Ostrava as a possible venue for the meeting, yet after learning about Kádár’s proposal, he, too, favored a reduction of the number of participants; he would even have agreed to limiting the invitation to the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. 34On the next day, Brezhnev announced that he had spoken to Dubček on the phone and had mentioned the proposal of a meeting. Dubček had reacted positively, saying he would give his answer later. Brezhnev told Kádár that the Soviet leadership was examining a variety of moves, among others also inviting Dubček to Moscow, and signaled that “certain other measures would be taken as well,” which he was not prepared to discuss on the phone, even if it was supposedly tap-proof. This meant, in other words, that preparations for a military solution were underway. 35On 16 March, Brezhnev told Kádár that Dubček still welcomed the idea of a meeting, but had as yet been unable to commit himself to any details. He had, however, mentioned that he was going to speak to Kádár and perhaps even to travel to Hungary for discussions with him. Brezhnev noted that “it was obvious that Dubček was eagerly looking forward to meeting Comrade Kádár; the relationship is a very good one and marked by complete trust.” Brezhnev was trying to curry favor with Kádár for a good reason: mutual trust would stand him in good stead in the realization of their common goal. He signaled approval of the idea; in a bilateral meeting, Kádár would be able to address their common worries and problems and prepare the ground for the four-party meeting. 36

Dubček, however, changed his mind in the meantime, abandoned the idea of going to Hungary, and informed Brezhnev on 19 March that he was ready for a meeting. He named Dresden as a possible venue because he had never been to the GDR and considered Dresden neutral territory. In light of the GDR leadership’s point of view, 37Dubček’s proposal does not really make sense in retrospect. What is even more curious is the fact that in the meantime Dubček had even adopted Brezhnev’s idea of the smoke screen; he suggested making the meeting appear like an “economic forum,” which would necessitate including the heads of the planning boards. 38What he was probably hoping for from this solution was that it might make it easier for him to ward off both international and national criticism of the Czechoslovak leadership’s decision to take part in a meeting whose main topic was bound to be an assessment of the situation in Czechoslovakia. In the literature on the Prague Spring, the myth, born in 1968 and still generally surviving, suggests that the Czechoslovak delegation was ensnared in Dresden only to realize the true nature of the meeting after its opening. Now it is obvious, however, that Dubček was aware of the situation from the outset and it was precisely him, who “forgot” to inform his colleagues. Thus the rest of the Czechoslovak delegation was sincerely shocked when they recognized the trap.

Brezhnev had, therefore, achieved his goal. All that remained to be done for him was to ensure that the Bulgarians were going to take part. To “soften up” Kádár, he told him that Gomułka had already agreed in principle. 39

The same day also saw a session of the Politburo of the HSWP. Several members of that body viewed the meeting with considerable anxiety; they were worried that it might be construed as a clear case of interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and, therefore, inflict unnecessary political damage on the Prague leadership. The proposal was floated to hold the meeting in Budapest. Quite a few asked Kádár to advise the Czechoslovak leaders not to go to Dresden on account of the dangers lurking for them there.

Kádár had not anticipated such a critical attitude on the part of his Politburo. The thought that, in a situation where Brezhnev had finally succeeded in persuading Dubček to attend the meeting, it might fall to him to “abort” the plan quite obviously rattled him. Political maneuvering, manipulation, and the untiring search for compromise formulas were definitely Kádár’s strong points yet it was unthinkable for him to thwart openly Brezhnev’s intentions. He therefore told the Politburo in a long argumentation that there was simply no way the meeting could now not take place. He did not even shirk from using arguments the implausibility of which he himself was perfectly aware. For instance, he wound up his speech by saying that “it was possible for the meeting to have no other result than to convince us, the others, of the necessity to support wholeheartedly the concept of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Party.” He then added in a more realistic vein, signaling his own doubts: “If this becomes apparent there, then that in itself would be no mean result.” 40Kádár telephoned Moscow on the same day to inform the Soviets about the positive result of the Politburo session, yet he added that this body “had reacted to the proposal with mixed emotions because they did not expect much good to come of it and they foresaw a negative echo both inside and outside Czechoslovakia.” 41

In Dresden, Kádár attempted to divide his efforts out of genuine conviction evenly between the two goals he had set himself: to assure the Czechoslovak leaders of his unqualified support and, at the same time, to point out to them emphatically the dangers inherent in the present situation. In his speech, he underlined the Hungarian leadership’s solidarity with the KSČ; what was happening in Czechoslovakia had to be considered an internal affair of that country in which no one was entitled to interfere. He urged solving the present problems in a manner that would result in a strengthened Socialist system. He also pointed out that the leadership was not unified and that there could be no successful conclusion to the present troubles without unity. A second precondition for victory, according to Kádár, was a recognition of the necessity to wage consistently a two-front war to fight for the correction of mistakes that had been made in the construction of socialism prior to January 1968 and to fight antisocialist phenomena and tendencies. Kádár spoke at length on his view that Czechoslovakia had not yet—contrary to the assertions of Brezhnev and Gomułka—reached the stage of counterrevolution; there was, however, that danger because the present situation resembled in a number of ways the one that preceded the Hungarian “counterrevolution” of 1956. He expressed the hope that the outcome would be different in Czechoslovakia. The most effective argument that Kádár advanced was that the people who had brought about the Hungarian crisis had not been ardent counterrevolutionaries either. Rather, they had been a confused lot without firm convictions, who had rallied to the cry of putting the resolutions of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) into practice and had caused tremendous damage without intending to do so: they had opened the gates of the Socialist fortress to the class enemy. In case this was not yet powerful enough as a warning note, Kádár added for good measure: Imre Nagy had not been a conscious counterrevolutionary aiming for regime change; he was carried away by the events of 25 and 26 October and made common cause with the class enemy. Finally, Kádár said quite bluntly to the Czechoslovak delegates: “These events can turn any one of you into an Imre Nagy.” 42Because Kádár was the only representative of the five parties openly to support the Dubček leadership and to maintain that the solution of the Czechoslovaks’ problems was exclusively their own concern, his speech was the most liberal at the meeting in Dresden. Conversely, it must be said that his remarks about Nagy were by far the bluntest reference to a worst-case scenario; everyone knew that Nagy had been executed.