Seth Jones - In the Graveyard of Empires - America's War in Afghanistan

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A definitive account of the American experience in Afghanistan from the rise of the Taliban to the depths of the insurgency. After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new “war of a thousand cuts” has now brought the country to its knees.
is a political history of Afghanistan in the “Age of Terror” from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental tragedy of America’s longest war since Vietnam.
After a brief survey of the great empires in Afghanistan—the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the late Soviet Union—Seth G. Jones examines the central question of our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime. It established security throughout the country—killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa’ida’s senior operatives—and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001 planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa’ida’s headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia.
While observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO allies in the Coalition, Jones—who has distinguished himself at RAND and was recently named by
as one of the “Best and Brightest” young policy experts—introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence.
Examining what has worked thus far—and what has not—this serious and important book underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of the great world powers to enter the region. 12 maps and charts
From Publishers Weekly
Since 2001, RAND Corporation political scientist Jones (
) has been observing the reinvigorated insurgency in Afghanistan and weighing the potency of its threat to the country's future and American interests in the region. Jones finds the roots of the re-emergence in the expected areas: the deterioration of security after the ousting of the Taliban regime in 2002, the U.S.'s focus on Iraq as its foreign policy priority and Pakistan's role as a haven for insurgents. He revisits Afghan history, specifically the invasions by the British in the mid- and late-19th century and the Russians in the late-20th to rue how little the U.S. has learned from these two previous wars. He sheds light on why Pakistan—a consistent supporter of the Taliban—continues to be a key player in the region's future. Jones makes important arguments for the inclusion of local leaders, particularly in rural regions, but his diligent panorama of the situation fails to consider whether the war in Afghanistan is already lost.
Review
“A useful and generally lively account of what can go wrong when outsiders venture onto the Afghan landscape.” (
* )
“This is a serious work that should be factored in as a new policy in Afghanistan evolves.” (
* )
“Offers a valuable window onto how officials have understood the military campaign.” (
* )
“[An] excellent book.” (
* )
“How we got to where we are in Afghanistan.” (
* )
“[Zeroes] in on what went awry after America’s successful routing of the Taliban in late 2001.” (
* )
“A blueprint for winning in a region that has historically brought mighty armies to their knees.” (
* )
“Seth Jones . . . has an anthropologist’s feel for a foreign society, a historian’s intuition for long-term trends, and a novelist’s eye for the telling details that illuminate a much larger story. If you read just one book about the Taliban, terrorism, and the United States, this is the place to start.” (
* )
“A timely and important work, without peer in terms of both its scholarship and the author’s intimate knowledge of the country, the insurgency threatening it, and the challenges in defeating it.” (
* )
“A deeply researched and well-analyzed account of the failures of American policies in Afghanistan,
will be mandatory reading for policymakers from Washington to Kabul.” (
* )
“Seth Jones has combined forceful narrative with careful analysis, illustrating the causes of this deteriorating situation, and recommending sensible, feasible steps to reverse the escalating violence.” (
* )
“Seth G. Jones’s book provides a vivid sense of just how paltry and misguided the American effort has been.…
will help to show what might still be done to build something enduring in Afghanistan and finally allow the U.S. to go home.” (
* )

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30. U.S. Department of Defense, Background and Activities of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007). Also see U.S. Department of State, Wanted Poster for Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (Washington, DC: Rewards for Justice Program, U.S. Department of State, 2006).

31. Dipesh Gadher, “Al-Qa’ida ‘Planning Big British Attack,’” Sunday Times (London), April 22, 2007.

32. On Wadi al-Aqiq, see, for example, Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 166, 192.

33. See, for example, “Bin Laden’s Treasurer Appointed New Afghan Qa’ida Leader,” Daily Times (Pakistan), May 30, 2007.

34. General Michael V. Hayden, The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 2.

35. Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qa’ida Homegrown,” The New Yorker , January 22, 2007.

36. Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 6.

37. Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005. On zakat and jihad, also see Marc Sage-man, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennyslvania Press, 2004).

38. See, for example, Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004); The 9/11 Commission Report , p. 55.

39. General Michael V. Hayden, The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 2.

40. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 15 November 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council, November 29, 2007, S/2007/677, p. 8.

41. United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/ a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Exhibit 2, Federal Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of William “Jamaal” Chrisman. Interview conducted December 2, 2006.

42. Statement from Mullah Omar, Leader of the Taliban, released December 17, 2007.

43. United States of America v. Babar Ahmad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:04-CR-301-MRK, Indictment, Filed October 6, 2004.

44. United States of America v. Syed Talha Ahsan, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:06-CR-194-JCH, Indictment. Also see United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad, United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Indictment.

45. Author interviews with European, Afghan, and Pakistani government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. Also see Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 8.

46. Author interviews with U.S. government officials in Shkin, Afghanistan, April 2006. Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, July 2005. Also see such press accounts as Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Unholy Allies,” Newsweek, September 26, 2005, pp. 40–42.

47. In what appeared to be a forced confession, Saeed Allah Khan stated: “I worked as a spy for the Americans along with four other people. The group received $45,000 and my share is $7,000.” Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, January 2006), p. 2.

48. Author interview with U.S. government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 2005.

49. On the rationale for suicide bombers, see Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, February 2006.

50. Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, p. 200.

51. C. Christine Fair et al., Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–2007 (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 2007), p. 10.

52. Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March 2006); “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Suicide Bomb Attack in Afghan Kandahar Province,” Afghan Islamic Press, October 9, 2005; “Pajhwok News Describes Video of Afghan Beheading by ‘Masked Arabs,’ Taliban,” Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News, October 9, 2005; “Canadian Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack in Kandahar,” Afghan Islamic Press, March 3, 2006; “Taliban Claim Attack on Police in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province,” Kabul National TV, January 7, 2006.

53. See, for example, Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.

54. Hekmat Karzai and Seth G. Jones, “How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 2006.

55. In its public rhetoric, the Taliban tended to identify the suicide bombers as Afghans, since it suggested there was a significant indigenous component of the insurgency.

56. Fair et al., Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, p. 28.

Chapter Seventeen

1. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.

2. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul and San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2008).

3. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

4. Colin Soloway, “I Yelled at Them to Stop,” Newsweek , October 7, 2002; Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 141–42.

5. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

6. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translated by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 6.

7. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, March 8, 2008; author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

8. Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

9. British Government, Afghanistan: Countering the Insurgency RC(E) vs. RC (S) Comparative Approaches, May 12, 2008.

10. The quote is from Bruce Hoffman and Seth G. Jones, “Cell Phones in the Hindu Kush,” The National Interest, No. 96, July/August 2008.

11. International Security Assistance Force, ISAF Campaign Plan (Kabul: ISAF, November 2008).

12. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 6.

13. Prior to the establishment of the first Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams—Afghanistan supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. These began in 2002.

14. Robert Borders, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development,” Journal of Development and Social Transformation, vol. 1, November 2004, pp. 5–12; Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, vol. 35, no. 4, Winter 2005–06, pp. 32–46.

15. Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.

16. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” p. 40.

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