Future Urban Habitation

bEducational diversity using three categories: Low = Primary and below, Secondary, ITE, Pre‐U; Middle = Polytechnic, Professional qualification; High = University degree and above.

cHousing diversity: HDB 1‐ to 3‐room/HDB 4‐room/HDB 5‐room, HDB maisonette/private or condominium apartment or landed property or shophouse.

dReligious diversity: Buddhism/Christianity/Hinduism/Islam/Taoism/Sikhism/Other/No religion.

Table 2.2 Combinations of housing dyads.

Table 2.3 Combinations of schooling status dyads.

Class polarization is a growing fact globally. World events, whether Brexit (Alabrese et al. 2019) or the American Presidency (Hochschild 2016) or the Hong Kong protests (Stevenson and Wu 2019), all point to societies facing the pressures of class divisions, especially between elites and the masses. Technological advancement and globalization have exacerbated these class divisions (Jackson 2019). In the case of Brexit, one observer considered ‘the divide between winners and losers of globalization a key driver of the vote’ (Hobolt 2016, p. 1259).

Although there are certainly other causal factors, the widening gap between classes has been linked to the rise of smart technologies. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) will likely have different effects on different groups. Smart technology will require highly‐skilled workers, paving the way, in turn, for more new discoveries and innovations. At the same time, the automation of jobs will adversely affect middle class groups. There will continue to be a demand for manual labour, but it is likely to be characterized by lower wages, part‐time work, and precarious work models.

The hollowing out of the middle is producing a polarized social structure differentiating the ‘best’ from the ‘rest’ (Jackson 2019). As Manuel Castells comments, ‘Elites are cosmopolitan, people are local’ (cited in Huntington 2004). The various groups conduct their lives separately, going about their routines in different social milieus, eating at different restaurants, living in different neighbourhoods, attending different schools and belonging to different religious congregations. The result is that their networks are closed to each other, and their circles never quite meet (Scott and Leonhardt 2005; Murray 2012; Pew Research Centre, Philip Schwadel 2018).

In Singapore, the high diversity scores for race and religion are no accident. Rather, they are the result of 50 years of nation building based on a multicultural model of racial and religious tolerance. State policies, such as the equal recognition accorded to all racial/ethnic groups, the deliberate social mixing of racial/ethnic groups in public housing or the celebration of each racial and religious group's special holidays, have blurred the lines separating racial and religious groups.

As a nation built on a meritocracy (Young 1958; Quah 1998), Singapore has produced a notable amount of social integration. In the early years, for example, it brought the bright children of all family backgrounds into the best schools, facilitating a social mixing along both class and racial lines (Siu 2019).

But the meritocracy is also a sorting mechanism with the potential to segregate. Whether in schools or workplaces, meritocracy seeks to identify the ‘best and brightest’ (Tan 2019). This produces class segregation because students are put into different educational tracks, and this, in turn, translates into distinctive trajectories and unequal life chances.

Over time, social mobility has given way to social reproduction (Chua et al. 2019). With a system already unequal (due to earlier periods of meritocratic sorting), staying the course in meritocracy merely preserves the lead of those with a head start (Tan 2018). Commenting on the Singaporean reality, Tharman Shanmugaratnam says:

What you see in other advanced countries could easily happen here, which is that while you retain some mobility in the middle of society, the top and the bottom tend to be become encrusted… The top tends to preserve its ability to succeed in meritocracy, and the bottom tends to get stuck at the bottom end of the ladder. It is happening in many societies, and we are beginning to see it happen here.

( Teng 2019 )

The social segregation of class groups, of elites versus non‐elites, will threaten the fabric of Singaporean society not least because it breeds a politics of envy, and for those at the lower end, including the young, feelings of helplessness and marginalization (Mills and Blossfeld 2006). Sometimes, the losers of the meritocratic race end up blaming themselves (Mijs 2016).

The future city – any future city – needs a healthy mix of social relationships between diverse groups. In the rest of this chapter, I discuss three ways to mitigate patterns of social polarization. The first is the mobilization of common frames of reference to unite diverse groups. The second is the promotion of voluntary associational life to contribute to conviviality and sociability. The third is the intentional building of personal communities based on the principles of diversity to create a shared sense of national belongingness.

Singaporean national identity, by which I mean the sense of belonging to the Singapore nation, has remained high over the years (Ooi et al. 2002). Altercations between racial/ethnic groups are few and far between, with racial riots a thing of the past. A peaceful society boosts collective social capital and is associated with such desirable outcomes as low crime rate (Putnam 2000; Quah 1998).

In Singapore, national identity serves as a superordinate identity over other smaller group‐based identities. It allows members of the various racial groups to view members of other groups, not as outgroup but as ingroup members. This occurs via the process of social recategorization , whereby former outgroup members are now part of the ingroup, with the national identity marker serving as a third‐party common denominator (Reeskens and Wright 2013). With boundaries blurred between in‐ and outgroups, a national identity increases the likelihood that we trust our fellow citizens, with their colour, creed or economic background posing fewer barriers to a sense of solidarity (Reeskens and Wright 2013).

In global cities, a potential source of conflict is the gulf between locals and foreigners, such as migrants, for example. The site of threat is typically in the economic domain, especially the fear that foreigners (both high‐end and low‐end) are taking away the jobs of locals (Koh 2003). Feelings of threat can be more pronounced when economic resources are scarcer, such as during an economic downturn (Olzak 1992). If newcomers are able to offer the same labour for a much lower price, feelings of threat and intergroup hostility seem inevitable (Bonacich 1972). At the other end of the spectrum, newcomers can also include high‐wage workers, for example, ‘transnational elites’, whose presence can make locals feel the best positions are being usurped (Beaverstock 2002).