Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

In these earlier books I also stressed the centrality of citizenship and the promotion of national identity in the Gulf monarchies’ ruling bargains, as many of the services and privileges associated with citizenship can only really be sustained if the national populations remain distinct, aloof, and in some cases compact. Often ignored, or in some cases misrepresented as a threat rather than as an opportunity for regimes of the region, the role of the millions of expatriates who work in the Persian Gulf — and who now make up the majority of residents in all of the Gulf monarchies’ major cities — was also discussed. Both books argued that as long as their remuneration and other benefits remained higher than in their country of origin, and as long as regimes kept blocking any path to naturalisation, then expatriates would remain mere labour migrants: primarily interested in safe and stable short-term wealth creation before eventually returning home. Thus, they would have no interest in altering the domestic political status quo, and if anything the more influential, wealthy, and skilled expatriates in the Gulf monarchies would become another important supportive or at least silent constituency of the traditional monarchies. [39] 39. For discussions of expatriates in Dubai and Abu Dhabi see Davidson (2008), chapter 5; Davidson (2009), chapter 6.

Two other explanations for the survival of Gulf monarchies — and more broadly the survival of monarchy in the Arab world — have circulated over the past fifteen years. Both have been popular and thus also warrant attention. But given that they have often downplayed economic factors and have focused primarily on distinct historical, cultural, or familial circumstances associated with the Arab world that are now rapidly changing, it is likely they will soon fall out of favour. The most nuanced and sophisticated of these further explanations is that monarchical resilience is mostly due to the internal strength of the ruling families themselves. Published in 1999, Michael Herb’s All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies argued that the evolution of collective action mechanisms and ‘bandwagoning’ techniques within the contemporary ruling families have reduced some of the divisiveness and factionalism which historically plagued the region’s monarchies for much of the last century.

In Herb’s terms the result has been the emergence of ‘dynastic monarchies’, especially in the Persian Gulf. These dynasties, as they continue to expand with an ever-growing number of junior princes and sheikhs, have in some cases become self-regulating proto-institutions, [40] 40. Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 3. Herb claims in his comparative study of ruling families in the Middle East that the dominance of one large and cohesive family over the state, rather than oil wealth, education, military support, external political support, representative institutions, selective marriages, charismatic rulers, or any other factors is the key to survival. perhaps providing some of the strength and stability normally associated with large-scale single-party political systems, such as those in East Asia. Certainly, as the Gulf monarchies’ oil-rich economies have boomed and state functions expanded, more high profile business and governmental positions have been created, and the most prudent Arab monarchs have distributed these as ‘consolation prizes’ to powerful members of their extended families. In this scenario, it is reasoned, any renegade family member will find it difficult to destabilise the monarchy or launch a coup d’état , as most relatives will side with the established authority, preferring not to lose their prominent places within the regime. Backed by case studies from across the region, Herb demonstrated that the more resilient monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE had followed these strategies very closely, while other, swiftly deposed, monarchs such as Libya’s king [41] 41. Muhammad Idris Al-Mahdi Al-Senussi. had failed to do so. [42] 42. See Herb (1999).

But given the survival of other, non-dynastic traditional monarchies, most notably Oman — whose ruler [43] 43. Qaboos bin Said Al-Said. has strongly resisted such powersharing measures [44] 44. See Valeri (2011). —and the dynastic monarchy explanation’s lack of emphasis on wealth distribution and social contracts, does it really explain regime longevity? Moreover, the ultimately unsuccessful attempts in Arab republics to implement Gulf-style dynastic rule for themselves also seem to undermine the explanation. [45] 45. For a fuller discussion see Lucas (2004). After all, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Syria’s Hafez Al-Assad, and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi all sought to position their sons as successors while placating other relatives with important regime posts. But, as the events of 2011 and 2012 have demonstrated, even these ‘monarchical presidencies’ or jamlaka have proven to be very brittle. [46] 46. For further discussion see Filiu, Jean-Pierre, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 3.

The second alternative explanation is much less convincing, although it is still regularly advanced by spokesmen for the Gulf monarchies to explain the latter’s continuing lack of meaningful reform. Based on vague notions that international concepts of pluralism and political freedom are inimical to the region, regime mouthpieces usually claim that democracy just won’t work, due to special characteristics, or khususiyya , such as tribal heritage and religious beliefs. Or they simply state that their countries are too young and thus ‘not ready’ for such changes. In this manner the Gulf monarchies have usually portrayed themselves as exceptions, thereby encouraging a ‘re-orientalisation’ of the region in the eyes of their observers, critics, and even their own citizens.

Before 2011, when attempts at political reforms or the staging of elections within other authoritarian Middle East states often failed, the most autocratic of the Gulf monarchies were usually quick to alert their populations to the dangers of democracy and the fundamental incompatibility of such systems with the supposed anthropological reality of the Arabian Peninsula. Given its proximity, Iran’s various flawed elections and the resulting violence have been useful examples, but even easier to exploit have been Kuwait’s troubled experiences with democracy. As the only Gulf monarchy which has a functioning, although very limited parliament, Kuwait’s system has long been distrusted by its monarchical neighbours, and the many problems it has faced have often been used to justify autocracy elsewhere in the region and warn against the perils of representative government. Such warnings have usually appeared as commentary pieces in the state-backed media, or even in official governmental statements and speeches. Following an especially problematic period in Kuwaiti politics in April 2010, Dubai’s ruler and the UAE’s unelected prime minister [47] 47. Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum. stated to the media that ‘Our leadership does not import ready-made models that may be valid for other societies but are certainly not suitable for our society’. [48] 48. Reuters, 24 June 2010. Speaking in December 2011 in an interview with CNN he repeated his argument by stating that ‘we have our own democracy; you cannot transport your democracy to us’. [49] 49. Gulf News , 29 December 2011.