To Team Monti:
Lt. Michael E. Johnson
Staff Sgt. Aaron M. Kenefick
Corpsman 3rd Class James R. Layton
And to all the men and women who paid the
ultimate sacrifice for our freedom:
Gunnery Sgt. Edwin W. Johnson, Jr .
Staff Sgt. Kenneth W. Westbrook
Mary Kate Moore
Justin Nathaniel Hardin
For a long while, I tried to forget about Ganjigal. When that didn’t work out so well, I decided to go through what had happened to me, piece by piece. I had written some stuff when I was up at Monti, mostly about my team and the battle. Later, I talked into a recorder for hours—about growing up, being a Marine, the ambush at Ganjigal, and coming to grips with life after the battle. The pictures I had taken and the dozens of statements in the investigations were a big help. The hardest work was going over draft after draft, sorting out what happened when.
I regret that I cannot share the names of several of the Afghans who stood by us Americans in those moments of agony. Intellectually, I understand it was their duty to defend their country. Emotionally, though, I was deeply touched by those who fought in conditions beyond the call of duty. The sad part is that I cannot divulge some names because those Afghans would be placed on a Taliban hit list inside their own country. How’s that for irony?
Bing and I would also like to thank the many who took the time to talk with us, including Lt. Col. Ishaq Tamkeen, Lt. Col. Dan Yaroslaski, Capt. Ademola Fabayo, Capt. Ray Kaplan, Lt. Jake Kerr, Gunny Kevin Devine, Sgt. Maj. Jimmie Carabello, Lt. Col. Mark O’Donnell, Brig. Gen. Daniel Yoo, Capt. Michael Harrison, Gunny Mike Skinta, Gunny Joshua Peterson, Staff Sgt. Chuck Bokis, Staff Sgt. Juan Rodriguez-Chavez, Hafez, CWO Yossarian Silano, Dean Chris Schmidt, my dad, Big Mike Meyer, Ann and Toby Young, my grandfather and grandmother Mema and Pepa, my teachers Mrs. Tana Rattliff and Heather Moss, and coaches Mike Griffiths, Toby Curry, and Will Hodges.
Our editor, Will Murphy, Mika Kasuga, Dennis Burke, and our agent, Sloan Harris of ICM, labored mightily through several drafts to impose an understandable narrative on a confused battle.
The comradeship and help I have received from the Marine Corps as an institution have been tremendous. I would especially like to thank the Commandant, Gen. Jim Amos, and also Gen. Joseph Dunford, Sgt. Maj. Mike Barrett, Lt. Col. Chris Hughes, Punch Haynes of the Marine Corps—Law Enforcement Foundation, and Owen West of the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation.
The Marines who had the most influence on my life were: Gunny Soto-Rodriguez, Gunny Peterson, Gunny Duprey, Gunny Rich, Gunny Nunn, Sgt. Rooney, Sgt. Pape, Sgt. Kreitzer, Sgt. Smith, Staff Sgt. Gavin, Sgt. Moenich, CWO Skinta, Cpl. Morin, and Cpl. Coggins.
I would also like to thank the family members who stood next to me when I returned home: my brother Tim, uncle Mark, aunt Cindy, Matt and Jennie Meyer, Troy, Steven, Casey Danzinger, and Austin Nettleship. My friends who were always there: Mike Staton, Dean Adams, Jeff, Vikki, Blake, and Randy Hatcher, Mike and Amy Mitchum, Levi Burton, Randy Hadeed, Reed Bergman, Keith Delucia, Maurice Freedman, Gary and Kevin Vernon, Adam Weinbrenner, Ben Madden, Joe Mangione, Dana, Ray, Diane, Ryan, Jay, and Sabrina Benedict, Andy Olson, Clint Walker, Jeff Suratt, and Monica Johnson. One look at those names and you can see that I am truly blessed.
And thank you to all who have donated to the Dakota Meyer Scholarship (www.dakotameyer.com). So far we have raised more than one million dollars for the education of the children of the wounded.
Every word in this book is what I remember to the best of my ability. I’ve been over this book time and again, separately with Bing, with our editor, Will Murphy, with Dean Schmidt, and with Toby and Ann. Will Swenson was also a great help. Perhaps writing the narrative will help me come to terms with what happened. I hope so.
To the families of Lt. Mike Johnson, Staff Sgt. Aaron Kenefick, Doc Layton, and Edwin Johnson, I offer my everlasting and profound regret. The Marine Corps teaches you not about trying, but about doing, and I didn’t get there in time. I will forever miss my team.
Appendix 1
GANJIGAL TIMELINE
(EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 8, 2009)
TIMELINE
0100-0400 — Numerous enemy groups moving toward Ganjigal.
0330 — Embedded training team (ETT) 2-8 and Askars link with Highlander 5 and border police; in a file of vehicles, they turn off main road and head east into Ganjigal Valley.
0400 — One mile inside the valley, they stop at operational release point (ORP); they dismount and proceed on foot.
0530 — Afghan National Army (ANA) observation post to north above the wash leading into Ganjigal (Marines on the outpost [OP] were Miller and Valadez).
0530 — Kaplan and Cpl. Norman and twelve ANA set up southern OP with a 240 Golf machine gun.
0530 — 1-32 scout-sniper team called Shadow 4 on OP farther back on south side, 1,200 meters away—too far to apply direct fire, but in excellent position to relay radio messages from the valley to the tactical operations center (TOC) at Joyce.
0530 (0100 Zulu) — Contact reported to TOC of Battalion 1-32 at Camp Joyce.
0530 — Lt. Johnson four-man party (Team Monti) 100 meters in front of TAC/Command Group when firing begins; Swenson runs 100 meters forward to join Lt. Johnson’s TAC (tactical command post) and calls suppression artillery fire.
0537 — Shadow (Staff Sgt. Summers and Staff Sgt. Alvarez) reports first 120-millimeter mission KE 3070.
0545 — ANA soldiers disperse among terraces.
0545 — Rodriguez-Chavez on radio hears Lt. Johnson tell Fabayo he needs fires to get out of a house.
0545 — Meyer’s requests to enter wash are denied via Fox 7 (Valadez radio relay).
0546 — Call for fire KE 3345.
0547 — Meyer, Valadez, and Rodriguez-Chavez in discussions.
0550 — Splash KE 3345 four HE 120s fire from Joyce; Garza testified this was effective fire.
0551 — Swenson requests air—told air is coming in fifteen mikes (minutes).
0556 — Call for fire KE 3365.
0557-0630 — Kaplan calls/relays seven smoke missions; denied because too close to civilians.
0600 — Splash 3070 four HE 155s from Asadabad (A-Bad).
0600 — Staff Sgt. Kenefick tries to give grid.
0600 — Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez disobey orders and drive toward the battle.
0600 — TOC via Shadow again assures Highlander (Swenson) that CCA (close combat aviation) helo support is “fifteen minutes away.”
0605 — Splash KE 3365 eight HE 120s; Garza testified this had no effect, even when adjusted.
0605 — Swenson and Fabayo agree to pull back.
0610 — Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez signal to five ANA soldiers to get into their truck.
0615 — Staff Sgt. Lantz, NCO in charge in TOC at Joyce (Hammer), contacts 7-17 Cav (Pale Horse) in direct support of 4/4 BCT in Op Lethal Storm in Shuriak Valley, 5 kilometers to the north of Ganjigal; Lantz requests re-tasking two OH-58 (Kiowas) Scout Weapons Team (SWT) 1.
0615 — TOC directs Dog platoon to prepare to go forward.
0616 — In TOC, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC)-qualified Tech Sgt. Matzke asks officer on watch to declare an air TIC (troops in contact) to bring in fixed-wing CAS (close air support), but request is denied.
0618 — Swenson calls for fire for smoke at grid 902 515 to cover withdrawal; denied.
0620 — 7-17 ops center denies Lantz’s request on procedural grounds “not routed through brigade”; 7-17 declares SWT 1 is “in support of higher-priority mission.”
Читать дальше