Andro Linklater - An Artist in Treason - The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson

Having lived in the west for more than twenty years and spent ten of them unsuccessfully promoting the Spanish Conspiracy, it was understandable that he should have been exasperated by the easterner’s assumption that sentiments in the west were as volatile as in the 1780s. In the argument that ensued, Burr apparently questioned the depth of Wilkinson’s commitment to the plan to invade Mexico, demanding angrily, in the governor’s recollection, “ ‘whether I could be content to vegitate or moulder in that d—d government?’ meaning the government of Louisiana.” Wilkinson replied in subdued terms that “I was making arrangements to retire to private life; that I was tired of the erratic life I had long led; and that the delicate situation of my wife, to whom I owed more than I could render, made it necessary.”

Quite implausibly, the governor claimed that this was when Burr first broached his Mexican plan: “But suppose some grand enterprize should present, which would lead direct to fame and fortune?” This lie apart, there clearly was a disagreement between them, because a second, hurried meeting was held as Burr was leaving. By way of compromise, they apparently decided to put aside the matter of secession and concentrate on what was essential for Burr, Wilkinson’s proposals to march on Santa Fe. War would bring out Jackson and Adair, and so long as the army was engaged in the west, New Orleans would be defenseless, and its French inhabitants would willingly turn it over to Burr. Beyond that, any conflict around Santa Fe would draw Spanish troops away to the north of Mexico, leaving little opposition to an invasion of Veracruz in the south.

Their discussions took place at a time of high alert, when the mounting tensions over the border between Louisiana and Texas seemed to make war with Spain inevitable. In the summer, the U.S. representatives in Spain, James Monroe and John Armstrong, broke off negotiations and secretly advised the president simply to seize Texas. Days before Burr’s arrival, Wilkinson had actually sent the war secretary a lucid and obviously well-considered proposal for invading Mexico by way of Santa Fe, approaching the city either by the Santa Fe trail or the Arkansas River, and employing “a Corps of 100 Artillerists, 400 Cavalry, 400 Rifle men and 1100 Musquetry.” An otherwise bizarre proposal to bring along “a band of Irish Priests who have been educated in Spain, (of whom I have a dozen)” indicated that the general planned not merely to seize “the Northern Provinces” but to take permanent possession. Clearly Wilkinson envisioned the silver-bearing Sierra Madre as a prize.

That fall, Dearborn wrote to advise Wilkinson that the army should be kept on alert. In a rare show of harmony, he commented approvingly on the general’s plan to invade Mexico with guns and priests: “I am not sure that a project of that kind may not become necessary.” In November, after Burr’s departure, Wilkinson promised Dearborn, “If I do not reduce New Mexico, at least, in one campaign, I will forfeit my command.”

It was Aaron Burr’s habit, according to the modern editor of his papers, “to hear what he wanted to hear.” What he evidently heard was that Wilkinson intended to move against Santa Fe shortly. People he tried to recruit testified later that Burr talked as though the Veracruz attack was part of the official strategy to invade Mexico. What he did not hear was the caveat that the general added when he told Dearborn of his invasion plan, that it would only take place “should we be involved in a War, (which Heaven avert).”

They parted with sufficient goodwill for Wilkinson to give Burr an introduction to Governor William Harrison of Indiana Territory, and a warm letter asking him to consider appointing Burr as the territory’s delegate to Congress. Soon after the col onel’s departure, however, the governor received another warning, this time from Dearborn: “There is a strong rumor that you, Burr, etc are too intimate. You ought to keep every suspicious person at arms length, and be as wise as a serpent and as harmless as a dove.” Wilkinson’s reaction was carefully designed to distance himself from Burr but without giving him away.

In a friendly message to Robert Smith, secretary of the navy, and brother of Samuel, Wilkinson dropped in a significant phrase: “Burr is about something, but whether internal or external, I cannot discover. I think you should keep an eye on him.” So vague was the wording that Smith did not notice its import and did nothing to act on it. The tone was not so much a warning from someone anxious about possible insurrection as insurance by someone concerned to protect his own back. Should war come, and Burr encourage secession in Kentucky and Tennesee, General Wilkinson could at least claim to have alerted the government.

Yet the general remained troubled. In December 1805, he contacted his old friend John Adair, fishing for information about Burr’s secessionist plans. Adair sent a teasing reply. “You observe to me,” he wrote in January 1806, “that I ‘have seen Colonel Burr, and ask me what was his Business in the west?’ Answer. Only to avoid a prosecution in New York. Now, Sir, you will oblige me by answering a question in turn for I know you can, Pray how far is it, and what kind of way from St. Louis to Santa Fé, and from thence to Mexico?” The answer he received sounded boastful on first reading, but more cautious on the second. “Do you know that I have reserved these places for my own triumphal entry,” Wilkinson declared, “that I not only know the way but all the difficulties and how to surmount them? I wish we could get leave, Mexico could soon be ours.”

Since Jefferson’s policy was to avoid the expense of fighting, no leave was given for attack. In the absence of war, Wilkinson would not move. As a result, Aaron Burr and his chief of staff, Jonathan Dayton, were forced to resort to blackmail.

DESPITE FAILING TO GET any encouragement for his plans from Governor Harrison, Burr immediately set about fund-raising on his return to Philadelphia. During the winter he was promised more than fifty thousand dollars, ostensibly to buy land west of the Mississippi on the Ouachita River. Burr’s son- in-law, Joseph Alston, governor of South Carolina, provided substantial financial guarantees, but the most generous supporter was Jonathan Dayton, who personally lent twenty thousand dollars. He did so on the specific understanding that the commanding general would be an active participant. Dayton had known Wilkinson since 1794 and was well-informed about his connection to the Spanish Conspiracy. But he had not been in contact with the general since their meeting at Cincinnati in June 1805.

Apart from a note sent shortly after Burr left St. Louis, Wilkinson had in fact ceased to communicate with the leaders of the conspiracy. “Nothing has been heard from the Brigadier since October,” Burr wrote in exasperation in April 1806. By contrast Burr had written several times to Wilkinson to keep him in touch with the conspiracy’s development. “On the subject of a certain speculation, it is not deemed material to write till the whole can be communicated,” Burr told him guardedly in December. And in April 1806 when it appeared that not enough funds were available, he announced, “The execution of our project is postponed till December: want of water in Ohio [i.e., money] rendered movement impracticable other reasons rendered delay expedient. The association is enlarged, and comprises all that Wilkinson could wish.”

The general’s silence clearly alarmed Burr and Dayton. They needed war with Spain, and when it failed to materialize, they realized that he would have to be forced to cooperate. As early as December 1805, Burr wrote suggesting that had war broken out earlier in the year, “[General] Lee would have been commander in chief: truth I assure you.” A month later in another letter, he retailed the gossip of Washington insiders that a road that Wilkinson claimed to have built through Tennessee had never really existed—“One, professing to be your friend, whispered to me soon afterwards that this conversation was calculated to do you injury”— but, Burr added innocently, Jefferson knew all about the allegation, “and I could not perceive that any inference unfriendly to you was drawn from the fact.”