Dakota Meyer: Into the Fire

1 “If you make it through, you can become a grunt”: Every year, between 7 and 10 percent of all recruits drop out of boot camp. Aline O. Quester, Marine Corps Recruits: A Historical Look at Accessions and Boot Camp Performance (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).

1 he killed more than five hundred Russian soldiers: Tapio A. M. Saarelainen, The Sniper: Simo Hayha (Tampere, Finland: Apali, 2008), 135 pages. (Saarelainen cites a figure of 542; others put it at 505. Several sources agree the number was above 500. Hayha after the war became a champion moose hunter.)

2 Chris Kyle, a SEAL, recorded 160 kills: Chris Kyle, American Sniper (New York: Morrow, 2012), p. 5.

1 The border meant nothing to the tribes: Paul Overby, Holy Blood (New York: Praeger, 1993), p. 162. Overby described fighting alongside the mujahideen stationed at Dangam in 1988. He had walked across from Pakistan.

1 Lt. Johnson calmed down the driver: Lt. Johnson report, “Report on Rocket Attack at Monti, 6 September 2009.” “I left the tower,” he wrote, “to coordinate an LTV [a Ford] pickup of the wounded soldier. Once the LTV pulled up to the guard tower, Cpl. Meyer picked up the wounded soldier and under indirect and direct fire carried him down two flights of stairs to the truck.”

1 pay for a tribal militia that would stop the rockets: West notes from meeting with Ganjigal elders, together with Lt. Cols. Ayoub and O’Donnell at ABP base next to FOB Joyce, 9 July 2009.

2 “They owe you nothing for your bad behavior”: West notes from meeting with Ayoub, Lt. Col. O’Donnell, and the Ganjigal elders, 9 July 2009.

3 “with zero status inside the village”: Capt. Kaplan conversation with West, 1 Dec. 2011.

4 “pro-U.S. and supportive of the Afghan government”: Dept. of the Army, AFZC-BCT-AD, 25 Sept. 2009, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation, Cols. R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit N (E.1).

5 Taliban had not sprung ambushes from inside villages: Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009.

6 Gal Rahman, a border police chief: West conversations with Kerr and Swenson at Joyce and Monti, July and Oct. 2009.

7 soft American target: Swenson email to West, April 18, 2012.

8 “Three-070 is the Undo KE, correct?”: Swenson email to West, 23 Jan. 2012. 81 “we could put smoke on the deck for screening”: Maj. Castro AR 15-6 Investigation, 21 Sept. 2009, Appendix S.

9 “KE 3070”: Swenson briefing to Bing West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.

10 Battalion 1-32 believed Williams was in charge: Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009, Section II: Findings and Recommendations.

11 Maj. Talib, the operations officer of the Afghan battalion, was in command : Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009, Section II: Findings and Recommendations.

12 equipment density list: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BH. Note: Fabayo (BH) and Swenson (BI) gave extensive statements of what happened and what they believed went wrong. Both statements were included in the Werth/Hooker report yet not listed in index.

13 thirty-two fighters were moving from Pakistan to reinforce Ganjigal: Mirc Chat, 2356 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 of Swenson packet, report from ODA received previously at 1728Z; see also MIRC Chat time, Cpl. Dakota L. Meyer, Medal of Honor packet, Tab C.

14 two kilometers north of Ganjigal village: See entries in Meyer packet, Tab C. Also see Mirc Chat, 1909 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4. Times for enemy movement are given in Zulu: 1727Z, 1909Z, 1922Z.

15 Fabayo knew nothing of these movements: However, Capt. Kaplan later testified that “reporting received and briefed immediately prior to the operation indicated the presence of 45-60 AAF (Anti-Afghan Forces).” Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit L (D.1).

16 “stopping under cover and hesitating at all open areas”: Mirc Chat, 0005 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 (Swenson).

17 perfect intelligence a day ahead of our movement: Rahman, a cleric, was the Taliban regional commander for Kunar and two other provinces. He led a hard-core group called JDQ, a branch of Al Qaeda that included Arab fighters and Chechens. See “Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Fighter and a Financier,” Asia Times , 23 May 2008.

18 two on the south side, and one in the middle: Dept. of the Army, Memorandum for the Record, AFZC-BCT-AD, 21 Sept. 2009, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation, Colonels R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit II-1. To wit: The next afternoon, an informer reported that Taliban commanders Faqir and Ismael had entered Ganjigal on 7 September. An informant inside the Border Police had tipped them off about the Key Leader Engagement mission. A Wikileaks entry from the JTF spot reports re the Ganjigal ambush read as follows: “Already 20 T [Taliban] were in the village. Hanifullah, Haji Mamiran and Niam were the three chief planners. Mamhullah Khadim had 15 Taliban in his group; Zia Ur Rahman had 15. AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces] were staging in Pakistan. Faqir brought in 20 more and set up in five positions; two on north side and two on south side and one in middle.”

19 two kilometers northeast of Ganjigal: Mirc Chat, 2343 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 (Swenson).

20 served as a major supply point in the war against the Russians: Cols. R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit L (D.1). In his statement, Capt. Kaplan was furious because Ganjigal was never estimated to hold in excess of twenty to thirty military-aged males, yet reporting immediately prior to the battle “indicated 45-60 AAF [anti-Afghan forces],” prepared to ambush CF (coalition forces). Kaplan was not informed of the updates after midnight by the Joyce TOC as he moved to his OP position. The TOC was not keeping Kaplan, the intel officer on the patrol, up to date with the Mirc Chat reports of enemy reinforcements.

1 the house of an imam, one of the village elders: Fabayo statement, Feb. 2, 2010, DA Form 2823.

2 They had a dozen fixed positions: An estimate of the positions plotted in different sworn statements numbered between eight and eleven.

3 returned fire, killing the enemy gunner: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AC. (Note not listed in the Index of Exhibits.) Statement by Cpl. Norman, 17 Sept. 2009.

4 Kaplan, and Cpl. Norman would duel with PKM and AK gunners: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit L (D.1). Also statements by Kaplan to West.

5 “Kilo Echo 3070. Will adjust”: See CJTF-82 Memo for Record, Timeline of Events: Ganjigal, 23 Nov. 2009. See, for instance, entries for 0537 and 0546. There is confusion among Mirc Chat, the Werth/Hooker Investigation, and statements of participants about the exact sequence of the fire requests. Regardless of which KE was called first, the results were the same: only a few rounds were fired. According to Werth/Hooker, upon Granger’s order, the artillery stopped completely around 0630, to include any rounds intended to obscure the battlefield.