Lucius Seneca - Yale Required Reading - Collected Works (Vol. 2)

"In good truth, Antonius," interposed Sulpicius, "you recall these circumstances to my memory with justice; since I never saw anything slip out of any person's hands, as that case then slipped out of mine. For whereas, as you observed, I had given you not a case to plead, but a flame to extinguish; what a commencement was it (immortal gods!) that you made! What timidity was there! What distrust! What a degree of hesitation and slowness of speech! But as soon as you had gained by your exordium the only thing that the assembly would allow you as an excuse, namely, that you were pleading for a man intimately connected with you, and your own quaestor, how quickly did you secure your way to a fair audience! But lo! when I thought that you had reaped no other benefit than that the hearers would think they ought to excuse you for defending a pernicious citizen, on account of the ties of union between you, you began to proceed gradually and tacitly, while others had as yet no suspicion of your designs, though I myself felt some apprehension, to maintain in your defence that what had happened was not sedition in Norbanus, but resentment on the part of the Roman people, resentment not excited unjustly, but deservedly, and in conformity with their duty. In the next place, what argument did you omit against Caepio? How did you confound all the circumstances of the case by allusions to hatred, ill-will, and compassion? Nor was this the case only in your defence, but even in regard to Scaurus and my other witnesses, whose evidence you did not confute by disproving it, but by having recourse to the same impetuosity of the people. When those circumstances were mentioned by you just now, I felt no desire for any rules of instruction; for the very demonstration of your methods of defence, as stated by yourself, I regard as no ordinary instruction." "But if you are so disposed," said Antonius, "I will tell you what maxims I adopt in speaking, and what I keep principally in view; for a long life and experience in important affairs have taught me to discern by what means the minds of men are to be moved.

"The first thing I generally consider is, whether the case requires that the minds of the audience should be excited; for such fiery oratory is not to be exerted on trivial subjects, nor when the minds of men are so affected that we can do nothing by eloquence to influence their opinions, lest we be thought to deserve ridicule or dislike, if we either act tragedies about trifles or endeavour to pluck up what cannot be moved. For as the feelings on which we have to work in the minds of the judges, or whoever they may be before whom we may plead, are love, hatred, anger, envy, pity, hope, joy, fear, anxiety, we are aware that love may be gained if you seem to advocate what is advantageous to the persons before whom you are speaking; or if you appear to exert yourself in behalf of good men, or at least for such as are good and serviceable to them; for the latter case more engages favour, the former, the defence of virtue, esteem; and if a hope of future advantage is proposed, it has a greater effect than the mention of past benefits. You must endeavour to show that in the case which you defend, either their dignity or advantage is concerned; and you should indicate that he for whom you solicit their love has referred nothing to his own private benefit, and done nothing at all for his own sake; for dislike is felt for the selfish gains of individuals, while favour is shown to their desires to serve others. But we must take care, while we are on this topic, not to appear to extol the merit and glory of those whom we would wish to be esteemed for their good deeds, too highly, as these qualities are usually the greatest objects of envy. From these considerations, too, we shall learn how to draw hatred on our adversaries, and to avert it from ourselves and our friends. The same means are to be used, also, either to excite or allay anger; for if you exaggerate every fact that is hurtful or disadvantageous to the audience, their hatred is excited; but if anything of the kind is thrown out against men of worth, or against characters on whom no one ought to cast any reflection, or against the public, there is then produced, if not so violent a degree of hatred, at least an unfavourable feeling, or displeasure near akin to hatred. Fear is also inculcated either from people's own dangers or those of the public. Personal fear affects men more deeply; but that which is common to all is to be treated by the orator as having similar influence. 16

"Similar, or rather the same, is the case with regard to hope, joy, and anxiety; but I know not whether the feeling of envy is not by far the most violent of all emotions; nor does it require less power to suppress than to excite it. Men envy chiefly their equals or inferiors when they perceive themselves left behind, and are mortified that the others have outstripped them; but there is often a strong unfavourable feeling towards superiors, which is the stronger if they are intolerably arrogant, and transgress the fair bounds of common justice through outstanding dignity or fortune. If such advantages are to be made instruments to kindle dislike, 17the chief thing to be said is, 'that they are not the acquisitions of virtue, that they have even been gained perhaps by vice and crime; and that, however honourable or imposing they may appear, no merit was ever carried so high as the insolence of mankind and their arrogant disdain." To allay envy, it may be observed, that such advantages have been gained by extreme toil and imminent perils; that they have not been applied to the individual's own private benefit, but that of others; that he himself, if he appear to have gained any glory, although it might not be an undue reward for danger, was not elated with it, but wholly set it aside and undervalued it; and such an effect must by all means be produced (since most men are envious, and it is a most common and prevalent vice, and envy is felt towards all outstanding and flourishing fortune), that the opinion entertained of such characters be lowered, and that their fortunes, so excellent in people's imaginations, may appear mingled with labour and trouble.

"Pity is excited, if he who hears can be induced to apply to his own circumstances those unhappy particulars which are lamented in the case of others, particulars which they have either suffered or fear to suffer; and while he looks at another, to glance frequently at himself. Thus, as all the circumstances connected to human suffering are heard with concern, if they are pathetically represented, so virtue in affliction and humiliation is the most sorrowful of all objects to contemplate; and as that other department of eloquence which, by its recommendation of goodness, ought to give the picture of a virtuous man, should be in a gentle and (as I have often observed) a submissive strain, so this, which is adopted by the orator to effect a change in the minds of the audience, and to work upon them in every way, should be vehement and energetic.

"But there is a certain resemblance in these two kinds (one of which we would have to be gentle, the other vehement), that makes it difficult to distinguish them. For something of that gentleness with which we conciliate the affections of an audience, ought to mingle with the ardour with which we awaken their passions; and something of this ardour should occasionally communicate a warmth to our gentleness of language; nor is there any species of eloquence better tempered than that in which the asperity of contention in the orator is mitigated by his humanity, or in which the relaxed tone of gentleness is sustained by a becoming gravity and energy. But in both modes of speaking, as well that in which spirit and force are required as that which is brought down to ordinary life and manners, the beginning should be slow, but the sequel full and diffuse. 18For you must not spring at once into the passionate portion of your speech, as it forms no part of the question, and men are first desirous to learn the very point that is to come under their judgment; nor, when you have entered upon that track, are you suddenly to diverge from it; for you are not to suppose that as an argument is understood as soon as it is stated, and a second and a third are then desired, so you can with the same ease move compassion, or envy, or anger, as soon as you make the attempt. 19Reason itself confirms an argument which fixes itself in the mind as soon as it is delivered; but that sort of eloquence does not aim at instructing the judge, but rather at agitating his mind by excessive emotion, which no one can produce unless by fullness and variety and even copiousness of language, and a proportionate energy of delivery. Those, therefore, who speak either with brevity, or in a low submissive strain, may indeed inform the judge, but can never move him, an effect on which success altogether depends. It is clear, that the ability of arguing on every subject on both sides of the question is drawn from the same considerations. But we must resist the force of an argument, either by refuting those things which are assumed in support of it, or by showing that the conclusion which our opponents would draw cannot be deduced from the premises, or possibly follow from them; or, if you cannot refute an argument in this manner, you must bring something against it of greater or equal weight. But whatever is delivered with gentleness to conciliate favour, or with vehemence to excite emotion, is to be countered 20by moving contrary feelings, so that benevolence may be eradicated by hatred, and compassion be dispelled by jealousy.