Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

The survival of the Gulf monarchies to date — at least on a domestic level — has been predicated on the unwritten, unspoken ruling bargains or social contracts that exist between the ruling families and their populations. Together with the neo-patriarchal governments that have formed, these bargains and their constituent strategies have usually been enough to placate most citizens, satisfy the needs of resident expatriates and guarantee some degree of political acquiescence from the population, thereby allowing the monarchies to avoid repression or coercive ‘maintenance of the polity’. [222] 1. See Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

Given the economic and demographic disparities between the six Gulf monarchies, these ruling bargain components differ from state to state and, as circumstances have changed; new components have been added while others have been withdrawn. Nevertheless within all of these highly dynamic bargains there are readily identifiable patterns and much common ground.

All of the Gulf monarchies have emphasised the state being first and foremost a distributor of wealth rather than an extractor, and arguably this remains the central pillar of monarchical survival. Drawn mostly from revenues derived from the region’s hydrocarbon concessions or from rent generated by more recent post-oil activities, the largesse of these modern day rentier states has undoubtedly provided their ruling families and governments with considerable ‘eudemonic legitimacy’—that is, legitimacy derived from economic well-being and the provision of social welfare. [223] 2. Eudemonic legitimacy was originally coined by Stephen White. See White, Stephen, ‘Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy’, World Politics , Vol. 38, No. 3, 1986, p. 463. Closely connected to this component has been the ability of these states to boost massively the national identity and social status of their citizens or ‘locals’—immediately identifying them as recipients of distributed wealth and often positioning them in advantageous business positions. In the wealthiest monarchies, this automatically elevates citizens above all other sections of the population. Although technically not part of this ‘rentier elite’, the millions of expatriates living and working in the Gulf states are often similarly satisfied, as most are able to enjoy a competitive, tax-free income, and usually plan on returning home after a few years. Those that do not conform can easily be suppressed and deported.

Non-economic components of the ruling bargains also matter greatly, especially in those monarchies with a declining ability to distribute wealth. In many cases, rulers and their heirs have invested much time and effort in cultivating personal resources or even perpetuating personality cults; often based on sporting prowess, scholarly achievements, or celebrity status. The aim, it seems, has been to sustain an air of traditional authority for these individuals to keep governing their people. Connected to this has been the generous funding and support for museums and other projects that emphasise the Gulf monarchies’ tribal heritage and pre-oil history, often serving as ‘living memories’ of how the incumbents can trace their lineage back to key founding fathers. Similarly important, especially in Saudi Arabia, but apparent in all six states, has been the exploitation and co-option of religion, mostly — but not exclusively — Islam. Ruling families have worked hard to generate an image of piety, while their governments have carefully funded and controlled most parts of the clerical establishment, thus heading off religious opposition. Other components have also recently been experimented with, often with mixed results. Projects and initiatives focusing on the environment or green energy, for example, have recently been proving popular. Despite the region’s massive hydrocarbon production and extremely high carbon footprint per capita, they have served to win favourable headlines for the dignitaries involved.

Since the 1960s the traditional system of tribal leaders giving gifts to their subjects, friends, and enemies in exchange for loyalty or faithful service has been massively advanced. The verbal instructions or small chits of paper issued by sheikhs or their secretaries to grateful petitioners were quickly replaced by official documents drawn up by rulers’ courts or new bureaucrats as hydrocarbon revenues allowed the nascent states to transfer wealth directly to their citizens and establish the most generous welfare states in the developing world, underpinned by subsidised utilities, fuel, and foodstuffs. One of the more visible benefits for citizens was the provision of government housing. Although fairly modest in the 1960s and 1970s, the free dwellings nonetheless allowed for air-conditioning and the connection of refrigerators, televisions, and other appliances. In the poorest parts of the region, especially in Saudi Arabia and Oman, the effect was to transform the lives of thousands. Many older Omanis today, for example, often state that ‘before Qaboos there was nothing’, referring to the poverty and lack of basic amenities prior to Qaboos bin Said Al-Said’s succession in 1970. In more recent years, the quality of free housing, especially in the smaller, richer Gulf monarchies, has dramatically improved, while expatriates have often moved into the original government housing. Recipients in these states can now expect sizeable apartments and villas, usually with one bedroom for every child. In some cases, utilities are also provided for free, as are telephones. [224] 3. E.g. in Qatar nationals do not pay for utilities or landline telephones. See Kamrava, Mehran, ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’, Middle East Journal , Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, p. 406. In the UAE, the same also used to be true.

In Qatar, for example, the Barwa Housing Project has provided hundreds of families with reasonably high quality free accommodation complete with parks and playgrounds. The housing is available only to Qatari citizens, but allows for a relatively high monthly income threshold of $4,400. [225] 4. AME Info, 15 June 2008. Similarly, and more extensively in the UAE, the Sheikh Zayed Housing Programme provides ‘deserving UAE national families’ with three choices: either a government-provided house, an interest free loan to buy a new house, or a grant to refurbish or maintain an existing residence. Most of the government-provided houses are of good quality, especially in the wealthiest emirate of Abu Dhabi, and the quality of free houses in the poorer, northern emirates, has been improving of late. In 2008 the programme’s annual budget was increased to $350 million, and an announcement was made that over 40,000 new villas would be constructed for UAE nationals over the next four years at a cost of $4 billion. [226] 5. Gulf News , 23 January 2008. In parallel Dubai now has its own such housing scheme, unsurprisingly named after its ruler — the Muhammad bin Rashid Housing Programme — and in early 2011 more than 700 new homes were allocated to UAE nationals at a cost of over $250 million. Aiming to ‘offer appropriate accommodation to Emiratis of all social classes and meeting their basic needs, especially a dignified housing’ the programme has little in common with government housing in other parts of the world, as the units are of nine designs ranging from three to five bedrooms and have façades in different architectural styles including Islamic and Andalusian. Moreover, the beneficiaries have been receiving text message construction updates direct from the developer. [227] 6. Gulf News , 10 January 2011.