Вил Мирзаянов - State Secrets - An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

I asked Uglev to be extremely careful in his dealings with Lev Fedorov. As I understood, Fedorov’s major objective in his relations with Uglev and me was to obtain any kind of information, which he would later use for writing his articles, and for passing himself off as a prominent specialist in chemical weapons. It was more than a provocation at that time, when my lawyer and I were trying with all our might to prove that I hadn’t disclosed any state secrets connected with the technical side of the problems of chemical weapons.

A vivid illustration of this is Fedorov’s article in which he deliberately and nonchalantly described the formula of Substance 33 and the principle of binary weapons based on it, passing himself off as an outstanding specialist in the sphere of chemical weapons. [153] Lev Fedorov, “Chemical Weapons or Chemical Warfare?”, Khimia i Jizn , N 7, 1993, p. 67.

Of course it was no big secret to the FSB (the KGB), where this information was really coming from. Uglev was soon under the threat of being charged with disclosing state secrets, and the Saratov department of the FSB started an investigation. Before that Vladimir Uglev gave a sensational interview to Novoe Vremya . In this interview, he confirmed my account about the toxicity of the new chemical agents and spoke about the history of their development at the Volsk branch of GOSNIIOKhT. He said that precursors of these agents were not included on the lists of substances controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Moreover, he claimed that a batch of the components of binary weapons was stockpiled at a secret base in the Bryansk Region. Uglev shared my apprehensions that the components of binary weapons, based on the new agent, could be disguised as civilian products, which would make international control much more difficult. [154] Oleg Vishnyakov, “Interview with a Noose around his Neck”, Novoe Vremya , N 6, 1993, p. 40.

I don’t doubt a bit that Uglev’s position was sincere. He always adhered to it when he gave interviews to the press. It was extremely important to me that one more person from the military-chemical complex was earnestly struggling against chemical weapons and wasn’t afraid of persecution.

We developed rather good relations and met from time to time when he came to Moscow. During these meetings, which took place in my apartment, we openly discussed the problems connected with the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. I was certain that the KGB recorded our conversations because I knew its surveillance techniques. However, this didn’t worry me because we didn’t discuss any technical secrets.

Vladimir was a courageous person, and he didn’t hesitate in the face of impending danger. He was driven by his adamant belief that it was necessary to take such actions for the good of the people.

In the middle of January 1993, a hearing was held at the RF Supreme Soviet on the problem of destroying the stockpiles of chemical weapons. It took place in the While House on the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment, which less than a year later would be shot up by tanks, driving out coup supporters headed up by adventurous Russian Vice President Aleksander Rutskoi, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and specialist in Marxist political economy, Ruslan Khasbulatov.

I went to this hearing at the invitation of Valeri Menshikov, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Ecology, with whom I had established good relations. There I met many active participants in the ecological movement who were worried that chemical weapons would be destroyed without the necessary safety precautions.

Vladimir Petrenko stood out among this group because of his picturesque beard. It turned out that he had served in Military Unit 61469 in Shikhany. There the young officer, along with others, was recruited as a guinea pig for the testing of chemical weapons. These experiments were very cheap for the military unit. The officers participating in the experiment each received an insignificant bonus. However, Petrenko almost totally lost his health due to his patriotic impulse, so he was transferred to the reserve. His attempts to receive some kind of compensation resulted in his being charged with slandering the chiefs of the military unit. For a long time he couldn’t even receive his small disability allowance. Attempts to address the public were even more costly. His wife was fired from her job at the same military unit, and they started to evict the Petrenko family from their apartment in Shikhany. Later Petrenko’s “case” became widely known, [155] Gordeyev, Alexander, “Chemical Arms: Russia’s Human Guinea Pig”, The Moscow Times , March 18, 1994; Will Englund, “Chemical Weapons Shadow Moscow. Russia prosecutes whistle-blowers of secret research”, Baltimore Sun , February 14, 1993; J. Michael Waller, “Post-Soviet Sakharovs: Renewed Persecution of Dissident Scientists and the American Response”, Demokratizatsiya , The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization , v. II, N 1, Winter 1993/94, p. 138-147. and he devoted the rest of his life to struggling against the barbaric destruction of chemical weapons at the military test site.

All of the official speakers at the meeting appeared completely insipid and couldn’t bring any arguments in support of their projects, other than promising “we will do it.” Critical statements by activists from the ecological movement, who arrived from the regions where chemical weapons were stockpiled, added fuel to the fire. They were talking about inadequate storage conditions and barbaric methods of destruction that threatened the safety and health of the surrounding populations.

For example, activists from Novocheboksarsk criticized the military-chemical complex’s project for destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons at the chemical plant that used to produce chemical agents. The plant’s proximity to the city’s densely populated districts was already the reason for the deterioration of the health of the local people, and the generals wanted to keep poisoning people, while destroying the stores of chemical weapons. Even from a purely psychological standpoint, people didn’t want to hear that chemical weapons would be destroyed near their homes. However, this never occurred to the functionaries from the Committee for Conventional Problems.

Despite the ongoing investigation and endless interrogations, I tried to participate in various public events as much as possible. In particular, I went to the conference “The KGB Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow” organized by Sergei Grigoriyants. The conference participants, including many former dissidents who had endured all the horrors of the Soviet concentration camps, greeted me warmly, saying that they supported me in my struggle against the KGB. Of course I was very glad that these people considered me an insider.

In 1992 a ruthless and bitter campaign unfolded in the Russian press and television against the Republic of Tatarstan, when it announced its intention of conducting a referendum on the independence of the republic. At this time the Tatar Nation saw the prospect of freedom somewhere on the horizon for the first time in many centuries of slavery. Many representatives of our nation were optimistic about it, but by the end of the 20 thcentury, the Tatar Nation found itself in a very thorny situation. Lenin’s national policy wasn’t the only reason for the degradation of my people as these “democrats” were saying. They claimed that 70 years of the sins of Communism were to blame for everything. Mostly the problems of the Tatar Nation were the result of imperial policy aimed at forced Russification of their colonies and the ruthless plunder of the Tatar national resources – namely oil.