Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

The plan is designed for execution as a whole, and the exclusion of attack of any category or categories of target would, in varying degree, decrease the effectiveness of the plan.

General Curtis LeMay wholeheartedly agreed with Lemnitzer. Indeed, if war came, LeMay thought the Soviet Union should be hit by more nuclear weapons, not fewer, to guarantee that every strategic target was eliminated. Despite strong political and philosophical differences, President Kennedy had recently promoted LeMay to Air Force chief of staff, out of respect for his operational skills. “If you have to go, you want LeMay in the lead bomber,” Kennedy later explained. “But you never want LeMay deciding whether or not you have to go.”

The underlying logic of both nuclear war plans was inescapable: kill or be killed. General Lemnitzer said that regardless of how the SIOP was executed, “some portion of the Soviet… nuclear force would strike the United States.” By the fall of 1961, the Soviet Union had about 16 long-range missiles, 150 long-range bombers, and 60 submarine-based missiles that could hit North America. It would be hard to find and destroy every one of them. Kaysen estimated that the number of American deaths stemming from his plan, “while small percentage wise — between three and seven percent [of the total U.S. population],” would nevertheless range between 5 million and 13 million. Just a handful of high-yield weapons, landing on New York City and Chicago, could produce that many deaths. “In thermonuclear warfare,” Kaysen noted, “people are easy to kill.” But the alternative to launching a surprise attack on the Soviet Union might be a lot worse. A Soviet first strike could kill as many as 100 million Americans.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS WRESTLING WITH these issues in the days leading up to his U.N. speech. The recommendations of the young civilians at the Pentagon seemed, in many ways, to contradict those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The president would have to decide who was right. Neither superpower wanted a nuclear war. But neither wanted to back down, alienate its allies, or appear weak. Behind the scenes, all sorts of formal and informal contacts were being made between the two governments, including a secret correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev. And yet their positions seemed irreconcilable, especially with a deadline approaching. For the Soviet leader, West Berlin was a “rotten tooth which must be pulled out,” a center of American espionage, a threat to the future of East Germany. For Kennedy, it was an outpost of freedom, surrounded by totalitarian rule, whose two million inhabitants couldn’t be abandoned. The Berlin Wall, at least, had preserved the status quo. “It’s not a very nice solution,” Kennedy said, the day the barbed wire went up, “but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.”

On September 19, the day before the White House meeting on whether to launch a surprise attack, Kennedy sent a list of questions to General Power:

Berlin developments may confront us with a situation where we may desire to take the initiative in the escalation of the conflict from the local to the general war level…. Could we achieve surprise (i.e., 15 minutes or less warning) under such conditions by examining our current plan?… How would you plan an attack that would use a minimum-sized force against Soviet long-range striking power only, and would attempt to achieve tactical surprise? How long would it take to develop such a plan?… Is this idea of a first strike against the Soviets’ long-range striking power a feasible one?… I assume I can stop the strategic attack at any time, should I receive word the enemy has capitulated. Is this correct?

The president also wanted to know if the missiles aimed at Europe could be destroyed by an American first strike. During the meeting on the twentieth, General Power expressed concern that Khrushchev was hiding many of his long-range missiles. Without better intelligence, a limited strike on the Soviet Union would be too risky. The choice was all or nothing — and Power advocated an attack with the full SIOP.

“The Western Powers have calmly resolved,” Kennedy said at the United Nations a few days later, “to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin.” The following week, Secretary of Defense McNamara told the press that the United States would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons “whenever we feel it necessary to protect our vital interests.” And he confidently added that America’s nuclear stockpile was much larger than that of the Soviet Union. The administration now found it useful to deflate the myth of the missile gap. Details about SAC’s ability to destroy the Soviet Union were provided to NATO officials — so that Soviet intelligence officers who’d infiltrated NATO would share the information with the Kremlin. Perceptions of American military strength were important, as tensions rose in Europe. Soviet fighter planes buzzed commercial airliners heading to West Berlin and dropped chaff to disrupt their navigational systems. Border guards in East Berlin shot at civilians trying to get past the wall. Police officers in West Berlin responded by firing clouds of tear gas to help the refugees escape — and fought a gun battle with East German police.

Although negotiations with the Soviets quietly continued, on October 10, President Kennedy, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the head of the Joint Chiefs, and a few other advisers met at the White House to finalize plans for a military defense of West Berlin. Everyone agreed about the first three phases, a gradually escalating set of responses with conventional weapons. But a disagreement arose over Phase IV, the point at which nuclear weapons would be introduced. McNamara said that tactical weapons should be used first, to protect NATO troops and show the Soviets that America wasn’t afraid to fight a nuclear war. Paul H. Nitze — a McNamara aide and an advocate not only of containing, but of overthrowing, Communist regimes throughout the world — thought the use of tactical weapons would be a mistake. According to notes of the meeting, Nitze said that Phase IV should begin with the United States launching an all-out first strike against the Soviet Union, because “with such a strike, we could in some real sense be victorious.” Neither side could be confident of winning a nuclear exchange, McNamara argued — and the consequences would be devastating for both. The meeting ended with the issue unresolved.

When President Kennedy later sent instructions for the defense of West Berlin to General Norstad, Phase IV was made up of three parts:

A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons….

C. General nuclear war.

Although Norstad was supposed to try A and B before proceeding to C, the behavior of the Soviets could prompt the United States to begin with C.

Norstad had already received these orders on October 27, when Soviet and American tanks confronted one another at Checkpoint Charlie, the last border crossing in Berlin. An American diplomat had been detained by East German border guards the previous week, and a dispute arose over the process of gaining access to East Berlin. American tanks were sent to Checkpoint Charlie as a show of strength. Soviet tanks appeared there at about five in the evening on the twenty-seventh. The British soon deployed two antitank guns to support the Americans, while all the French troops in West Berlin remained safely in their barracks. For the first time since the Cold War began, tanks belonging to the U.S. Army and the Red Army pointed their guns at one another, separated by about a hundred yards. General Norstad had ordered his tank commanders to tear down the Berlin Wall, if East German guards blocked the rightful passage of American civilians. Amid the armored standoff at the border, Secretary of State Rusk had those orders rescinded. A miscalculation by either side, a needless provocation, could lead to war.