Вил Мирзаянов - State Secrets - An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

I was summoned for the next interrogation on April 12, 1993. A surprise was waiting there for my lawyer and me – the lists of secrets [163] EXTRACT from “The List of Major Information Constituting State Secrets”, confirmed by resolution N 1121-387 of USSR Counsel of Ministers on December 3, 1980. Top Secret. See Annex 32. , [164] EXTRACT from the “The List of Information to be Qualified as Secret by the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry” confirmed by order N 234-19 of the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry on May 27 1991. Top Secret. See Annex 33. and the results [165] FINDINGS OF THE EXPERT COMMISSION Moscow March 16, 1993. Top Secret. See Annex 34. The refusal of experts Vadim Smirnitsky and Nikolai Chugunov entirely destroyed this job of Shkarin. Moreover, their conclusions and testimonies didn’t leave any chance for the Findings of the Expert Commission to be used in the final Indictment. of the work of the expert commission. On that day I wasn’t ready to change my tactics for my behavior at the interrogations, which is evident from the following passage from the transcript of interrogation, which I also refused to sign. However, after that I changed my mind, following the advice of my lawyer Asnis, because we had already partially reached our objective. First, the expert commission was split in its decision, and the respectable and authoritative specialists, General Vadim V. Smirnitsky and Colonel Nikolai I. Chugunov, didn’t agree with the “opinion” of other members, which completely matched the resolution of the Permanent Technical Commission at GOSNIIOKhT, [166] See ref. 86. with the exception that from it I disclosed “…the cooperation of designers and manufacturers…” naming test sites and locations of production of chemical weapons.

What is more, Asnis and I found another of their declarations most useful for my defense: “The commission has no information (documents) at its disposal at this time about any negative consequences that Mirzayanov’s actions caused.” In other words, the KGB’s vaunted experts stated that my ostensible crime was a victimless one. Also, the investigator finally produced all the lists of secrets that we had been requesting, for such a long time. Nonetheless, at a later date, in violation of all the norms of the Criminal and Procedural Code, Investigator Shkarin did not include these materials in my case (he included only extracts of them), and this is why I couldn’t copy them and make them public. However, I managed to copy some of the necessary excerpts regarding the essence of state secrets in the area of scientific research work on weapons. This is why during the next interrogation that took place on April 14, 1993, I worked very hard, reading everything attentively, and copied the parts I found most interesting. Upon the recommendation of my lawyer, I also wrote a petition in which I asked to submit a request for clarification of the terms used on the lists for interpreting chemical weapons. I remember that on all the lists of information that constitute state secrecy, there was not a single word about chemical weapons, or their development and testing. Instead of this the experts and the investigator used general terms such as “ammunition”. The situation was exactly the same with the notion of the “special purpose program” for the development of weapons, the information from which I had allegedly disclosed. For these reasons I insisted on my arguments at the interrogation on April 15, 1993. In particular, in answering the usual question of the investigator about what “explanations I could give regarding the materials that were shown to me”, I declared:

“I read the resolutions and Lists of Information of state secrecy that were presented to me, and I am submitting a request about elaborating on the question about specifying whether all the lists shown to me – and in particular clauses which the experts refer to in their resolution – are aimed at protecting information about scientific research in the area of the development of chemical weapons in our country, because in the texts of the lists there are no terms “chemical armaments,” “chemical weapons,” or “military chemical agents.” The list of the Ministry of Chemical Industry only contains the terms “model chemical agents of the probable enemy,” “objects of chemical weapons destruction,” and “means of chemical defense.” Additionally, I request that expert Nikolai I. Chugunov be interrogated and asked what, from the point of view of the requirements produced, falls into the notion “special purpose program for scientific research” and whether it is possible to say that I disclosed the final results of some specific program for scientific research. I also request that the experts who signed the general findings be interrogated about their conclusions about the precise wording of Clause 56 of the Temporary List of Information of State Secrecy. I consider it necessary to state that the list of the Ministry of Chemical Industry dated January 1, 1993, is no longer valid because, since according to Clause 1 of this list, it is based on the List of Information of State Secrecy (compiled in 1980), which became invalidated on January 1, 1993.”

I should mention that beginning in January 1, 1993, the new List of Information of State Secrecy, which practically repeats the words of the old one, was introduced in Russia, and it also lacks any kind of wording about chemical weapons.

This conclusion came as no surprise to me, because the majority of the members of the expert commission were representatives of the military-chemical complex. These people were much more guided by their official responsibilities than by their feelings of civic duty. The fact that the experts Major General Vadim V. Smirnitsky (whose military rank was not listed in the document) and Colonel Nikolai I. Chugunov refused to sign this conclusion confirms this. Each of them wrote his own personal conclusion, in which each denied that I had disclosed any state secrets. Their conclusions could be summed up as follows from the resolution written by Nikolai Chugunov: [167] “CONCLUSION OF THE EXPERT Nikolai Chugunov”, March 18, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 35.

“If the indicated information is true, it can’t constitute a state or a work-related secret because it doesn’t contain specific facts about the structure of the new chemical agent; therefore, its disclosure can’t have a negative impact on the quality of the military and economic potential of the country or have any other grave consequences for the defensive capability, or the state security, or seriously damage the political interests of the state, or damage the state in any other way.”

General Smirnitsky stressed in his conclusions [168] “CONCLUSION OF THE EXPERT Vadim Smirnitsky”, March 17, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 38. that the information about the newly synthesized chemical agent didn’t disclose:

-its name (conventional or chemical);

-its physical or chemical properties, which are indispensable characteristics of any synthesized product;

-the name and quantitative ratio of the components of the binary system, without this the notion “binary bomb” makes no sense;

-information about what types of ammunition the new chemical agent is intended for;

- or information about whether the chemical agent was adopted by the army.

Victor Shkarin tried to lessen the significance of the conclusions written by the respectable veterans of the Chemical Troops, and he conducted additional interrogations [169] “TRANSCRIPT of the interrogation of the expert Nikolai Chugunov”, April 8, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 36. , [170] “TRANSCRIPT of the interrogation of the expert Nikolai Chugunov”, April 23, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 37. , [171] “TRANSCRIPT of interrogation of the expert Vadim Smirnitsky”, March 22, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 39. to “clarify” their positions, which were already quite obvious. They didn’t change their minds, which of course was a serious blow for the carefully concocted “findings” of the Investigation Department. During the interrogation on April 23, 1993 Nikolai Chugunov entirely destroyed one of the main accusatory tricks of Shkarin. When he asked Chugunov about my alleged disclosure of the results of the “goal-oriented program” he said, “It’s difficult for me to answer the question as to whether Mirzayanov revealed the results of some kind of concrete program of scientific research work, because the materials presented to the Expertise don’t contain any information about a concrete program of scientific research and its elements”. Defiant Shkarin tried to save the situation by using the term “goal-oriented program” and immediately sent a letter to Director Petrunin [172] Letter of Head of the section at the Department of Investigation, A. A. Shabunin to V. A. Petrunin, Director of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology April 22, 1993 6/001580. Top Secret. See Annex 44. asking for clarification, but the director [173] Letter of Deputy Director of GRNIIOKhT N.A. Kuznetsov to A.A. Shabunin, Head of the Section of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Top Secret. See Annex 45. was almost helpless to respond because there was no real goal-oriented program, except for the General Directives for the creation of a new chemical agent. I was certain that such a “special purpose program” for the development of chemical weapons had never existed and does not exist today. After this crash, Captain of Justice Shkarin simply erased all references to a “goal-oriented program” from all copies of the lists of state secrets quoted in the case and edited their items as if they never ever contained any of those words. He also deleted this from all the other documents and transcripts of interrogations attached to the case except for the letters.