Bernal Díaz del Castillo - The Memoirs of the Conquistador Bernal Diaz del Castillo, Vol 2 (of 2)

Cortes was greatly perplexed to know what he should do, and scarcely knew what answer to give, nor how he should be able to send assistance to both places at once; many of our men were wounded, and almost worn out with fatigue; four had died of their wounds, and eight others of pleurisy, and of bleeding profusely from the nose and mouth, occasioned by the weight of our arms, which we durst never lay aside, and by the forced marches and the quantity of dust which got down our throats.

Our general, however, informed the ambassadors of the first-mentioned townships that he would soon repair to their assistance; but desired them in the meantime to apply to their neighbours for help, and with their united forces to oppose the advancing foe. It was their timidity, he said, which inspired the Mexicans with courage; for the latter had not so many troops at their command as formerly, from the vast increase of their opponents on all sides.

By these representations Cortes succeeded in allaying their fears and arousing their courage, but they requested some authority from him in writing to show to their neighbours, in which he should command them to repair to their assistance.

To explain their motive for desiring this, I must remark, that though the Indians at that time could neither read nor understand our writing, yet they looked upon any written document as signifying a more particular and peremptory command. They were therefore highly delighted when Cortes gave them the required letter, and they showed it to their friends, who then instantly marched out their troops to join them, and with their united forces they now boldly advanced against the Mexicans, and fought with pretty good success in the battle which followed.

We must now return to Chalco, respecting the safety of which Cortes was particularly solicitous; for it was of the greatest importance to him that this province should be kept clear of the enemy. Our line of communication with Vera Cruz and Tlascalla ran through this country, and from which we also obtained the greater part of our provisions, as the soil was uncommonly productive of maise. Sandoval, therefore, was ordered to march thither very early next morning with 200 foot, twenty horse, twelve crossbow-men, and ten musketeers, besides all the Tlascallan troops which still remained with us, – though these had greatly decreased in numbers; for, as I have above mentioned, most of them had departed to their homes with the booty they had made. A company of Tezcucans was therefore added to this detachment, and placed under the immediate command of Luis Marin, an officer with whom Sandoval lived on the most intimate terms of friendship. We others remained behind for the protection of Tezcuco and our brigantines, nor did Alvarado or Oli leave our head-quarters on this occasion.

Before accompanying Sandoval to Chalco, I must make a few comments on some observations which fell from several cavaliers, who, on comparing my account of Cortes' expedition to Xaltocan with that of Gomara, discovered that I had omitted three things mentioned in his history. One circumstance was, that Cortes had appeared before Mexico with the thirteen brigantines, and fought a terrible battle with Quauhtemoctzin's whole armed force, which had been distributed in the canoes and large pirogues. The other, that Cortes, when he had advanced up to Mexico along the causeway had held a parley with the Mexican chiefs, and threatened to reduce the town by famine: and the third, that he had not acquainted the inhabitants of Tezcuco with his intention of marching against Xaltocan, from fear they might betray his designs to the Mexicans.

The answer I made those gentlemen on these three points was, that at the time of our expedition against the Xaltocans, our brigantines were not completed, and that it must appear ridiculous in itself, for the brigantines to have found their way overland thither, and that our cavalry and other troops should have taken their road through the lake. But as we have above seen, when Cortes had advanced along the causeway from Tlacupa, it was with great difficulty he made his retreat good, nor had we at that time besieged the town so closely as to be able to cut off all its supplies of provisions; on the contrary, Mexico was then still in possession of the districts whence it obtained those supplies. Everything which Gomara relates as having taken place on that occasion did not happen till some time after. It is equally untrue when this historian states that Cortes took a roundabout way in order to conceal his design upon Xaltocan from the Tezcucans on his march thither; he had no choice of roads, as there was only one, which led through the territory of Tezcuco.

These are indeed shocking blunders; but I am well aware that they must not be laid entirely to the door of Gomara, but for the most part to the false information which had been furnished him, and this expressly to bestow all the renown of our deeds of arms on Cortes, and thereby throw the heroic valour of his soldiers into the shade. What I relate is the pure truth, and these same cavaliers were subsequently convinced that my statements were correct. Having thus digressed for a short time I must return to Sandoval, who, after he had attended mass marched out with his troops from Tezcuco and arrived in front of Chalco by break of day.

How the captain Sandoval marches to Chalco and Tlalmanalco, and what he did there.

Sandoval set out with his troops on the 12th of March, 1521. The first night he encamped at Chalco, and arrived the next morning early before Tlalmanalco, where the caziques and inhabitants gave him a most hearty welcome, and provided abundance of food for his troops; but the caziques informed him he had still to march further on to the large township of Huaxtepec, where a large body of Mexican troops was stationed, who would be joined by all the warriors of the province.

Sandoval, on receiving this information, concluded that there was no time to be lost, and immediately marched towards Chimalhuacan, which was subject to Chalco, where he quartered his troops for the night. The inhabitants of Chalco had sent out spies in every direction, and learnt that the enemy was not far off, but lay in wait for the Spaniards in the thickets and hollows of the mountains. Sandoval, who was an officer of great determination and foresight, ordered his march as follows: the musketeers and crossbow-men went in advance, the cavalry were to follow three and three together, and when the former had discharged their pieces, the horse were to charge the enemy's line at full gallop, and to direct the point of their lances at the face, and continue the attack until the enemy was put to flight. The infantry were to keep their ranks firmly closed, and not to rush in upon the enemy until a signal for that purpose was given. This order of attack Sandoval deemed necessary, as the enemy's numbers were very great, and the nature of the ground unfavorable for his manœuvres; besides that, it was impossible to discover whether the Mexicans had not dug pits or laid other snares to entrap the Spaniards; so that it was quite necessary his small army should keep close together in a body.

After Sandoval had marched a little further on he came up with the Mexicans, who were advancing towards him in three distinct bodies, with fearful yells and the horrible din of drums and shell trumpets, and instantly fell upon our troops like so many furious lions. As soon as Sandoval observed that the enemy intended to fall upon him in three distinct bodies, he likewise changed his order of attack, and commanded the cavalry to charge the foe without delay, and not wait for the rest of the troops. He then placed himself at their head, encouraged his men and rushed forward to the attack, under the cry of – "Santiago!" The powerful shock which the enemy thus sustained certainly caused some of them to recoil, but they immediately closed again and boldly advanced against our horse, being greatly assisted by the unevenness of the ground and a deep break, where it was difficult for our horse to manœuvre. Sandoval, perceiving the enemy's advantage, ordered his foot to close their ranks again, placed the crossbow-men and musketeers in front, and those who were armed with swords and shields on the flanks. In this order they were again to advance to the attack as soon as they heard a shot from the other side of the break, which would be a signal to them that the cavalry had charged and driven the foe back on to the level ground. Our allies were likewise ordered to follow the example of the Spanish foot; this was accordingly done and the object accomplished.