Вил Мирзаянов - State Secrets - An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

Trying to repair the damage, Shkarin also interrogated the members of the expert commission Anatoly Kochetkov, [174] “TRANSCRIPT of interrogation of the expert Anatoly Kochetkov”, March 30, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 40. Boris Kuznetsov [175] “TRANSCIRPT of interrogation of the expert Boris Kuznetsov”, April 8, 1993, Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 41. and Igor Gabov. [176] “TRANSCRIPT of interrogation of the expert Igor Gabov”, April 29, 1993, Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 42. The first two of them surprisingly “admitted” that Mirzayanov meant the new chemical agent A-232 in the article “A Poisoned Policy”. I had never used this codename in my publications and interviews, and I didn’t mention the term “Novichok” either. Before these experts testified, Andrei Zheleznyakov and Vladimir Uglev [177] See ref. 154. , [178] See ref. 128. had publicly disclosed them. I didn’t understand why Shkarin created this perfidy, until the case went to trial.

There was already a greater blunder in the works, apart from the mistakes mentioned above regarding the arbitrary interpretation of the terms on the lists of secrets, where even the words “chemical weapons” weren’t to be found. We also insisted that if all lists of state secrets didn’t contain any definition of chemical weapons or chemical agents, then it would not be legal to apply them to my case. The definition “ammunitions” from any reasonable point of view cannot be applied to chemical weapons or chemical agents. Certainly the Investigation Department was in an awkward situation to argue with this logic. To try to save the situation, the Investigation Department of the MB RF sent a letter to General Staff Headquarters of Russia. [179] Letter of Head of the Investigation Department MB RF, Major General S.D. Balashov to Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov, Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, April 22, 1993 N 6/01584. Top Secret. See Annex 46. The answer was confusing, [180] Letter of Colonel G. Funygin, Deputy Head of the 8th Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department, of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, May 12, 1993 N 317/5/0 397 in response to N 6/01584. Top Secret. See Annex 47. though it slightly comforted the investigator. I consider it my duty to say that both the request and the answer are highly provocative.

Those who compiled the new list of secrets and those who interpreted it supposed that the development of chemical weapons would continue in the future. This is despite the fact that by September of 1992, when the new list of secrets was compiled and the term “chemical weapons” still wasn’t to be found there, the Chemical Weapons Convention had been initialed and Russia was one of the major participants of the negotiations. However, the signatories participating counted on secrecy and were certain that their secrets would never be made public.

Evidently, there was more than enough juridical “evidence” of my guilt, from the point of view of the investigation, to justify conducting closed legal proceedings.

On the other hand, the lists of secrets did not contain even an indirect reference to the development of chemical weapons, and it was impossible to ignore this deficit any further. General Balashov and his subordinates understood that if another specialist repeated my actions, they would have practically no legal basis for conducting a legitimate investigation. That is why General-Chekist Demin [181] He was one of initiators of my persecution who awkwardly tried to justify it at a press-conference in November 5 1992. See ref. 83. initiated the urgent adoption of an amendment to the Temporary List of Secrets. [182] “RESOLUTION of the Council of Ministers”, Moscow March 30, 1993, N 256-16. Top Secret. See Annex 43. The new Russian definition included “information that discloses the content of former or current works in the area of chemical or biological weapons, or the essence of those works, the results achieved, as well as information on the protocols of synthesis, production technologies, or articles of production equipment.” On March 30, 1993, it was issued in the form of Resolution N 256-16, signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

This was already quite a different story. Finally a real document was issued, in which for the first time in history Russia legally admitted that chemical weapons were being developed. I can say without any exaggeration that it appeared thanks to me.

Hopefully, after this resolution was passed my colleagues, the specialists in chemical weapons, finally got their chance to appeal to the authorities and ask to have their pensions increased to the level of other employees working in especially dangerous and hazardous conditions. However, they probably don’t know that such a document exists. This is another reason why I am disclosing this document. Of course the KGB didn’t have these noble objectives in mind when it composed this document. It was designed to accuse me by retroactively creating a quasi-legal base to prove my guilt. A number of U.S. human rights organizations, politicians, representatives to the United Nations and others immediately started paying attention to this after I sent the “Resolution” on to my friend Gale Colby, who is now my wife, along with other excerpts from my case.

The “experts” Anatoly Kochetkov 174and Boris Kuznetsov 175and others started constantly referring to this resolution during their additional interrogations in the Investigation Department. So then, there it was. There were no doubts left about how and why this hurriedly adopted government document appeared. With a goal of intimidating the American journalist Will Englund in April 9 1993, the Investigation Department summoned him for interrogation as a witness. [183] Pavel Gutiontov, “Let’s Begin with the American to Teach Others”, Moskovski Komsomolets , N 65, April 7 1993; Maksim Gun, “The American Journalist was interrogated in Lefortovo”, Izvestia , April 10, 1993. , [184] Kim Gamel, American Journalist Interrogated in Lefortovo, Moscow Tribune , April 9, 1993. , [185] Justin Burke, “US Reporter Called For Questioning By Russia’s KGB”, Christian Science Monitor , April 9, 1993. , [186] Jon Auerbach, “US reporter refuses to testify in Russia”, Boston Globe , April 8, 1993. Will Englund categorically refused to testify against me and didn’t sign the transcript of interrogation. Unfortunately his interpreter Andrei Mironov made a mistake and signed the interrogation transcript as the interpreter, which could be taken as Will’s refusal to sign this document – just because of his lack of knowledge of Russian.

The investigator had no clear legal grounds on which to base my indictment, and so he tried to compensate for this gap by speaking about the alleged serious damage that my publications caused to interests of the state. The List of Major Information of State Secrecy contained the definition of secrecy. Information was considered secret if its revelation resulted in damage to the defense capability, state, military, political, or other interests of the country. For this reason Shkarin appealed to a number of departments with respective inquiries. [187] Letter of the Head of Investigation Department Mayor General S.D. Balashov to Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov, Head of the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 6/01341/April 5, 1993. Secret. See Annex 48. , [188] Letter of Head of the General Staff , Colonel General M. Kolesnikov to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, April 29, 1993 N 312/10/053. In response to N 6 01341 of April 5, 1993. See Annex 49. , [189] Letter of Head of the Department Major General S.D. Balashov to V.P. Ivanov, Chairman of the RF Committee for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry , 6/01342 April 5, 1993. See Annex 50. , [190] Letter of Chairman V.P. Ivanov to S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Secret. See Annex 51. , [191] Letter of Head of the Department Major General S.D. Balashov to G.V. Berdennikov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 6/01343//April 5, 1993. Secret. See Annex 52. , [192] Letter of Deputy Minister of G.V. Berdennikov to S.D. Balashov, Head of Investigation Department at the RF Ministry of Security, May 11, 1993 N 61/drk. Secret. See Annex 53.