Анджела Стент - Putin's World - Russia Against the West and with the Rest

Another misapprehension was the assumption that Russia’s economic integration with the West would have a moderating effect on its political behavior. This was, after all, the basis of the West’s détente policy in the 1970s, that closer economic ties would promote more productive political relations. During the 1970s, détente worked for some years until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, because the USSR understood that it needed to import Western technology and it was prepared to offer political quid pro quos. Détente produced a landmark arms control treaty, significantly improved political ties, and partially opened a window on the world for some Russians. In the early 1990s, Yeltsin supported a Western agenda in the Balkans because he sought Western economic assistance and political support for his reforms. The rather Marxist belief that economics can influence politics persists, particularly in Europe. Germany led the EU in launching a “partnership for modernization” with Russia in 2010, believing this would result in a “strategic partnership.” 9But Putin has sought to decouple Russia’s economic from its political ties to the West. Although the EU program still exists on paper, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas have effectively put it on hold. Attempts to promote economic and judicial reform and support for civil society have been uneven, leading some to term this a “partnership without modernization.”

The West initially hoped Russia would become a responsible stakeholder in a post–Cold War, rules-based liberal international order it had created. But the Kremlin viewed this as an attempt by the United States, supported by its allies, to impose an agenda on Russia in which it had no agency and which was inimical to Russia’s real interests. Putin is more interested in power and scale than in rules. The West may see the 1990s as a time of promise in Russia, of greater pluralism and the move toward a market society. Most Russians today, led by Putin, see it very differently—as a time of poverty, upheaval, chaos, combined with rising economic inequality and humiliation by the West. Putin frequently repeats this historical catalogue of complaints to his Western interlocutors.

Viewed historically, cooperation with Russia has been the exception rather than the rule, at least in US-Russia relations. When people talk about “normalizing” US ties to Russia, they mean achieving an equilibrium between cooperation and competition. There have been a few high points in US-Russia ties: the Grand Alliance during World War Two, and coordination and intelligence sharing after the 9/11 attacks in the Afghanistan War. In both these instances, despite tensions in the relationship, Russia was an enthusiastic partner because Washington and Moscow had identified a common enemy they sought to defeat, and the Kremlin believed the United States was treating it as an equal. But when the common enemy was defeated, the alliance fell apart. More narrow cooperation on arms control has worked too. There were also other moments of cooperation during German unification, the First Gulf War, and the Bosnian War. Apart from these instances, US-Russia relations have been characterized largely by mutual mistrust and suspicion. This is, at the best of times, a limited partnership in which cooperation coexists with competition and conflict.

Europe’s relationship with Russia has historically been more complicated. The Germany-Russia relationship has been the most significant. The two countries were on opposite sides in two world wars, a divided Germany was at the heart of the Cold War in Europe, and mutual suspicions prevailed during the Cold War and beyond. Since the Soviet collapse, the relationship has been generally cooperative—until 2014. France and Russia also have enjoyed periods of alliance and cooperation, while Poland’s relations with Russia have largely been antagonistic and UK-Russian relations currently the worst of any European country. Europe’s inclination, since the Soviet collapse, has been to promote economic and political dialogue and cooperation, but these expectations have been severely challenged since the start of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s subsequent election interference. The reality is that Russia is partially integrated into the global economy and a major exporter of oil and gas to Europe and, increasingly, to Asia. Whenever Russia takes actions that are considered inimical to the United States or Europe, sanctions are the first resort. But these have a limited impact on Russian actions. The Trump administration and the US Congress have ramped up sanctions on Russia, but so far Russia has doubled down, refusing to cease its cyber activities and challenging every Western claim about its culpability, be it in election interference, the MH-17 crash, Russian soldiers in the Donbas, or the Skripal poisonings. This constant Russian pushback is likely to remain as long as Putin is in the Kremlin.

For the rest of Putin’s term in office, Russia will assert its interests in its neighborhood, insisting both that Western encroachments there threaten its core interests and that the West should accept these concerns as entirely legitimate. It will project power abroad where it can, taking advantage of the disarray in US foreign policy. Putin will continue to use television and other media to play on the enemy image of the United States and Europe to ensure his popularity and power at home and among pro-Russia groups in the West. Under these circumstances, America and its allies have a limited number of difficult choices in dealing with Russia.

Russia’s size and strategic location, its nuclear weapons arsenal, its veto in the United Nations Security Council, and its endowments of vast natural resources—as well as its ability to thwart Western interests—necessitate engagement. Russia cannot be isolated because it has partnerships with many countries that refuse either to criticize Russia or sign on to sanctions and do not see Russia’s actions in Ukraine as threatening to their own interests.

Moreover, two decades of US and European democracy promotion have not succeeded in creating a more democratic society or institutionalizing the rule of law. Indeed, the Kremlin sees these efforts as a cloak for “regime change.” Under Putin, the Kremlin has steadily closed the space for political competition and has ejected US and British organizations seeking to support Russian civil society. The Kremlin has worked hard to immunize Russian society from Western influence through its state-run media, particularly Russian television.

Given these constraints, Trump’s ambassador to Russia, Jon Huntsman, has argued for the need to focus on those aspects of the relationship that demand pragmatic engagement:

Where [Russia] has a national interest, they will engage. And you have to be smart enough to identify areas where we both have overlapping interests. Where we have interests and they don’t, they’re just not going to waste their time. And neither should we. 10

For the United States, the issues on which Washington and Moscow can engage are Syria, terrorism, Ukraine, and strategic stability—arms control and nonproliferation. It is a constant challenge to coordinate, let alone cooperate, on these issues, but nonengagement with Russia could lead to an even greater escalation in tensions. For Europe, whose economic and energy interdependence with Moscow necessitates sustained engagement, the Ukraine crisis is the key issue, both because it has destabilized Europe’s periphery and because EU sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions have adversely affected European economies.

The continuing Ukraine crisis has highlighted an enduring problem in Russia’s relations with the West: disagreement on the shape of Euro-Atlantic security architecture and Russia’s insistence that the West renegotiate the concept of European security with Moscow. So far, the West has rejected Russian proposals because they would essentially render NATO obsolete. But since the Crimean annexation, two realities have become clear: the West will not risk military confrontation with Russia over its actions in the post-Soviet space, and as a result of these actions, further NATO or EU enlargement to post-Soviet countries is highly unlikely. Russia has thus achieved one of Putin’s major foreign policy goals.