Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

Perhaps the best way of answering this question is to look for pointers in the present, however isolated and scattered they might be. There are three examples. The first concerns the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, which China described as a ‘punitive war to teach Vietnam a lesson’ about the proximity of Chinese power and its belief that the Vietnamese had not been sufficiently grateful for the assistance they had received from China during the Vietnam War. [955] [955] Alexander Vuving, ‘Traditional and Modern Sino-Vietnamese Relations’, in Reid and Zheng, Negotiating Asymmetry , p. 9. The language of this war, the tone of imperial condescension, the desire to assert a hierarchical relationship, the need for big brother to teach younger brother a lesson, were a throwback to the days of the pre-modern Chinese world order and the tributary system. [956] [956] Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy , p. 270. In not dissimilar vein, China has used military force in the disputes over the islands in the South China Sea, against the Philippines in 1995 and most notably against Vietnam in 1956, 1974, and again in 1988, when China took six islands in the Spratly area, three Vietnamese ships were sunk and seventy-two Vietnamese seamen killed. [957] [957] Li, ‘Security Challenge of an Ascendant China ’, p. 28; Callahan, Contingent States , p. 66. These actions all bear the imprint of the tributary system, the need to assert the natural hierarchical order of things, and, if necessary, punish those who dared step out of line. It should be noted, however, that relations between China and Vietnam have improved considerably over recent years, although the enmity between them, which stretches back many centuries, is deeply rooted. [958] [958] Shambaugh, ‘ China Engages Asia’, p. 81; Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong’, p. 81.

The second example concerns the relationship between China and Chinese citizens abroad. In autumn 2005 it was alleged that a Chinese female tourist in Malaysia had been strip-searched and subjected to violent assault by Malaysian officials. The issue was first reported by the China Press , a Malaysian Chinese-language newspaper, and was subsequently taken up with such vehemence by the Chinese media that the Malaysian prime minister ordered an independent investigation, as well as instructing his home affairs minister to make a special trip to Beijing in order to explain and apologize. [959] [959] ‘Abuse Claims Spark Uproar’, China Daily , 28 November 2005; ‘Malaysia Urged to Probe Women Abuse Cases’, China Daily , 30 November 2005; ‘Police Abuse Images Hurt Tourist Confidence’, editorial, China Daily , 30 November 2005. An editorial in the China Daily , the official government newspaper, exclaimed: ‘All sensible minds cannot but be shocked by the images showing a female compatriot of ours being forced to perform “ear-squats” naked by a Malaysian policewoman in uniform. No excuse can justify brutality of such magnitude.’ [960] [960] ‘ Malaysia Urged to Probe Women Abuse Cases’, China Daily , 30 November 2005. The editorial exercised little restraint or circumspection. Yet soon afterwards it was discovered that the woman in question was not a Chinese citizen, or even Chinese for that matter, but a Malay. [961] [961] ‘Oriental Daily in Danger of Getting Suspended’, Strait Times , 20 January 2006. The Chinese response to the incident was, from the outset, both disproportionate and belligerent, and based on false information culled from the Chinese-Malaysian press. It would be wrong to draw too many conclusions from one isolated incident, but the Chinese reaction, under the circumstances, was overbearing and intemperate. The Chinese treated the Malaysian government with scant respect. They didn’t even have the courtesy to check the facts first. They behaved in an imperial fashion towards what they seemed to regard, in tone at least, as a lesser state. Meanwhile, the Malaysian government, for its part, acted in the manner of a suitably humble and deferential tributary state. As Chinese tourism in the region grows apace, the incident suggests that the protection afforded to Chinese citizens abroad will be attentive and proactive at best, invasive and aggressive at worst.

The final example concerns the response of the Chinese to the riots against the local Chinese in Indonesia in 1997. In the event, the Chinese government displayed considerable restraint, seeking to discourage the kind of demonstrations staged by the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, New York, South-East Asia and Australia. [962] [962] Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era , p. 81; also Callahan, Contingent States , p. 54. Nonetheless, to judge by postings on the internet, the reaction of many Chinese was one of considerable anger. The following post is one such example:

My mother country, do you hear the crying? Your children abroad are crying out. Help them. I do not understand politics and do not dare talk about politics. I do not know what it means to say ‘we have no long-term friends or enemies, only long-term interests’, and I do not know what these interests are… I only know that my own compatriots are being barbarously slaughtered, they need help, and not just moral expressions of understanding and concern. My motherland, they are your children. The blood that flows from their bodies is the blood of the Han race. Their sincerity and goodwill also come from your nourishment. Help them… [963] [963] Quoted in Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era , p. 82.

Notwithstanding these sentiments, the Chinese government acted with caution and moderation; but as Chinese power in the region grows, the relationship between the China and the overseas Chinese — who wield exceptional economic power in virtually every ASEAN country, [964] [964] The ethnic Chinese account for the following proportion of the total population: Malaysia 29 %; Brunei 15 %; Cambodia 5 %; Indonesia 3.5 %; Myanmar 20 %; Philippines 2.0 %; Thailand 10 %; Vietnam 3 %. Acharya, ‘Containment, Engagement, or Counter-dominance?’, p. 134; Chua, World on Fire , p. 34. and whose self-confidence, status and position will be greatly enhanced by China ’s rise — will become a growing factor in these countries. [965] [965] The Chinese government actively promotes its relations with the overseas Chinese; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive , p. 77; also pp. 125-7. Emboldened by the rise of China, the local Chinese may seek to take advantage of their improved bargaining position in order to enhance their power, while governments in these countries are likely to be increasingly cautious about the way they handle their Chinese minorities for fear of upsetting Beijing. The historian Wang Gungwu argues that the overseas Chinese share many characteristics with other ethnic minorities: ‘But where the “Chinese” are totally different is [that] their “mother country” is near Southeast Asia, very large and populous, potentially powerful and traditionally contemptuous of the peoples and cultures of the region.’ [966] [966] Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p. 302.

There have been two great exceptions to the new turn in China ’s regional policy. One is China ’s most important ‘lost territory’, namely Taiwan, and the other her regional colonizer and greatest adversary, Japan. While China has pursued a strategy of engagement, accommodation and compromise with virtually every other country in the region since the turn of the century, that cannot be said of its attitude towards Japan or, at least until recently, Taiwan. [967] [967] Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 280-88.