Bruce R. Hopkins - The Tax Law of Charitable Giving

27 27See § 4.8.

28 28Rev. Rul. 78-38, 1978-1 C.B. 67.

29 29Rev. Rul. 80-335, 1980-2 C.B. 170.

30 30E.g., Commissioner v. Bradley, 56 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1932).

31 31Reg. § 1.170A-1(b). Of course, in applying this rule, it must be shown that the intermediate transferee is, in fact, an agent of the donor; e.g., Ferguson v. Commissioner, 99-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,412 (9th Cir. 1999), aff'g 108 T.C. 244 (1997); Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 795 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1986); Greer v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 294 (1978), aff'd on another issue, 634 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1980); Londen v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 106 (1965). Whether a person is, in fact, an agent of another is a question of state law. See § 8.1.

32 32E.g., Morrison v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 251 (1987).

33 33McCall v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9263 (D.S.C. 1972).

34 34Richardson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 67, 73 (1984).

35 35See Reg. § 1.170A-1(b).

36 36Ferguson v. Commissioner, 99-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,412 (9th Cir. 1999).

37 37This opinion, with its focus on ripening of stock into a fixed right to receive money, illustrates that this matter of the timing of charitable gifts, for deductibility purposes, ties in with the doctrine of anticipatory assignment of income (see § 2.1(h)) and the step transaction doctrine (see § 3.7). The facts in another court opinion amount to a case study as to how not to go about structuring a charitable contribution of stock, with lessons abounding for donors, lawyers, accountants, and appraisers (Bergquist v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 8 (2008)).

38 38Kingsrow Enters., Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

39 3917 U.S.C. § 28 (1976).

40 40The copyright “is not transferred by mere physical delivery, or other acquisition, of the certificate” (Kingsrow Enters, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).

41 41Smith v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 431, 437-38 (1981).

42 42Rev. Rul. 78-38, 1978-1 C.B. 67. This rule assumes that the notes represent bona fide debt (e.g., Lippmann v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 130 (1969)).

43 43Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. 81. Also O'Neil v. United States, 82-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9209 (E.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd without opinion (9th Cir. 1982); Guren v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 118 (1976); Petty v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 521 (1963).

44 44See text accompanying supra note 1. Also Story III v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 936 (1962); Andrus v. Burnet, 50 F.2d 332 (D.C. Ct. App. 1931).

45 45Rev. Rul. 68-174, 1968-1 C.B. 81.

46 46Watson v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 544 (1978), aff'd, 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).

47 47Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8420002.

48 48Rev. Rul. 82-197, 1982-2 C.B. 72; Rev. Rul. 78-181, 1978-1 C.B. 261.

49 49See § 2.4(c).

50 50See Private Foundations ch. 4.

51 51Id., ch. 5.

52 52Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9335057.

53 53Tech. Adv. Mem. 9828001.

54 54See Private Foundations ch. 4.

55 55Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200530007, superseding Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200312003.

56 56See Private Foundations ch. 5.

57 57Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(c)(3).

58 58See Private Foundations ch. 10.

59 59IRC § 512(b)(5). See § 3.6.

60 60Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9623035.

61 61In a federal tax controversy, state law controls the determination of a taxpayer's interest in property, while the tax consequences are determined in accordance with federal law (e.g., United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985)).

62 62E.g., Dyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321 (1990); Brotzler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1478 (1982); Guest v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 9 (1981); Alioto v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1147 (1980); Dodge, Jr. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1170 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

63 63Douglas v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 563 (1989).

64 64Kaplan v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 695 (2006).

65 65Tidler v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 934 (1987).

66 66See § 4.14.

67 67In general, see § 7.6.

68 68Mecox Partners LP v. United States, 117 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2016-593 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Also Zarlengo v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155 (2014); Rothman v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (2012), supp. by 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1864 (2012).

69 69Ten Twenty Six Investors v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1516 (2017).

70 70See § 7.6(d), text accompanied by note 216.

71 71See IRC § 1361(a)(2).

72 72IRC § 170(a)(2); Reg. § 1.170A-11(b). An illustration of this rule appears in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7802001. This rule was created because corporations intending to make the maximum charitable contribution allowable as a deduction experienced difficulty in determining, before the end of the tax year, what their net income would be. S. Rep. No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (vol. 3) 3–4 (1949).

73 73Reg. § 1.170A-11(b)(2). In Chase v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1960), and Wood-Mosaic Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Ky. 1958), charitable deductions were denied because there was no evidence that the corporations authorized the contributions during the tax years involved.

74 74Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7802001. This rule was created because corporations intending to make the maximum charitable contribution allowable as a deduction experienced difficulty in determining before the end of the tax year what their net income would be (S. Rep. No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (vol. 3) 3–4 (1949)).

75 75See § 4.16.

76 76See IRC § 1361(a)(1).

77 77See § 4.18.

78 78IRC § 1366(a)(1)(A).

79 79Rev. Rul. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 333.

80 80IRC § 1363(b). The election provided by IRC § 170(a)(2) is not available to an individual.

81 81IRC § 703(a)(2)(C).

82 82IRC § 1366(a)(1)(A).

83 83IRC § 1367(a)(2)(B).

84 84IRC § 1367(a)(2). This rule is comparable to the basis adjustment rule in the case of charitable contributions made by a partnership (see § 6.16).

85 85The IRS ruled that, if an S corporation made a charitable contribution of appreciated property during a tax year beginning after December 31, 2005, and before January 1, 2008, the amount of the charitable contribution deduction a shareholder of the corporation may claim may not exceed the sum of (1) the shareholder's pro rata share of the fair market value of the contributed property over the property's adjusted tax basis and (2) the loss limitation amount (IRC § 1366(d)) that is allocable to the contributed property's adjusted basis (Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(4)). Rev. Rul. 2008-16, 2008-1 C.B. 585.

86 86IRC § 703(a)(2)(C).

87 87IRC § 702(a)(4); Reg. §§ 1.702-1(a)(4), 1.703-1(a)(2)(iv).

88 88Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(7).

89 89See ch. 7.

90 90Rev. Rul. 96-11, 1996-1 C.B. 140.

91 91IRC § 705(a)(1).

92 92IRC § 705(a)(2).

93 93IRC § 705(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B).

94 94IRC § 705(a)(1)(B).

95 95IRC § 705(a)(2)(B).

96 96Another illustration of these rules is available in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200208019, concerning the federal tax consequences of the making of a qualified conservation contribution (see § 7.6) by a partnership.

97 97IRC § 704(d).

98 98Act § 13503(b).

99 99See § 2.6, third bulleted item.

100 100Similar issues arise in the context of contributions of vehicles. See § 7.24.

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