Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

From the early nineties, Japanese politics began to shift to the right and become more nationalistic, a process hastened by the collapse of the Social Democratic Party, which had always been a staunch opponent of Japanese rearmament. [999] [999] Drifte, Japan ’s Security Relations with China since 1989 , pp. 78- 9. Japanese ruling politicians grew more aggressive towards China, displaying impatience with traditional deferential tendencies towards their neighbour, increased concern about China ’s rise, and frustration with what they saw as China ’s exploitation of Japan ’s colonial past. [1000] [1000] Ibid., p. 79; Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘China- Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?’, in Shambaugh, Power Shift , p. 137. In 1996 for the first time the proportion of those saying in an annual poll that they did not have friendly feelings towards the Chinese exceeded those that did. The crisis over North Korea and its threatened development of nuclear weapons, together with its abduction of Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983, served to harden nationalist sentiment: indeed, the North Korean threat was seen as a proxy for the Chinese threat, thereby helping to ratchet up hostility towards China as well. [1001] [1001] Drifte, Japan ’s Security Relations with China since 1989 , p. 77. In 1999 an extreme nationalist, Ishihara Shintaro, was elected governor of Tokyo: previously anti-American, he quickly became rabidly hostile towards China. Meanwhile, Japan entered into a new defence agreement with the United States which was clearly directed against China and which implicitly involved Japan in the defence of Taiwan. [1002] [1002] Ibid., pp. 80–81, 83, 88-9; Mochizuki, ‘China-Japan Relations’, p. 147. The growing enmity towards China found its fullest expression to date during Junichiro Koizumi’s premiership between 2001 and 2006, with his annual visits in his capacity as prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine — a politically inspired memorial to Japan’s fallen soldiers, including Class A war criminals — which were intended to encourage nationalism at home while also being provocative towards China. Since Koizumi, however, both the short premiership of Shinzo Abe, previously regarded as hawkish towards China, and especially that of Yasuo Fukuda have revealed a desire in ruling circles to temper the hostility of the Koizumi era and seek a more accommodating relationship with China. [1003] [1003] David Pilling, ‘Less Toxic Relations between Japan and China ’, Financial Times , 6 February 2008. It remains to be seen what course Japan will steer during the premiership of Taro Aso, who also has a nationalist reputation, but his period in office is likely to prove of short duration.

Japan, meanwhile, finds itself more or less isolated in East Asia. Although it has been generous in bestowing aid on many countries in the region, it has failed to address its wartime legacy, which is a continuing source of resentment for many of its neighbours, especially South Korea and China. It has remained, furthermore, relatively aloof from its neighbours, having refused to open up its market and resisted entering into multilateral, rather than bilateral, arrangements with them until its hand was finally forced by China ’s recent initiatives with ASEAN. [1004] [1004] Zhang Yunling, Designing East Asian FTA , p. 61. There have been two recent illustrations of Japan ’s continued isolation. The first concerned its failed bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2005, when China succeeded in mobilizing most of the region in opposition to Japan’s proposed membership, thereby effectively torpedoing it. [1005] [1005] Japan Times , 13 April 2005; Shi Yinhong, ‘The General Situation of the China-Japan Relations and the Imperative for a Composite Strategy’, workshop on Sino-Japanese relations, Renmin-Aichi University Conference, Beijing, 2005, p. 2. The second example was the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005, provoked partly by Japan’s UN bid but mainly by the publication of a new school history textbook in Japan that sought to downplay Japanese crimes against China during the last war; [1006] [1006] Ibid., pp. 2–3; Japan Times , 13 April 2005. in this case, as in that of the United Nations, the sympathies of the region were overwhelmingly on the side of the Chinese rather than the Japanese government. [1007] [1007] For example, Japan Times , 17 April 2005 and 19 June 2005. In both instances, the underlying cause of Japan ’s isolation is the same: its failure to address not only China ’s grievances about the last war but nearly everyone else’s as well. [1008] [1008] International Herald Tribune , 2 April 2007.

China ’s rise requires a fundamental shift in Japanese thinking — indeed, Japan ’s interests would have been best served if it had been willing to address the wartime treatment of its neighbours several decades ago [1009] [1009] Drifte, Japan ’s Security Relations with China since 1989 , pp. 183-4. — but there remains little sign of it. Instead Japan has clung to variants of its post-war stance, with the result that China has succeeded, with the adroitness of its recent diplomacy in the region, in outmanoeuvring it. Meanwhile, the relationship between the two remains frozen in the manner of the Cold War, with each twist and turn being seen in terms of a zero-sum game. [1010] [1010] Shi Yinhong, ‘The General Situation of the China-Japan Relations and the Imperative for a Composite Strategy’, 2005, pp. 1, 5. The issues of contention between the two are many, though the historical questions clearly predominate over all others. In terms of the present, by far the most important — and dangerous — issue concerns the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands and the similarly disputed maritime border in the East China Sea. [1011] [1011] Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989 , pp. 55–60; Shi Yinhong, ‘The General Situation of the China-Japan Relations and the Imperative for a Composite Strategy’, 2005, pp. 3–5; Shi Yinhong, workshop on Sino-Japanese relations, Renmin-Aichi University conference, Beijing, 2005. There have already been clashes over the islands, most notably in 1990. [1012] [1012] Drifte, Japan ’s Security Relations with China since 1989 , pp. 49–51. Unlike the disputed islands in the South China Sea, there are known to be significant oil and gas deposits in the area, thereby lending them an added strategic significance. China has offered to shelve the issue of sovereignty, as it has done with the Spratlys, in favour of joint development, but the Japanese have rejected the idea. The Chinese, meanwhile, have begun exploration in a disputed area of sea. [1013] [1013] Ibid., p. 59. An agreement between the two countries on joint exploration and development would help to ease tension, though it would not resolve the underlying issue of sovereignty over the islands or the maritime border. [1014] [1014] Reinhard Drifte, ‘Japanese-Chinese Territorial Disputes in the East China Sea — Between Military Confrontation and Economic Cooperation’, pp. 35-6 (unpublished working paper, available to download from http://eprints.lseac.uk.). Until some kind of agreement is reached, this dispute is the one most likely to provide a flashpoint between the two countries. [1015] [1015] Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction , pp. 273-5.

At times of crisis, the Chinese government has tried hard to restrain popular attitudes of resentment towards Japan for fear that they might get out of control; sometimes, however, they have spilt over, as was the case with the large and angry demonstrations that took place in several Chinese cities in 2005. While Taiwan and the United States have been important factors in Chinese nationalism, especially in the 1990s, its growth has been driven, above all, by feelings of resentment and hostility towards Japan. These remain much stronger than the enmity displayed towards the United States. [1016] [1016] Interview with Shi Yinhong, Beijing, 26 August 2005. Apart from the Korean War, there is no history of conflict between China and the US. Moreover, the two countries succeeded in 1971 in remaking their relationship and putting it on an entirely new footing that has survived to the present day. They are also, of course, geographically separated by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. In contrast, the bitter enmity between the Japanese and Chinese has existed for over a century without interruption. There is simply no modern tradition of compromise or coexistence between them and yet they are by far the two most powerful countries in East Asia. [1017] [1017] Satoh, The Odd Couple ; Hirano So, ‘Study of Contemporary Political History of East Asian Region — from the Chain Effect of Chinese and Japanese Nationalism Perspective’, workshop on Sino-Japanese relations, Renmin-Aichi University conference, Beijing, 8 December 2005. The Chinese may not particularly like the Americans but they generally respect them; in contrast, as I have frequently found, the Chinese — including the highly educated — will often volunteer that they hate the Japanese. [1018] [1018] Gries, China’s New Nationalism , pp. 38, 40; interview with Shi Yinhong, Beijing, 26 August 2005. The rise of China, moreover, has if anything served to harden attitudes towards Japan. As Shi Yinhong has observed, the view is now widely expressed that: ‘If China concedes to Japan it means that China cannot rise. What is the point of rising if we have to concede to Japan?’ [1019] [1019] Shi Yinhong, workshop on Sino-Japanese relations. It is, nonetheless, strongly in China ’s interests to play for time. Notwithstanding that Japan remains East Asia’s largest economy (according to GDP by market exchange rates) and by far its most advanced, time, as always it would seem, is on China’s side. Assuming that China continues to grow at a brisk pace, the balance of power between the two will continue to move in China’s favour, [1020] [1020] Perhaps this is the underlying reason for China ’s more self-confident stance in its relationship with Japan, as evinced by Hu Jintao. Kokubun Ryosei, ‘Did the Ice Melt between Japan and China?’, conference on ‘Nationalism and Globalisation in North-East Asia’, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics, 12 May 2007, pp. 1, 9, 11–12. with the latter steadily emerging as the fulcrum of the East Asian economy. [1021] [1021] Lampton, ‘ China ’s Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America ’s Expense’, p. 320. Even for Japan, China is now of great economic significance: it became Japan’s largest export market in 2008, overtaking the United States, with the value of Japanese exports to China doubling between 2000 and 2003, [1022] [1022] Michiyo Nakamoto, ‘China Ousts US as Top Japanese Market’, Financial Times , 21 August 2008; www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0109.html. and it has also become an important manufacturing base for many Japanese multinationals. Japan, in short, is being drawn into a relationship of growing economic interdependence with China. But this does not mean that relations between the two countries will inevitably grow more harmonious: the underlying antagonism between them is far too deeply rooted for that.