However, most modern theorists do not buy all of the elements of a classic tension-release model. Humor is not necessarily “cathartic” in the therapeutic sense; that is, it does not necessarily reduce the tendency to engage in future behaviors related to the tension (Ferguson & Ford, 2008; Martin, 2007). For example, research shows that sexist humor does not decrease the tendency to engage in sexist behavior soon afterward; sometimes the opposite occurs, and sexist humor may even lead to complex domineering behaviors (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010). Thus, a straightforward catharsis model of humor based on sexual or other tension may not be correct. One alternative but related explanation for this kind of humor is that there may be a pleasantness associated with being able to release the tension of a repressed or suppressed impulse or motive, but such humor does not reduce our tendencies to engage in this impulse; it just releases us from the unpleasantness of not being able to express it. For example, modern social psychologists talk about disparagement humor of groups as releasing “negative intergroup motives” (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010, p. 661).
Indeed, many modern theorists argue that humor is complex and multifaceted, and one usually needs both elements, especially when actual laughter occurs. Humor, broadly defined, does not always make us laugh; perhaps tension release is even required for actual laughter to occur. We may receive a rather pleasant feeling and perhaps a smile from, for example, a clever witticism, twist, or incongruity; yet it is still humor, even though it does not evoke the deep release of a joke that causes a belly laugh. But when humor does make us laugh, there is usually some level of tension involved and released.
Recall from the discussion of masturbation (chapter 5) that many asexual people do masturbate, but at a lower rate and less frequently than sexual people. If so, this analysis is, of course, most applicable to the non-masturbating asexuals.
If humor that causes laughter is more associated with emotional tension than other forms of humor (e.g., puns and other incongruities), then this joke may elicit only mild appreciation in asexual people. It may evoke a pleasant cognitive shift, a recognition of a strange incongruity being somewhat resolved. Thus, sexual people may laugh; asexual people may just smile?
So, yes, women (particularly those without much experience grasping a penis) may also not appreciate this joke.
Of course, when a phenomenon has multiple causes—say, two, for this example—they could be two discrete biological causes, or two discrete environmental ones, and not necessarily one of each.
Like micro and macro causes, distal and proximate causes are not necessarily incompatible, as they can also coexist at different points along a (potentially very long) causal stream or pathway for a given phenomenon. For example, an evolutionary cause of gender differences in sexuality is that during human evolution, men and women developed different mating strategies. Women developed a more cautious mating strategy to maximize their large parental/reproductive investment (relatively few eggs, nine months of gestation). Men developed a more risky and indiscriminate mating strategy to maximize their small parental/reproductive investment (cheap, replaceable sperm). A compatible proximate explanation is that these different mating strategies are caused by hormone levels affecting sex drive, with women exhibiting lower levels of testosterone and a lower sex drive than men. Sometimes evolutionary causes are construed as the whys , and proximate causes as the hows , of events and phenomena.
As mentioned, historical causes would also constitute more of a macro- than a microanalysis.
This is not to imply that this would be a “conscious” strategy.
Estrogens (e.g., estradiol) are sometimes referred to as “female hormones,” but this is a bit simplistic, just as suggesting that testosterone is a male hormone (see the complexity of sex and gender in chapter 6). For example, testosterone itself can be converted to estradiol under the influence of an enzyme (aromatase) and both testosterone and estrogen (e.g., estradiol) are produced in both males and females.
One of these groups is pedophiles. This fact should not be taken to mean that homosexuality (or asexuality) and thus pedophilia should be seen as linked in a behavioral way—that is, to mean that gay men, lesbians, or asexuals are more likely to abuse children. This is not the case. Instead, this fact should be taken as evidence that sexual attraction, atypical and otherwise, is very likely influenced by prenatal events.
We can add to this evidence the research mentioned in chapter 6 showing that asexual women have atypical menarche onset (Bogaert, 2004). There is also evidence that asexual people may be somewhat shorter than sexual people (Bogaert, 2004). Atypical menarche and stature are both potential markers of altered biological development, including an altered prenatal development. Interestingly, there is evidence of atypical height patterns in gays and lesbians, although this research is not consistent and may be subject to non-biological interpretations (Bogaert & McCreary, 2011).
Does this mean that no asexual person would ever become sexual (e.g., develop sexual attractions) by taking testosterone? Not necessarily. Although the majority of asexual people likely do not have a “hormone deficiency,” there is always a possibility that some asexual people have lower-than-average testosterone or other hormones relative to sexual people. For example, low hormone levels in some asexual people may occur because of a health condition (for some evidence of this, see my original article published in 2004). Also, it is possible that some asexual people with average hormone levels who take abnormally high testosterone could raise their sex drive and, perhaps, develop some level of sexual attraction for others. There are at least two issues here, though: First, as mentioned, there is currently little evidence that asexual people, as a whole, have lower testosterone levels than average sexual people. Second, is it ethical to administer abnormally high hormones to an asexual person if asexuality, arguably, is not a disorder (see also chapters 8 and 9)?