George Williams - History of the Negro Race in America from 1619 to 1880 (Vol. 1&2)

Slavery having been firmly established in Massachusetts, the next step was to make it hereditary. This was done under the sanction of the highest and most solemn forms of the courts of law. It is not our purpose to give this subject the attention it merits, in this place; but in a subsequent chapter it will receive due attention. We will, however, say in passing, that it was the opinion of many lawyers in the last century, some of whom served upon the bench in Massachusetts, that children followed the condition of their mothers. Chief-Justice Parsons held that "the issue of the female slave, according to the maxim of the civil law, was the property of her master." And, subsequently, Chief-Justice Parker rendered the following opinion:—

"The practice was … to consider such issue as slaves, and the property of the master of the parents, liable to be sold and transferred like other chattels, and as assets in the hands of executors and administrators. … We think there is no doubt that, at any period of our history, the issue of a slave husband and a free wife would have been declared free. His children, if the issue of a marriage with a slave, would, immediately on their birth, become the property of his master, or of the master of the female slave." 287

This decision is strengthened by the statement of Kendall in reference to the wide-spread desire of Negro slaves to secure free Indian wives, in order to insure the freedom of their children. He says—

"While slavery was supposed to be maintainable by law in Massachusetts, there was a particular temptation to Negroes for taking Indian wives, the children of Indian women being acknowledged to be free." 288

We refer the reader, with perfect confidence, to our friend Dr. George H. Moore, who, in his treatment of this particular feature of slavery in Massachusetts, has, with great research, put down a number of zealous friends of the colony who have denied, with great emphasis, that any child was ever born into slavery there. Neither the opinion of Chief-Justice Dana, nor the naked and barren assertions of historians Palfrey, Sumner, and Washburn—great though the men were—can dispose of the historical reality of hereditary slavery in Massachusetts , down to the adoption of the Constitution of 1780.

The General Court of Massachusetts issued an order in 1645 289for the return of certain kidnapped or stolen Negroes to their native country. It has been variously commented upon by historians and orators. The story runs, that a number of ships, plying between New-England seaport towns and Madeira and the Canaries, made it their custom to call on the coast of Guinea "to trade for negroes." Thus secured, they were disposed of in the slave-markets of Barbadoes and the West Indies. The New-England slave-market did not demand a large supply. Situated on a cold, bleak, and almost sterile coast, Massachusetts lacked the conditions to make slave-trading as lucrative as the Southern States; but, nevertheless, she disposed of quite a number, as the reader will observe when we examine the first census. A ship from the town of Boston consorted with "some Londoners" with the object of gaining slaves. Mr. Bancroft 290says that "upon the Lord's day, invited the natives aboard one of their ships," and then made prisoners of such as came; which is not mentioned by Hildreth. 291The latter writer says, that "on pretence of some quarrel with the natives," landed a small cannon called a "murderer," attacked the village on Sunday; and having burned the village, and killed many, made a few prisoners. Several of these prisoners fell to the Boston ship. On account of a disagreement between the captain and under officers of the ship, as well as the owners, the story of the above affair was detailed before a Boston court. Richard Saltonstall was one of the magistrates before whom the case was tried. He was moved by the recital of the cruel wrong done the Africans, and therefore presented a petition to the court, charging the captain and mate with the threefold crime of "murder," "man-stealing," and "sabbath-breaking." 292

It seems that by the Fundamental Laws, adopted by the people in 1641, the first two offences were punishable by death, and all of them "capitall, by the law of God." The court doubted its jurisdiction over crimes committed on the distant coast of Guinea. But article ninety-one of "The Body of Liberties" determined who were lawful slaves—those who sold themselves or were sold, "lawful captives taken in just wares," and those "judged thereto by authority." Had the unfortunate Negroes been purchased, there was no law in Massachusetts to free them from their owners; but having been kidnapped, unlawfully obtained, the court felt that it was its plain duty to bear witness against the "sin of man-stealing." For, in the laws adopted in 1641, among the "Capital Laws," at the latter part of article ninety-four is the following: "If any man stealeth a man, or mankind, he shall surely be put to death." 293There is a marginal reference to Exod. xxi. 16. Dr. Moore does not refer to this in his elaborate discussion of statute on "bond slavery." And Winthrop says that the magistrates decided that the Negroes, "having been procured not honestly by purchase, but by the unlawful act of kidnaping," should be returned to their native country. That there was a criminal code in the colony, there can be no doubt; but we have searched for it in vain. Hildreth 294says it was printed in 1649, but that there is now no copy extant.

The court issued an order about the return of the kidnapped Negroes, which we will give in full, on account of its historical value, and because of the difference of opinion concerning it.

"The general court conceiving themselves bound by the first opportunity to bear witness against the heinous, and crying sin of man-stealing, as also to prescribe such timely redress for what is past, and such a law for the future, as may sufficiently deter all others belonging to us to have to do in such vile and odious courses, justly abhorred of all good and just men, do order that the negro interpreter with others unlawfully taken, be by the first opportunity at the charge of the country for the present, sent to his native country (Guinea) and a letter with him of the indignation of the court thereabouts, and justice thereof, desiring our honored governor would please put this order in execution." 295

This "protest against man-stealing" has adorned and flavored many an oration on the "position of Massachusetts" on the slavery question. It has been brought out "to point a moral and adorn a tale" by the proud friends of the Commonwealth; but the law quoted above against "man-stealing," the language of the "protest," the statute on "bond servitude," and the practices of the colonists for many years afterwards, prove that many have gloried, but not according to the truth. 296When it came to the question of damages, the court said: "For the negars (they being none of his, but stolen ) we thinke meete to allow nothing." 297

So the decision of the court was based upon law—the prohibition against "man-stealing." And it should not be forgotten that many of the laws of the colony were modelled after the Mosaic code. It is referred to, apologetically, in the statute of 1641; and no careful student can fail to read between the lines the desire there expressed to refer to the Old Testament as authority for slavery. Now, slaves were purchased by Abraham, and the New-England "doctors of the law" were unwilling to have slaves stolen when they could be bought 298so easily. Dr. Moore says, in reference to the decision—

"In all the proceedings of the General Court on this occasion, there is not a trace of anti-slavery opinion or sentiment, still less of anti-slavery legislation; though both have been repeatedly claimed for the honor of the colony." 299