Paul Preston - Franco

By 22 November, the Nationalist attack was repulsed. 40 On the following day, Franco and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Martín Moreno, travelled from Salamanca to Leganés on the outskirts of Madrid. The Generalísimo addressed a meeting of Mola, Saliquet, Varela and their respective general staffs. Without massive reinforcements which he simply did not have, there was no choice but to abandon the attack. The Generalísimo ordered an end to frontal assaults on the grounds of the weakness of his forces, the foreign assistance received by the Republic and the difficult tactical situation of the Nationalist Army, given its reliance on long exposed lines of supply and communication. 41 Orgaz would take over the forces on the Madrid front, Mola those in the north. Franco’s forces had suffered their first major reverse. 42 However, instead of taking the militarily sensible decision of withdrawing to easily defended lines four or five kilometres from the city, Franco revealed his obstinate determination never to give up an inch of conquered ground. He thus ordered Asensio to fortify the positions taken in the University City in order, as he perceived it, to maintain a psychological and moral advantage, irrespective of the cost which, in the next three months, would be considerable. 43

Franco was immensely fortunate that the Republican forces in Madrid were too depleted to mount a serious counter-offensive. If they had, the tide might well have turned decisively in their favour. Totally disconcerted by the losses suffered by their men, Varela and Yagüe had told Captain Roland von Strunk, a German military observer in Spain, in the presence of John Whitaker, ‘We are finished. We cannot stand at any point if the Reds are capable of undertaking counter-attacks.’ Captain von Strunk was in total agreement, convinced that only German reinforcements could save Franco from defeat. He commented bitterly to the US Consul in Seville that ‘Franco could have captured Madrid on the first day’ and added that he had informed Franco that he must accept German direction of the campaign or else Germany would withdraw its material and Franco had accepted. 44 In Paris, in Rome, in Morocco, as well as in the Nationalist tents around Madrid, it was believed that if Franco did not get more help from Germany and Italy, his movement would collapse. 45

Before the Republic could test the new confidence forged in the flames of Madrid, Franco’s battered columns would receive massive reinforcements from Fascist Italy. It is ironic that only four days before Franco’s tacit acknowledgement – in his change of strategy – that he had been defeated, he had secured the co-ordinated recognition of Germany and Italy. In near-identical terms, Berlin and Rome justified their action on the grounds that Franco controlled ‘the greater part of Spanish territory’. 46 On 18 November in Salamanca, a visibly emotional Franco appeared before crowds wildly cheering for Hitler and Mussolini. He told them that Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were ‘the bulwarks of culture, civilization and Christianity in Europe’. 47 On the same day, Hitler instructed the new German Chargé d’Affaires in Spain about his duties. The man selected was the retired General Wilhelm Faupel, one-time organizer of the Freikorps, adviser to the Argentinian and Peruvian Armies, and Director of the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut. A staunch Nazi, he was told not to interfere in military affairs. 48 Faupel presented his credentials to Franco on 30 November. 49

Franco’s delight with the signs of co-ordinated fascist help would no doubt have been tarnished had he known of the contempt with which the Italians viewed his military achievements. On 25 November, Mussolini told the German Ambassador to Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, that the Nationalists were lacking in offensive spirit and personal bravery. After negotiating with Franco the Italo-Spanish agreement on military and economic co-operation, Filippo Anfuso, Ciano’s representative, reported on 3 December that the Nationalists acted as if they were taking part in a colonial war, concerned with tiny tactical actions rather than with striking great strategic blows. He concluded that Franco needed Italian generals, an Italian column under the orders of Roatta and a sense of urgency. 50 It was only because Mussolini wanted a fascist Spain to put pressure on France and was hopeful that Franco could be coached in the ways of fascism that the Duce contemplated sending further aid to the Caudillo. But, like the Germans, he insisted on certain conditions. The most important was an undertaking ‘to conduct future Spanish policy in the Mediterranean in harmony with that of Italy’. 51

That Franco, conventionally considered to be fiercely proud, should have been happy to accept German and Italian aid on humiliating conditions was not at all puzzling. In the first place, he was desperate. Moreover, he still felt a certain deference towards both Hitler and Mussolini. It was to be his good fortune that, as the American Ambassador in Berlin, William E. Dodd, observed, ‘having recognized Franco as conqueror when this has yet to be proved, Mussolini and Hitler must see to it that he is successful or be associated with a failure’. 52 Italy was already racing down the slippery slope to total commitment. In a matter of four months, Mussolini had gone almost imperceptibly from his initial reluctant decision to supply twelve transport aircraft, via the shipping of substantial quantities of aircraft and armoured vehicles in August, September and October, to formal recognition. That gesture would soon involve Mussolini in an irrevocable commitment to Franco’s cause which was now facing possible defeat and needed massive assistance.

Faupel telegrammed the Wilhelmstrasse on 5 December with the stark message ‘We are now faced with the decision either to leave Spain to herself or to throw in additional forces.’ In the German Foreign Office, State-Secretary Weizsäcker feared that to comply would require sending a sea convoy which would attract the hostile attention of England. He believed that Italy should bear the brunt of helping Franco. 53 Immediately after signing his secret agreement with Franco on 28 November, Mussolini called a staff conference to examine the possibility of stepping up Italian military aid to Franco and asked Hitler to send a representative. On 6 December, the Duce, Ciano and Roatta met a pessimistic Admiral Canaris at the Palazzo Venezia. Mussolini suggested that Germany and Italy each prepare a division for Spain, that German and Italian instructors be sent to train Franco’s troops and that a joint Italo-German general staff direct and co-ordinate operations alongside Franco’s staff. Canaris agreed to co-ordination of the continued delivery of military aircraft and naval and submarine support for Franco in the Mediterranean but repeated the views of Hitler, of von Blomberg, of other senior Wehrmacht officers and of State-Secretary Weizsäcker that Germany could not be seen to send large numbers of troops to Franco without risking international repercussions which might undermine her rearmament plans. Nevertheless, Mussolini decided to go ahead with Italy’s commitment of substantial ground forces. It was also agreed that a joint Italo-German general staff be set up to galvanize Franco’s operations despite the fears of Canaris that Franco would narrow-mindedly resist. 54

It is clear from the minutes of this meeting on 6 December that Mussolini, in a spirit of disdain towards Franco, had decided to take the outcome of the Spanish Civil War into his own hands. Although, for obvious reasons, Franco was not informed about what had been said at the meeting, he could in general terms be confident that the Italians could now withdraw their support for him only with the greatest difficulty. On the following day, Mussolini wrote to General Roatta giving him command of all Italian land and air forces already in Spain and soon to be sent. The Duce instructed Roatta to liaise with Franco and the newly arrived German Chargé d’Affaires , General Faupel, over the creation of a joint headquarters staff. Two days after the 6 December conference, Mussolini set up a special office, the Ufficio Spagna , to co-ordinate the various ministerial contributions to Italian aid for Franco. * 55