Dakota Meyer: Into the Fire

1012 — Another platoon from Dog arrives at Joyce.

1015 — UAV on station.

1045 — Afghan border police QRF arrives Ganjigal and joins battle.

1047 — Pale Horse Kiowas heavily engaging Taliban (AAF—Anti-Afghan Forces) at grid 983 511.

1050 — CJTF ops center contacts ISAF Joint Command (IJC Corps Command) to declare “personnel recovery”; DUSTWUN (Duty Status—Whereabouts Unknown); Special Operations forces en route to Ganjigal.

1056 — Williams and Garza arrive at Joyce.

1100 — Special Operations Force Blackhawk on station at Ganjigal; encounters heavy fire when throwing out smoke; cannot land a recovery team.

1110 — Pale Horse hovers over trench line and identifies Team Monti.

1120 — Meyer and Swenson find four U.S. (Team Monti) and one Afghan KIA.

1202 — Meyer and Hafez arrive at Joyce with two bodies.

1220 — Meyer and Bokis prepare the bodies for movement to the rear.

1300 — Sgt. Maj. Carabello tells Meyer to wash the blood from his face.

1335 — Four bodies of Team Monti flown from Joyce.

1400 — Eight bodies of Afghan soldiers driven to A-Bad or kept at Joyce for relatives to claim for burial.

1416 — Swenson, Kaplan, and seven Marine advisors arrive back at Joyce.

1530 — Special Forces prepare to sweep Ganjigal.

1600 — Meyer prepares two Askars for burial, visits the wounded Askars, and eats dinner on the roof with Hafez and several Afghan soldiers.

Thirteen Marine and two Army advisors plus Capt. Kaplan, plus sixty Afghan National Army and thirty Afghan border police, plus one U.S. Army platoon in reserve, plus sixteen U.S. Army scout-sniper soldiers on northern observation post.

Forty-five to sixty enemy, mostly from Pakistan, with some aid from about a hundred villagers.

South OP (Kaplan—Chosin 2, Cpl. Norman—Fox 2): grid XD 970 516.

Scout-sniper South OP (Sgt. Summers—Shadow 4): grid 954 510.

North OP (Miller, Valadez—Fox 7): grid 970 523.

In the valley (Williams—Fox 6, Fabayo—Fox 3, Garza—Fox 9, Swenson—Highlander 5, Meyer—Fox 3-3, Rodriguez-Chavez—Fox 3-2): center grid 972 520. Ganjigal village: grid 978 520.

Schoolhouse: grid 973 517.

CCP: grid 955 519.

ORP: grid 949 521.

Team Monti: found at grid 974 519.

Reported enemy positions (thirteen) at grids 972 517, 982 522, 981 521, 973 516, 971 516, 972 518, 975 516, 968 526, 975 520, 985 490, 983 532, 975 521, 957 493 (this indicates the enemy were mobile and trying to close on the patrol).

For service as set forth in the following:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7, in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009. Corporal Meyer maintained security at a patrol rally point while other members of his team moved on foot with two platoons of Afghan National Army and Border Police into the village of Ganjgal for a pre-dawn meeting with village elders. Moving into the village, the patrol was ambushed by more than 50 enemy fighters firing rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns from houses and fortified positions on the slopes above. Hearing over the radio that four U.S. team members were cut off, Corporal Meyer seized the initiative. With a fellow Marine driving, Corporal Meyer took the exposed gunner’s position in a gun-truck as they drove down the steeply terraced terrain in a daring attempt to disrupt the enemy attack and locate the trapped U.S. team. Disregarding intense enemy fire now concentrated on their lone vehicle, Corporal Meyer killed a number of enemy fighters with the mounted machine guns and his rifle, some at near point blank range, as he and his driver made three solo trips into the ambush area. During the first two trips, he and his driver evacuated two dozen Afghan soldiers, many of whom were wounded. When one machine gun became inoperable, he directed a return to the rally point to switch to another gun-truck for a third trip into the ambush area where his accurate fire directly supported the remaining U.S. personnel and Afghan soldiers fighting their way out of the ambush. Despite a shrapnel wound to his arm, Corporal Meyer made two more trips into the ambush area in a third gun-truck accompanied by four other Afghan vehicles to recover more wounded Afghan soldiers and search for the missing U.S. team members. Still under heavy enemy fire, he dismounted the vehicle on the fifth trip and moved on foot to locate and recover the bodies of his team members. Corporal Meyer’s daring initiative and bold fighting spirit throughout the 6-hour battle significantly disrupted the enemy’s attack and inspired the members of the combined force to fight on. His unwavering courage and steadfast devotion to his U.S. and Afghan comrades in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The Central Command posted online a redacted but full account of the investigation by Cols. Werth and Hooker on November 25, 2009. The citations from the online documents list the exhibits by alphabetical reference; e.g., Exhibit N. The hard copy of the Werth/Hooker account lists the statements by unit and alphanumerically; e.g., Members of 1-32 Task Force Chosin, Exhibit A.1. Wherever possible, I have given both citations.

The sworn statements from the Medal of Honor packets are cited separately by an indication of the alphabetical tab reference for Meyer’s packet and the appendix reference for Swenson’s packet. All references to exhibits refer to the Werth/Hooker Investigation.

1 Staff Sgt. Kenefick and Lt. Johnson: For the sake of Marine traditions, let me set one thing straight. On our advisor team, I never called my seniors by their first names. That is done in the SEALs and Special Forces teams, but usually not in Marine advisor units. When I write about the lieutenant and the staff sergeant in this book, sometimes I use their first names because the four of us were friends, but each of us knew his position in the chain of command.

2 Battalion 1-32, tasked with preventing enemy infiltration from Pakistan: The battalion, called Chosin, was from the 10th Mountain Division and working in Afghanistan as part of a brigade called Task Force Mountain Warrior.

3 Afghan battalion that we were advising: At Monti, we were advising the 3rd Coy (Company) of the 2nd Kandak, 215th Corps. The kandak/battalion’s headquarters was at Camp Joyce.

4 “Kunar people like Americans,” he told each new team of advisors: Eshok conversation with West on several occasions, including 17 Oct. 2009 at Joyce.

5 Joyce would focus on straightening out the screwed-up Afghan logistics: As Maj. Williams explained at Joyce to West on 17 Oct. 2009, “For instance, we supplied the kandak with plastic water jugs. Now the Afghan S-4 [logistics officer] says they’re gone—disappeared—and he wants us to come up with more. No, that’s the wrong request. He has money from his own chain of command; he buys replacements or he finds the jugs he lost. I don’t have any I’m going to give him.”