Yves Charbit - Demographic Dynamics and Development

To explain contemporary demographic transitions, Coale’s (1973) diffusion model has been enriched by many authors. McNicoll (1980) analyzed the consequences of political and institutional factors in the behavior of families. Becker (1991) explained the limitation of births within couples due to microeconomic factors. Caldwell (1982) highlighted the role of intergenerational wealth flows: these are transferred from children to parents in high-fertility contexts and their direction changes, from parents to children, when the costs in children’s education and health increase, leading to fertility control. From a psychosocial perspective, Fawcett (1983) proposed to take into account the perceptions of the value of children. Simons (1982) was interested in the impact of religious practice on reproductive behavior.

Another theoretical proposition is that of the second demographic transition, which refers to the diversification of family configurations in post-modern societies, marked by the increase in cohabitation outside marriage, the increase in divorces and new cohabitations after union breakdowns, the delay in age for having the first child, the increase in births outside marriage and childless couples. These changes in nuptiality and fertility are probably derived from the primacy of individual choices, more equitable gender relations, greater autonomy for women, macrostructural factors, microeconomic calculations and new cultural models and values, which are expressed individually and collectively (Lesthaeghe 2010). While these movements may have taken place in some European countries, they have not yet spread to all other parts of the world, where family and gender systems are extremely resistant to change.

The observation of contemporary demographic evolution raises questions about the universal validity of the three paradigms by Chesnais to explain the demographic transition: first, on the likelihood of the stabilization hypothesis when the transition is complete; then, on the reproductive transition in two phases (limitation of marriages, limitation of births); finally, on the influence of entry into modern economic growth (Chesnais 1986a, p. 1061).

The first question concerning the transition’s completion is based on the observation of recent upward and downward oscillations in contemporary low fertility. In 1979, Bourgeois-Pichat asked: “Is the current decline in fertility in Europe part of the demographic transition model?” To this question, he gave the following answer:

What we are currently observing seems to indicate that this last phase is not characterized by constant fertility, but rather by a succession of waves produced by modifications in family structures, which themselves result from variations in fertility. (Bourgeois-Pichat 1979, pp. 293–294)

Vallin also stressed that “the evolutions observed in the most advanced countries are moving further and further away from the model of demographic transition, and, while convergence is still possible, it is unlikely that it will lead to stabilization” (Vallin 2003, p. 75). Moreover, Myrskylä et al . (2009) have shown that the relationship between fertility in the most developed countries and the high level in the Human Development Index (HDI) 12has become positive, which explains the recovery in fertility levels in countries having reached the higher level of development.

The second question concerns the paradigm of the two-phase reproduction transition module (limitation of marriages, and consequent limitation of births), which is not always confirmed. For example, in Mexico, nuptiality is still early: in the 30 generations between 1951 and 1980, the median age for the first union 13of Mexican women was stable at age 21, despite a significant increase in their education. This did not prevent fertility from decreasing rapidly, and other factors explain this, such as the diffusion of modern contraception methods, including female sterilization (Zavala and Paéz 2016). A comparison between Algeria and Mexico showed that the reduction in fertility was similar between 1970 and 2005: decreasing from 7 to 2.4 children per woman. However, the average age for the first union evolved differently throughout the period: while it remained roughly stable in Mexico (from 21 to 23 years old), it sharply increased in Algeria (from 18 to 30 years old) (Cosio Zavala 2012).

Finally, the other paradigm that does not hold true everywhere is that of economic growth to explain changes in fertility. As a matter of fact, in developing countries, there are two fertility transition models: the first model is that of the urban and educated population, which controls their births, following an improvement in their standard of living. The second model, Malthusian poverty , has its origin in weak economic growth and poor living conditions. This has been the case in Mexico for three decades, in a situation of interminable economic crisis, where families limit the number of children because they lack the means to raise them (Cosio Zavala 1996). These two fertility transition models are also present in sub-Saharan Africa: in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire (Vimard and Fassassi 2001), Benin (Capo-Chichi 1999), Nigeria (Caldwell et al . 1992) and in a number of countries in the region (Lesthaeghe and Jolly 1995). Therefore, the postulate of a negative relationship between fertility levels and economic growth does not apply to developing countries or to highly developed populations, as mentioned above (Myrskylä et al . 2009). It is, therefore, not a global relationship, neither in all places nor at all times, capable of explaining the generalization of the demographic transition worldwide.

In the next section, we will analyze the demographic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to illustrate the diversity and particularity of developments. Having begun around 1900 in the south of the subcontinent, it has barely started in some countries today. The temporal and spatial disparities are very important, depending on social, economic and cultural contexts.

The first phase of the Latin American demographic transition began at the end of the 19th century, when mortality declined in countries with high European immigration (Argentina, Cuba, Uruguay) and large cities, with the best urban and hygiene services of the time, inspired by Paris or New York 14. At the beginning of the 20th century, the lowest crude death rates were found in Uruguay (14 per thousand), Argentina (20 per thousand), Cuba (24 per thousand) and Panama (21 per thousand), whereas the rest of the countries recorded crude death rates above 30 per thousand (Delaunay and Cosio Zavala 1992, p. 17). For the whole of Latin America 15, Arriaga estimated life expectancy at 25 years around 1825, and at 27 years around 1900 (Arriaga 1968), a considerable delay compared to European levels, which reached around 41 years for life expectancy by 1840 in Sweden, England, Wales and France (Vallin 2003, p. 5). Large differences were also observed within the subcontinent, depending on regions, infrastructure and economic and social development levels. In Cuba, for example, life expectancy in 1910 reached 34 years for men and 37 years for women (Albizu-Campos 2000). The decline in Cuban mortality was particularly rapid and Cuba has the lowest infant mortality rate in Latin America, with a rate of four deaths of children under the age of 1 per thousand births between 2015–2020 (United Nations 2019a, Mort/1-1).

Table 1.3shows the changes in life expectancies and the infant mortality rate between 1950 and 2020.

In the mid-20th century, the rapid decline in mortality spread throughout Latin America and the Caribbean ( Table 1.3). In two decades, between 1950–1955 and 1970–1975, life expectancies at birth increased by almost 10 years, and between 1980–1985 and 2000–2005, the increase was 7 years. Over the last period, between 2000–2005 and 2015–2020, the increase was 3 years. Then, during the 1980s, the “lost decade” 16, the progress in mortality slowed down ( Table 1.3) due to the Latin American economic crisis. The end of the 2000s also saw a stagnation in mortality, as the health transition now tackles chronic, degenerative diseases and violent causes, in a context of increasing social inequalities, demographic aging and great disparities between cities and rural areas, depending on gender and educational level.