Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

If the antisocialist forces were to become so powerful as to endanger the socialist system, they [Dubček and the other leaders] would not hesitate to confront them and neither their hands nor their knees would be trembling as they did so. They were powerful enough to call those who were scheming against the socialist system to account, even if there was the threat of external interference. 52

This determination began to sound increasingly hollow to Moscow, and the news from Prague was ever more worrisome. An article published by Literární Noviny on the tenth anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy, which called him wrongfully executed and a martyr, caused indignation in Budapest as well as in Moscow. Kádár considered this as sniping that was taking aim at him personally and at his support for the Prague leadership. What he found particularly galling was the fact that the leadership of KSČ did not react unequivocally to this provocation. The “2,000 Words” manifesto, which was published on 27 June, was counterrevolutionary in the eyes of the Hungarian leadership, and they expected it to draw a number of resolute administrative responses. In a letter to Dubček of 5 July, Kádár outlined in detail his utter condemnation of the two documents. Whereas in his reply Dubček classified the article on Nagy as a provocation, he defended the KSČ’s attitude concerning the “2,000 Words” by pointing out that the manifesto had produced no tangible result. 53It is important to declare that contrary to previous interpretations, neither the Nagy article nor the “2,000 Words” manifesto was a turning point in the policy of the Hungarian leadership, since the HSWP’s position remained to avoid a military solution at all costs, even in the middle of July.

Toward the end of June, Kádár traveled to Moscow at the head of a party delegation. Brezhnev painted a somber picture of the ČSSR: Dubček was gradually drifting to the right, the right was growing in strength, Czechoslovakia was getting ever closer to going down the road of Yugoslavia, and its further trajectory might even take it into the bourgeois camp. 54Brezhnev announced that Moscow was planning two moves: first, a letter to the KSČ and, second, another meeting with those of its allies who had been present in Dresden. Kádár agreed in principle, but remembering the negative Czechoslovak echoes of the meeting of the “Five” in Moscow in May, he underlined the crucial importance of allowing Czechoslovakia to participate in the meeting. The Hungarian leadership itself differed at that time from the Soviet line on a number of issues, such as economic relations with the West in general and relations with the FRG in particular, so it seemed important to maintain the goodwill of the Soviet leadership. Kádár presumably felt that the time had come to make it quite clear that, while the Hungarian party favored a political solution for the Czechoslovak crisis in principle, it would support a military intervention as a measure of last resort if a political settlement could not be achieved and the continued existence of the Socialist order was in danger. This had been his point of view all along yet from what he had said so far, the Soviets could not be sure. This is why his “declaration of loyalty” was so important. Kádár did not want to irritate Moscow with aberrations of which he was not guilty. The minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU of 3 July 1968 contain Brezhnev’s take on the topic: “In expound ing his thoughts on the Czechoslovak situation, Cde. Kádár said it was obvious that an occupation of Czechoslovakia was inevitable. ‘If this should become necessary, we will vote in favour of this move.’” 55In the version of the report prepared for the Politburo of the HSWP, this pledge is not mentioned. Nevertheless, we may follow Tibor Huszár in believing that Kádár actually made some similar statement, provided we assume that it was made in the dialectical form outlined above in which military intervention was seen as a measure of last resort.

Brezhnev distorted Kádár’s statement to foreground the part that he himself played and to be able to present it as evidence of an important political victory he had gained by forcing a wavering ally back into line with the rest of the Soviet camp. This was certainly the interpretation that the members of the Politburo of the CPSU made of it. 56It was by no means Brezhnev’s first “distortion” of Kádár’s point of view: in the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 17 July 1968, he claimed that in their assessment of the Czechoslovak situation at the Moscow meeting of the “Five” on 8 May there had been “unanimous agreement,” even though Kádár had put forward a point of view there that differed sharply from that of the others. 57

Kádár also came to play an important role in preparing the meeting of the “Warsaw Five” on 14 and 15 July in Warsaw. Brezhnev had informed the others on 9 July that the Presidium of the KSČ had on the previous day declined at short notice the invitation to another meeting of the six “Dresden” allies. Kádár was taken aback by the reaction of the KSČ, for during his visit to Budapest, Dubček had voiced his dissatisfaction with the fact that in May the “Five” had met for consultations in Moscow without the Czechoslovaks. This is why Kádár proposed a meeting between representatives of the KSČ and the CPSU within a day or two, which would be followed in seven to ten days’ time by a meeting of the six allies. This would allow the leaders from Prague sufficient time to do their homework. If they were to decline this invitation as well, then the meeting would have to go ahead without them. 58On the next day, Presidium member Oldřich Švestka, one of the representatives of the “healthy forces” told János Gosztonyi, editorin-chief of the HSWP’s daily who had been sent by Kádár on a secret mission to Prague to gather firsthand information, that the Presidium of the KSČ had come out unanimously against the proposal. Kádár therefore, echoing Švestka, told Brezhnev that the Warsaw meeting was making the situation of the left more difficult by shifting the center to the right. 59Vasil Bil’ak, another representative of the “healthy forces,” had been in Budapest a few days before; in his talks with Kádár and György Aczél, he had repeatedly stressed that Czechoslovakia was capable of solving its problems on its own and needed no help from outside. 60Kádár therefore suggested to Brezhnev wording the letter to the KSČ in a tone that would make the Czechoslovaks’ participation possible. He added for tactical reasons that the topic of the talks had better not be the situation in Czechoslovakia; each party was to be asked to report on its own situation. 61

In this difficult situation, Dubček asked Kádár urgently to meet him in secret. The meeting took place on 13 July on Hungarian soil, in Komárom. Yet the hopes of Dubček and his companion Černík were disappointed. Instead of offering assurances of continued support, Kádár and Fock severely criticized them for declining to take part in the Warsaw meeting. Kádár told them not only that this had been their worst mistake since January, but that they had also reached a point of no return, which meant “that we have parted ways and will be fighting on opposing sides.” 62

When Kádár set out for the meeting in Warsaw on 14 and 15 July he did so equipped with a resolution of the HSWP Politburo that continued to call for a political settlement for Czechoslovakia and that was designed to keep the leaders of the “fraternal parties” from opting for a “military solution.”

In Warsaw, Kádár stuck to his brief in his first speech. He reported on the meeting in Komárom and underlined the danger inherent in the country’s situation, which had, however, not yet reached the stage of counterrevolution. In the debate, Ulbricht and Zhivkov allowed themselves to be carried away in the moment for which there had been no parallel up to then: they not only resolutely and openly condemned Kádár’s point of view, but added (the former overtly, the latter indirectly) that it might well be the case for Hungary’s internal problems to be next in line for a solution at a comparable meeting of the “fraternal parties.” 63This was evidence for the emergence of a dangerous tendency that entitled “fraternal parties” to act as joint trouble shooters not only in crucial crises, but also in the context of developments or reforms that did not endanger socialism as such but were considered undesirable by the others. There was no doubt that Hungary was a case in point at that time. 64Kádár therefore thought it advisable to repeat in front of the present company the “declaration of loyalty” he had issued two weeks before in Moscow in order to calm everyone down. He unexpectedly rose to his feet a second time and announced: “We unreservedly agree with the explanations and conclusions of our Soviet comrades and are prepared to take part in any joint action.” 65Although this was a serious violation of the HSWP’s resolution, taking this step was arguably facilitated for Kádár by Brezhnev’s making it clear in his speech that despite pressure from the others no final decision would be reached at the meeting itself. Kádár was, therefore, still free, even though he had “publicly” committed himself to agreeing in principle to an ultimate military solution, to work toward a political settlement in the background. Yet the chances for such a settlement were dwindling.