32 requesting smoke “to conceal their movement”: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
33 The angle of the fire had shifted southeast: Fabayo, Appendix e11, 26 Feb. 2010.
34 more men were shooting at him from inside the town: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
35 A woman in a red and purple dress: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit G.
36 another woman stacking rocks to make fighting position: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
37 the far ambush was becoming a near ambush: Fabayo, Exhibit BH. “Our far ambush became a near ambush,” Fabayo said. “They start to maneuver around us, while we try to withdraw.”
38 an RPG exploded near him, throwing him to the ground: Garza statement, Annex E, Appendix e5, 16 Sept. 2009, MFR, AFZC-BCT-AD, Maj. Johannes Castro, USA.
39 ordered the Army platoon—Dog 3-2—to move forward: 15-6 Investigation, JP Exhibit F and Exhibit K, and Enemy Action Attack RPT Afghan war diary, 2009-09-08 ref. AFG20090908n2165.
40 “We’re surrounded”: Meyer, Annex E, Appendix e3.
41 Lt. Fabayo saw our Humvee: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
42 “You got to keep calm”: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
43 “You must surrender”: Swenson email to West, 5 Jan. 2011.
44 I don’t want some kid to find it intact and blow himself up: Swenson discussion with West, 14 Sept. 2011.
45 “Where’s the reporter?”: Fabayo, Exhibit BH.
46 was dead: Swenson discussions with West, 17 Oct. 2009 and 14 Sept. 2011.
47 Swenson, who carried five hundred rounds for his M4: Swenson discussions with West, 14 Sept. 2011.
48 the notepad in his pocket had crumbled: Fabayo, Appendix e12 (Swenson).
49 handed them anti-infection pills: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e11, and Exhibit BH.
50 “You’ll get shot”: Garza statement, Appendix e15.
51 see one Askar stand up and take a bullet in the neck: Memo for the Record, CJTF-1-CJ1, Transcribed Sworn Statement of CPT Swenson, William D., 29 July 2011.
52 Fabayo dropped his first-aid bag: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e11.
53 two OH-58 Kiowas were en route to the valley: According to Memo for Record, JTF-82, 23 Nov. 2009, Timeline of Events Ganjigal Valley, 7-8 Sept. 2009, at 0720 the SWT Kiowas were wings up from FOB Fenty and they arrived on station at 0745; the official timeline is clear, but unofficially a Marine UAH, according to Swenson (Tab J), diverted without informing higher headquarters and provided initial gun runs around 0715.
54 he called for a medevac: Recorded in TOC at Joyce at 0738, Exhibit K.
55 “Is he Army or Marine?”: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Gunny Miller, Exhibit U.
56 grenades impacted behind them and to their right side: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e14.
CHAPTER 11: INTO THE FIRE
1 Lt. Johnson said he’d cover Hafez: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AJ.
2 He didn’t see or hear Lt. Johnson after that: telecommunication West and Meyer et al. at Random House with Hafez on 11 Feb. 2012.
3 Hafez clawed at his gear and threw a smoke grenade: telecommunication West and Meyer et al. at Random House with Hafez on 11 Feb. 2012.
4 give a grid. Nine seven: Meyer, CBS interview, 60 Minutes .
5 Valadez came up on the net: Rodriguez-Chavez statement, Tab N.
6 “There are a lot of bad guys on both sides”: Valadez statement, Tab P.
7 suffered only mild bruises: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibits AD and AB.
8 crouched alongside a drainage ditch, not ten meters away: Meyer After Action Report for Ganjigal, 11 Sept. 2009.
9 “The gun won’t go down enough”: Statement of Rodriguez-Chavez, Tab O.
10 “expertise-induced amnesia”: Jeff Wise, Extreme Fear (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), p. 50.
11 the others ducked back into the ditch: Meyer brief to West at Monti, 17 Oct. 2009. (The notes read that Meyer said he “hit four.”)
12 firing an AK at us from his hip: Rodriguez-Chavez description to West, teleconference, 31 Jan. 2012.
13 the pilots couldn’t do enough to help us: Tab R. The first flight of pilots to arrive were CW2 Kristopher Bassett, CW2 James O’Neal, CW2 Ryan Neal, and CW2 Michael McClain.
14 ignoring the RPG shells exploding in the air: CWO Silano description to West, telecommunication, 3 June 2012.
CHAPTER 12: INTO THE WASH
1 six Afghan soldiers were dead and nine wounded: Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit II-1 (P.7).
2 Swenson brought back two dead jihadists, too: Swenson, Exhibit BI.
3 Fabayo got into our turret and Hafez got on the radio: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e12.
4 picked up Dodd Ali, and rolled his stiff body into the open back: Swenson wrote to me on 6 Jan. 2012: “At the time, Dakota was a Marine E-4; I did not know him. I was situationally aware of the location of those who fought at the battle, but putting a name to the role performed is different. You referenced football: I know where the QB [quarterback] was, but I do not necessarily recall his roster number. What I witnessed of Dakota’s heroism, I am certain of.”
1 Swenson got out to talk to the Army platoon leader: Swenson, Tab J.
2 four Americans were missing: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BR.
3 “You’re not going back into the fight”: Meyer interview with CBS, 60 Minutes .
4 left the battlefield: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit II-1. (P.7), concluded that “the 2-8 ETT commander, the record shows that he performed capably and courageously.”
5 “Hold where you are”: Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.
6 move into the valley: Email Swenson to West, 6 Jan. 2011.
7 “Spot”: Meyer interview with CBS, 60 Minutes .
8 we pulled out about ten or twelve wounded: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AJ.
9 waiting their turn to enter the valley: Bassett statement, Appendix e13, 14 Sept. 2009.
10 fire missions kept getting denied: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit U. “I heard constant requests for fire support,” Sgt. Summers, up at Shadow 4, said.
11 fended off the endless questions from the TOC at Joyce: Summers, Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit C1, 17 Nov. 2009. “My feeling is that the Marines and Afghan forces were left out to dry,” Shadow 4—Sgt. Summers—said. “It’s a horrible feeling but that’s how I feel about it. QRF? Air? Nothing but endless questions [by the TOC].”
12 the pilots didn’t return fire: Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.
13 they were fighting the outsiders: This is unsurprising. See, for instance, Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 437.
1 a PKM was still shooting at some Askars: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
2 fell into a deep, well-constructed trench: Swenson brief to West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.
3 villagers returning to Ganjigal: The Werth/Hooker investigation (JP, Exhibit A, Part 2, page 16) stated that “no Afghan civilians were either killed or injured during this operation.” In all due respect, this cannot be confirmed. Tens of thousands of bullets were fired over the course of the day. No one walked around keeping count of who was struck, whether Afghan soldiers, civilians who were not involved, civilians who were aiding the enemy, or enemy who were wearing civilian clothes.
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