Oliver Stone - The Putin Interviews

VP:Yes, I talked about that publicly—including in Munich. And when the decision was made on the reunification of Germany, and back then, the dignitaries both in the United States and the United Nations Secretary General, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. They were all saying there was one thing that the Soviet Union could be sure of—that the eastern border of NATO would not be extended any further than the eastern border of the German Democratic Republic.

OS:So this was a clear violation. [29] Claim: “ OS: …there was a deal with the Soviet Union not to expand NATO eastward. VP: They were all saying there was one thing that the Soviet Union could be sure of—that the eastern border of NATO would not be extended any further than the eastern border of the German Democratic Republic. OS: So this was a clear violation.” Supporting: “Russia’s Got a Point: The US Broke a NATO Promise,” Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, LA Times (May 30, 2016). Retrieved at: http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shifrinson-russia-us-nato-deal--20160530-snap-story.html

VP:It was not enshrined on paper. It’s a mistake, but that mistake was made by Mr. Gorbachev. In politics, everything has to be enshrined on paper because even something which is enshrined can be violated often. And he just talked and he decided that that was enough. But that’s not the case. And after that there have been two waves of NATO expansion. Incidentally, I remember President Clinton and his last official visit here. We met in the adjacent room with him and with his delegation. And I told him—half-seriously/half as a joke—“probably Russia should think about joining NATO.” That’s what I told him. And his response was, “Why not? I think that’s possible.” But when we saw the reaction of his team, we understood that they were somewhat bewildered or even frightened by this idea.

OS:Did you really mean it?

VP:I said that I said it half-seriously/half as a joke. And what I really meant, I think I would rather not divulge it right now. But that’s what I told him and the reaction of his delegation was very cautious. And I can tell you why—because NATO, as far as I am concerned, is a remnant of the past. This organization emerged during the Cold War—between two systems. And as of now, NATO is a mere instrument of foreign policy of the United States. It has no allies within—it has only vassals. And I have a fairly good impression of how work is done within NATO. Someone can argue about some secondary issues. But as far as any serious issues are concerned, there is no discussion whatsoever within NATO. There are only two opinions in NATO—the American opinion and the wrong opinion.

OS:Well, it seems that you’re taking this change in the wind seriously.

VP:Just a second—I’d like to add something. Just imagine if Russia were part of NATO. Certainly we wouldn’t behave like that, because we have an opinion of our own on a great number of issues. And we would defend our opinion.

OS:So there is an advantage to joining it because you’re able to vote “no” on something.

VP:[laughs] I think that’s exactly what the delegation of the United States didn’t like about that idea.

OS:Well, I believe under the rules of NATO you’d have to share all your nuclear information with the United States.

VP:You see, our openness to all our partners—including towards the United States—after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and after the change in our political system, was so great that it even covered our nuclear forces. We had almost no secrets back then. The American monitors were at one of our largest factories producing components for nuclear weapons. And those monitors were stationed there on a permanent basis. You see? We were open enough. And there were no additional threats to us.

OS:It’s clear at this point in time that you’re missing the signals in the wind—there were a lot of signals coming, including Mr. Bush’s withdrawal in 2001 from the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972. [30] Background Information See, “US Withdraws From ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted,” Wade Boese, Arms Control Association (July/August 2002). Retrieved at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_aug02

VP:No, that’s not the case. We were most actively discussing this issue with our partners. And there is one curious thing—the presidents of your country change, but the policy doesn’t change—I mean on principled issues. I refer in particular to the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty. [31] Background Information: “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” Terence Neilen, New York Times (Dec. 31, 2001). Retrieved at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html It’s the goal. That treaty was the cornerstone of the system of national security as a whole. It was the foundation of international security. And first President Clinton tried to persuade me to support the United States withdrawal from this treaty.

OS:On what basis?

VP:No foundation, no basis at all. He was saying that there was a threat emanating from Iran. Then the same attempt was undertaken by President Bush. We tried to convince him, to show him, and that was not entirely fruitless, that it was a threat to us. And at a certain stage our American counterparts at the defense ministry level, at the state secretary level, said that they understood our concerns. And I have to say that we proposed that we should work together on an ABM system—the United States, Europe, and Russia. But in the end, even though quite sadly our partners refused to follow up on that proposal, they suggested that we should handle our concerns—technically. But they refused to follow up on their own proposal. In this regard we spent very much time on this matter and we were saying that we would not develop our ABM system because that was very expensive and we didn’t know whether that would lead to anything at all. But to preserve the crucial element of international security and stability, namely the strategic balance of power, we would be obliged to develop our offensive capabilities—missiles capable of surmounting any ABM systems. And their response was quite simple. They told us they were not building up that system against Russia. And they told us, “Do whatever you like, because we’ll assume it’s not against the United States.” And I said, “All right, let’s do it this way.” And that’s what we’re doing. And I find it strange that now when we announce that we are renovating our nuclear capabilities without overstepping the limits of treaties on the reduction in our nuclear arsenal, it always leads to a very nervous reaction on the part of our partners. We were not the first to start this race and we told them in the first place what we were going to do—what we would have to do.

OS:Two quick questions—so, Bush did this without consultation? He just did it?

VP:We had had many discussions, many negotiations on that matter and the United States made this decision to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally.

OS:Right, with Clinton there were discussions, but with the Bush people it didn’t work?

VP:We had discussions both with the Bush team and the Clinton team.

OS:Okay, so no rules—new rules. American rules.

VP:Probably our partners thought that the armed forces of Russia, the economy of Russia, the technological capacities of Russia were such that we would not be able to face the challenge. But as of now I think everyone has understood that Russia is not just capable of that. Russia is doing that and meeting the challenge.