Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

Map 11. Chinese Claims in the South China Sea

In 1984 Deng Xiaoping suggested ‘the possibility of resolving certain territorial disputes by having the countries concerned jointly develop the disputed areas before discussing the question of sovereignty’. [946] [946] Ibid., p. 63. In other words, the question of sovereignty should not necessarily delay moving forward on other issues. Deng’s remark has frequently been cited by Chinese sources in the context of the islands in the South China Sea, where his approach has in practice been followed, and in relation to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea that are disputed with Japan; it has also been suggested in connection with Taiwan. [947] [947] Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 53. While insisting on their ultimate sovereignty over the latter, the Chinese have offered to shelve the matter more or less indefinitely, providing Taiwan does not seek to declare independence, illustrating the flexibility with which the Chinese are prepared to approach the issue. Alternatively, they have suggested that, providing their sovereignty over the island is accepted by the Taiwanese, Taiwan can continue to have its own government, political system and even armed forces. [948] [948] Callahan, Contingent States , pp. 179- 80.

This highlights another fundamental difference between the Chinese conception of sovereignty and that held in the West — most clearly demonstrated in the attitude displayed by China towards the handover of sovereignty in Hong Kong. The transfer of sovereignty was regarded by the Chinese as non-negotiable, as in the case of all the so-called lost territories — namely, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and probably the various disputed islands too — which China regards, on the basis of history, culture and ethnicity, as rightly its own. But by Western standards its sovereignty has been exercised in an unusually pliant manner. The British — and Western — narrative concerning Hong Kong was that, following the handover in 1997, the Chinese would transform the territory into something that closely resembled the mainland. This expectation has not been borne out. For the most part, Hong Kong has changed very little. As such, it is utterly atypical of the normal experience of post-colonial transition. The key to understanding the Chinese approach lies in the notion of ‘one country, two systems’, as enshrined in the territory’s constitution, otherwise known as the Basic Law. As far as China was concerned, the issue was the recognition of its sovereignty over Hong Kong rather than whether or not the territory shared the same system of government. [949] [949] Ibid., pp. 158- 61, 166, 174. The Western approach is different: sovereignty and one-system are seen as synonymous. ‘One country, two systems’ lies in a millennia-old Chinese tradition that acknowledges and accepts the existence of differences between its many provinces, or, to put it another way, that such differences are an inherent and necessary part of a civilization-state. In other words, the civilization-state, like the tributary system which derives from it, is based on the principle of ‘one civilization, many systems’. In contrast, the Western notion of sovereignty rests on the principle of ‘one nation-state, one system’, and the Westphalian system on ‘one system, many nation-states’ [950] [950] Ibid., p. 141. .

The Chinese attitude towards sovereignty is closely related to the old Confucian concept of ‘harmony with difference’, which has been revived under the present Chinese leader, Hu Jintao. Some Chinese scholars, in fact, have interpreted ‘one country, two systems’ as an example of ‘harmony with difference’. Whereas in Western discourse, harmony implies identity and a close affinity, this is not the case in Chinese tradition, which regards difference as an essential characteristic of harmony. According to Confucius, ‘the exemplary person harmonizes with others, but does not necessarily agree with them; the small person agrees with others but is not harmonious with them.’ [951] [951] Cited in ibid., pp. 158- 9; also p. 143. Agreeing with people means that you are uncritically the same as them: the opposite of harmony is not chaos but rather uniformity and homogeneity. Interestingly, in China the latter are often associated with the term ‘hegemony’, which is used pejoratively to describe big power behaviour — once the Soviet Union, now the United States — in contrast to ‘harmony’ which is seen as enabling and embracing difference.

In considering the future relationship between China and its East Asian neighbours, it is pertinent to take into account not only the historical legacy of the tributary system but also what might be described as the realpolitik of size. This was clearly a significant aspect of the tributary system, but it is an even more powerful factor in the era of globalization and the modern nation-state. China is anxious to emphasize its desire to exercise self-restraint and respect for the interests of other states, but in the longer run, on the assumption that China continues its economic rise, the disparity between China and the other nations in the region is likely to become ever more pronounced over time. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the inequality between the power of China and that of neighbouring states will be rather greater than that to be found in any other region of the world. Such overweening power will be expressed in a gamut of ways, from economic and cultural to political and military. This is the major factor that lies behind the suspicions latent in the region towards China: the fear not so much of what China is now — especially as it has gone out of its way to reassure its neighbours — but what it might be like in the future. [952] [952] Michael D. Swaine, ‘ China ’s Regional Military Posture’, in Shambaugh, Power Shift , p. 277. The chief of the Malaysian navy put it like this in 1996: ‘as the years progress, there exist[s]… uncertainty in the form of China ’s behaviour once she attained her great power status. Will she conform to international or regional rules or will she be a new military power which acts in whatever way she sees fit?’ [953] [953] Quoted in Amitav Acharya, ‘Containment, Engagement, or Counter-dominace? Malaysia’s Response to the Rise of China’, in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China , p. 131; also Kim, ‘The Political Economy of Mahathir’s China Policy’, p. 11. Imagine the relationship, fifty years hence, between a hugely powerful and advanced China, with a population well in excess of 1.5 billion, and Laos and Cambodia, with populations by then of perhaps around 10 million and 20 million respectively; or, for that matter, Malaysia, with perhaps rather more than 30 million people. On grounds of size — let alone the tributary legacy — the relationship between China and its region is bound to be fundamentally different from that between the dominant country and its neighbours in any other region.

What will China be like? How will it act? It is clear that China ’s behaviour towards, and conception of, the region is bound to be heavily influenced by the legacy of the tributary system and its character as a civilization-state. The influence of this way of thinking is already apparent in China ’s attitude towards the Spratly and Paracel islands, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In its own region at least, one can categorically say that China will not simply be a Westphalian nation-state. But even if that is the case, how assertive is China likely to be? Is one to judge China’s future behaviour by the restraint and relative magnanimity that is characteristic of the present regime, or will that be superseded by something altogether more Sinocentric? Could China slowly abandon its present extreme caution and become more forceful in its relations with other countries, for example those, such as India, Japan and the South- East Asian countries, with whom it has territorial disputes which for the time being it has agreed to shelve? [954] [954] Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 154- 5. As China grows more powerful, it would hardly be surprising if it did become more Sinocentric: in fact, at least in the longer run, that is what one might expect. After all, with the present overwhelming emphasis on economic development and the desire to ensure that there are no distractions, restraint is at least partly a function of priorities: in the reform era, China ’s self-discipline has been huge and impressive. But casting our minds into the future to a time when living standards are much higher and China has established itself as the dominant power in East Asia, how might a more Sinocentric outlook express itself?