Lucius Seneca - Yale Required Reading - Collected Works (Vol. 2)

"It contributes much to success in speaking, that the morals, principles, conduct, and lives of those who plead cases, and of those for whom they plead, should be such as to merit esteem; and that those of their adversaries should be such as to deserve censure; and also that the minds of those before whom the case is pleaded should be moved as much as possible to a favourable feeling, as well towards the speaker as towards him for whom he speaks. The feelings of the hearers are conciliated by a person's dignity, by his actions, by the character of his life; particulars which can more easily be adorned by eloquence, if they really exist, than be invented, if they have no existence. But the qualities that attract favour to the orator are a soft tone of voice, a countenance expressive of modesty, a mild manner of speaking; so that if he attacks any one with severity, he may seem to do so unwillingly and from compulsion. It is of peculiar advantage that indications of good nature, of liberality, of gentleness, of piety, of grateful feelings, free from selfishness and avarice, should appear in him; and everything that characterizes men of probity and humility, not acrimonious, nor stubborn, nor litigious, nor harsh, very much conciliates benevolence, and alienates the affections from those in whom such qualities are not apparent. The contrary qualities to these, therefore, are to be imputed to your opponents. This mode of address is extremely excellent in those cases in which the mind of the judge is not likely to be inflamed by an ardent and vehement assault; for energetic oratory is not always desirable, but often smooth, submissive, gentle language, which gains much favour for defendants { rei }, a term by which I designate not only such as are accused, but all persons about whose affairs there is any litigation; for people formerly used the word in that sense. To describe the character of your clients in your speeches, therefore, as just, full of integrity, religious, unpresuming, and long-suffering, has an extraordinary effect; and such a description, either in the commencement, or in your statement of facts, or in the peroration, has so much influence, if it is agreeably and judiciously managed, that it often prevails more than the merits of the case. Such influence, indeed, is produced by a certain feeling and art in speaking, that the speech seems to represent, as it were, the character of the speaker; for, by adopting a peculiar mode of thought and expression, united with action that is gentle and indicative of amiableness, such an effect is produced, that the speaker seems to be a man of probity, integrity, and virtue.

"To this mode of speaking we may add the opposite method, which moves the minds of the judges by very different means, and impels them to hate, or love, or envy, or benevolence, or fear, or hope, or desire, or abhorrence, or joy, or grief, or pity, or severity; or leads them to whatever feelings resemble and are allied to these and similar emotions of mind. It is desirable, too, for the orator, that the judges may voluntarily bring to the hearing of the case some feelings in their breasts favourable to the object of the speaker. For it is easier, as they say, to increase the speed of someone who is already running, than to excite to motion someone who is static. But if such shall not be the case, or be somewhat doubtful, then, as a careful physician, before he proceeds to administer any medicine to a patient, must not only understand the disease of him whom he would cure, but also his habit and constitution of body when in health; so I, for my part, when I undertake a case of such doubt and importance as is likely to excite the feelings of the judges, employ all my abilities on the care and consideration of ascertaining, as skilfully as I can, what their sentiments and opinions are, what they expect, to which side they incline, and to what conclusion they are likely to be led, with the least difficulty, by the force of oratory. If they yield themselves up, and, as I said before, voluntarily incline and tilt to the side to which I would impel them, I embrace what is offered, and turn my sails to that quarter from where any breath of wind is perceived to blow. But if the judge is unbiased, and free from all passion, it is a work of greater difficulty; for every feeling must then be moved by the power of oratory, without any assistance from nature. But so great are the powers of eloquence, which was rightly termed by a good poet, 9

Incliner of the soul, and queen of all things,

that it cannot only make him upright who is biased, or bias him who is steadfast, but can, like an able and resolute commander, lead even him captive who resists and opposes.

"These are the points about which Crassus just now jokingly questioned me when he said that I treated them divinely, and praised what I did, as being excellently done, in the cases of Manius Aquilius, 10Gaius Norbanus, 11and some others; but really, Crassus, when such arts are adopted by you in pleading, I use to feel terrified; such power of mind, such impetuosity, such passion, is expressed in your eyes, your countenance, your gesture, and even in your very finger; 12such a torrent is there of the most emphatic and best chosen words, such noble thoughts, so just, so new, so free from all disguise or puerile embellishment, that you seem not only to me to fire the judge, but to be yourself on fire. Nor is it possible that the judge should feel concern, or hate, or envy, or fear in any degree, or that he should be moved to compassion and tears, unless all those sensations which the orator would awaken in the judge shall appear to be deeply felt and experienced by the orator himself. For if a counterfeit passion were to be assumed, and if there were nothing, in a speech of that kind, but what was false and simulated, still greater art would perhaps be necessary. What is the case with you, however, Crassus, or with others, I do not know; as to myself, there is no reason why I should say what is false to men of your great good sense and friendship for me, I never yet, upon my honour, tried to excite sorrow, or compassion, or envy, or hatred, when speaking before a court of law, but I myself, in rousing the judges, was affected with the very same sensations that I wished to produce in them. For it is not easy to cause the judge to be angry with him with whom you desire him to be angry, if you yourself appear to take the matter coolly; or to make him hate him whom you wish him to hate, unless he first see you burning with hatred; nor will he be moved to pity, unless you give him plain indications of your own acute feelings, by your expressions, sentiments, tone of voice, look, and finally by sympathetic tears; for as no fuel is so combustible as to kindle without the application of fire, so no disposition of mind is so susceptible of the impressions of the orator as to be animated to strong feeling, unless he himself approach it full of inflammation and ardour.

"And that it may not appear to you extraordinary and astonishing, that a man should so often be angry, so often grieve, and be so often excited by every passion of the mind, especially in other men's concerns, there is such force, let me assure you, in those thoughts and sentiments which you apply, handle, and discuss in speaking, that there is no occasion for simulation or deceit; for the very nature of the language which is adopted to move the passions of others, moves the orator himself in a greater degree than any one of those who listen to him. That we may not be surprised, too, that this happens in legal cases, in criminal trials, in the danger of our friends, and before a multitude in the city and in the forum, where not only our reputation for ability is at stake, (for that might be a slight consideration; although, when you have professed to accomplish what few can do, it is not wholly to be neglected;) but where other things of greater importance are concerned, fidelity, duty to our clients, and earnestness in discharging that duty; we are so much moved by such considerations, that even while we defend the merest strangers, we cannot regard them as strangers, if we wish to be thought honest men ourselves. But, as I said, that this may not appear surprising in us, what can be more fictitious than poetry, than theatrical representations, than the argument of a play? Yet on the stage I myself have often observed the eyes of the actor through his mask appear inflamed with fury, while he was repeating these verses, 13