Lucius Seneca - Yale Required Reading - Collected Works (Vol. 2)

"From things closely relating to the subject arguments are drawn thus: 'If the utmost praise is to be attributed to filial duty, you ought to be moved when you see Quintus Metellus mourn so tenderly.' From general considerations, thus: 'If magistrates ought to be under the power of the Roman people, of what do you accuse Norbanus, whose tribuneship was subservient to the will of the state?' From particulars that fall under the general consideration, thus: 'If all who consult the interest of the public ought to be dear to us, certainly military commanders should be peculiarly dear, by whose conduct, courage, and exposure to danger, we preserve our own safety and the dignity of the empire.' From similarity, thus: 'If wild beasts love their offspring, what affection ought we to feel for our children?' From dissimilarity, thus: 'If it be the character of barbarians to live as it were for a short season, our plans ought to have respect to perpetuity.' In both modes of comparison, from similarity as well as dissimilarity, examples are taken from the acts, sayings, and successes of others; and fictitious narratives may often be introduced. From contraries, arguments are drawn thus: 'If Gracchus acted in a detestable manner , Opimius has acted in a glorious manner.' From subsequent circumstances, thus: 'If he be slain with a weapon, and you, his enemy, are found on the very spot with a bloody sword, and nobody but you is seen there, and no one else had any reason to commit the act, and you were always of a daring character, what ground is there on which we can possibly doubt of your guilt?' From concurrent, antecedent, and repugnant circumstances, thus, as Crassus argued when he was quite a young man: 'Although, Carbo, you defended Opimius, this audience will not on that account esteem you a good citizen; for it is clear that you dissembled and had other views, because you often, in your harangues, deplored the fate of Tiberius Gracchus, because you were an accomplice in the death of Publius Africanus, because you proposed a law of such a nature in your tribuneship, because you have always opposed the good members of the state.' From the causes of things, thus: 'If you would abolish avarice, you must abolish the parent of it, luxury.' From whatever arises from those causes, thus: 'If we use the money in the treasury as well for the services of war as the ornaments of peace, let us take care of the public revenues.' Stronger, weaker, and parallel instances, we shall compare thus: from a stronger we shall argue in this way, 'If a good name be preferable to riches, and money is pursued with so much industry, with how much more exertion is glory to be sought?' From a weaker, thus:

Since merely for a small acquaintance's sake

He takes this woman's death so nearly, what

If he himself had loved? what would he feel

For me, his father? 7

"From a parallel case, thus: 'It is natural of one and the same character, to seize the public money, and to give it away it to the public detriment.' But instances borrowed from extraneous circumstances are such as are not supported by their own strength, but somewhat foreign: as, 'This is true; for Quintus Lutatius has affirmed it,' 'This is false; for an examination has been made,' 'This must of necessity follow; for I shall read the writings;' on which head I spoke fully a little while ago. LI have been as brief in the exemplification of these matters as their nature would permit. For as, if I wished to make known to any one a quantity of gold, that was buried in separate heaps, it ought to be sufficient if I told him the signs and marks of the places, with the knowledge of which he might dig for himself, and find what he wished with very little trouble, and without any mistake; so I wished to specify such marks, as it were, of arguments, as would let him who seeks them know where they are; 8what remains can be brought out by diligence and thought. What kind of arguments is most suitable to any particular kind of case it requires no exquisite skill to prescribe, but merely moderate capacity to determine. For it is not now my intention to set forth any system of rhetoric, but to communicate to men of eminent learning some hints drawn from my own experience. These common-places, therefore, being fixed in the mind and memory, and called forth on every subject proposed to be discussed, there will be nothing that can escape the orator, not merely in matters discussed in the forum, but in any department of eloquence whatever. But if he shall attain such success, as to seem to be what he would wish to seem, and to affect the minds of those before whom he pleads in such a manner as to lead or rather force them in whatever direction he pleases, he will assuredly need nothing else to render him accomplished in oratory.

"We now see, that it is by no means sufficient to find out what to say, unless we can handle it skilfully when we have found it. This treatment ought to be varied, so that he who listens may neither discover any artifice, nor be tired and satiated with uniformity. Whatever you suggest, should be laid down as a proposition, and you should show why it is so; and, from the same premises, you should sometimes form a conclusion, and sometimes leave it to be formed by the hearer, and make a transition to something else. Frequently, however, you need make no proposition, but show, by the reasoning which you shall use, what proposition might have been made. If you produce a comparison to anything, you should first confirm what you offer as a comparison; and then apply to it the point in question. In general, you should shade the distinctive points of your arguments, so that none of your hearers may count them; and that, while they appear clear as to matter, they may seem blended in your mode of speaking on them.

"I run over these matters cursorily, as addressing men of learning, and, being myself but half-learned, so that we may at length arrive at matters of greater consequence. For there is nothing, Catulus, of more importance in speaking than that the hearer should be favourable to the speaker, and be himself so strongly moved that he may be influenced more by impulse and excitement of mind, than by judgment or reflection. For mankind make far more decisions through hatred, or love, or desire, or anger, or grief, or joy, or hope, or fear, or error, or some other affection of mind, than from regard to truth, or any settled maxim, or principle of right, or judicial form, or adherence to the laws. Unless anything else, therefore, be agreeable to you, let us proceed to consider these points."

"There seems," observed Catulus, "to be still a little lacking in those matters which you have discussed, Antonius, something that requires to be explained before you proceed to what you propose." "What is it?" asked Antonius. "What order," replied Catulus, "and arrangement of arguments, has your approval; for in that department you always seem a god to me." "You may see how much of a god I am in that respect, Catulus," replied Antonius; "for I assure you the matter would never have come into my thoughts if I had not been reminded of it; so that you may suppose I am generally led by mere practice in speaking, or rather perhaps by chance, to fix on that arrangement of matter by which I seem at times to produce some effect However, that very point which I, because I had no thought of it, passed by as I should pass by a person unknown to me, is of such efficacy in oratory, that nothing is more conducive to victory; but yet you seem to me to have been premature in requiring an account of the order and disposition of the orator's material; for if I had placed all his power in argumentation, and in proving his case from its own inherent merits, it might be time to say something on the order and arrangement of his arguments; but as three heads were specified by me, and I have spoken on only one, it will be proper, after I have attended to the other two, to consider, last of all, about the general arrangement of a speech.