Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

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Command and Control: краткое содержание, описание и аннотация

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The New Yorker “Excellent… hair-raising
is how nonfiction should be written.” (Louis Menand)
Time
“A devastatingly lucid and detailed new history of nuclear weapons in the U.S…. fascinating.” (Lev Grossman)
Financial Times
“So incontrovertibly right and so damnably readable… a work with the multilayered density of an ambitiously conceived novel… Schlosser has done what journalism does at its best."
Los Angeles Times
“Deeply reported, deeply frightening… a techno-thriller of the first order.” Famed investigative journalist Eric Schlosser digs deep to uncover secrets about the management of America’s nuclear arsenal. A ground-breaking account of accidents, near-misses, extraordinary heroism, and technological breakthroughs,
explores the dilemma that has existed since the dawn of the nuclear age: how do you deploy weapons of mass destruction without being destroyed by them? That question has never been resolved — and Schlosser reveals how the combination of human fallibility and technological complexity still poses a grave risk to mankind.
Written with the vibrancy of a first-rate thriller,
interweaves the minute-by-minute story of an accident at a nuclear missile silo in rural Arkansas with a historical narrative that spans more than fifty years. It depicts the urgent effort by American scientists, policymakers, and military officers to ensure that nuclear weapons can’t be stolen, sabotaged, used without permission, or detonated inadvertently. Schlosser also looks at the Cold War from a new perspective, offering history from the ground up, telling the stories of bomber pilots, missile commanders, maintenance crews, and other ordinary servicemen who risked their lives to avert a nuclear holocaust. At the heart of the book lies the struggle, amid the rolling hills and small farms of Damascus, Arkansas, to prevent the explosion of a ballistic missile carrying the most powerful nuclear warhead ever built by the United States.
Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with men who designed and routinely handled nuclear weapons,
takes readers into a terrifying but fascinating world that, until now, has been largely hidden from view. Through the details of a single accident, Schlosser illustrates how an unlikely event can become unavoidable, how small risks can have terrible consequences, and how the most brilliant minds in the nation can only provide us with an illusion of control. Audacious, gripping, and unforgettable,
is a tour de force of investigative journalism, an eye-opening look at the dangers of America’s nuclear age.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v=h_ZvrSePzZY http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2wR11pGsYk

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“a higher degree of nuclear safing”: Quoted in “A Survey of Nuclear Weapon Safety Problems,” p. 13.

“Such safing,” Quarles instructed: Quoted in ibid.

The Optimum Mix

“A super long-distance intercontinental”: “Text of Soviet Statement,” New York Times , August 27, 1957.

a radio signal of “beep-beep”: Some experts speculated, erroneously, that the beeping was part of a Soviet secret code. See Marvin Miles, “Russ Moon’s Code Sending Analyzed,” Los Angeles Times , October 9, 1957.

boasted that Laika lived for a week: See Max Frankel, “Satellite Return Seen as Soviet Goal,” New York Times , November 16, 1957.

she actually died within a few hours of liftoff : Like the Soviet Union’s other space dogs, Laika was a stray picked up on the streets of Moscow. She died from excess heat in the capsule. See Carol Kino, “Art: Boldly, Where No Dog Had Gone Before,” New York Times , November 4, 2007.

“weakened the free world” and “starved the national defense”: Quoted in “Rocket Race: How to Catch Up,” New York Times , October 20, 1957.

“a devastating blow to U.S. prestige”: Quoted in “Why Did U.S. Lose the Race? Critics Speak Up,” Life , October 21, 1957.

“plunge heavily” into the missile controversy: For a fine account of how Sputnik affected political and bureaucratic rivalries not only in the United States but also in the Soviet Union, see Matthew Brzenzinski, Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries That Ignited the Space Age (New York: Henry Holt, 2007). The quote by George Reedy can be found on page 213.

“blast the Republicans out of the water”: Quoted in ibid., p. 182.

putting “fiscal security ahead of national security”: Quoted in Christopher A. Preble, “Who Ever Believed in the ‘Missile Gap’?: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4 (December 2003), p. 806.

“The United States does not have an intercontinental missile”: These quotes can be found in a report prepared by the CIA for the newly elected president, John F. Kennedy: “Compendium of Soviet Remarks on Missiles,” February 28, 1961 (SECRET/declassified), NSA.

More than twenty thousand Hungarian citizens were killed: Cited in Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History , vol. 33, no. 2 (April 1998), p. 210.

hundreds more were later executed: Cited in ibid., p. 211.

He was particularly irritated by a secret report: The report was “Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age,” Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, November 7, 1957 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA.

“It misses the whole point to say”: Quoted in Robert J. Donovon, “Killian Missile Czar: Ike Picks M.I.T. Head to Rush Research, Development,” Daily Boston Globe, November 8, 1957.

“we have slipped dangerously behind the Soviet Union”: Quoted in “Excerpts from the Comments of Senator Johnson, Dr. Teller, and Dr. Bush,” New York Times , November 26, 1957.

“just about the grimmest warning”: Stewart Alsop, “We Have Been Warned,” Washington Post and Times Herald , November 25, 1957.

“locate precise blast locations”: Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Command and Control,” p. 218. For the science behind the Bomb Alarm System, see “Operation Dominic II, Shot Small Boy, Project Officers Report — Project 7.14: Bomb Alarm Detector Test,” Cecil C. Harvell, Defense Atomic Support Agency, April 19, 1963 (CONFIDENTIAL/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA/declassified).

The logistics of such a “ground alert”: For the origins and workings of SAC’s ground alert, see “The SAC Alert Program, 1956–1959,” Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, January 1960 (SECRET/declassified), NSA, pp. 1–79, and “History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 January 1958 — 30 June 1958,” pp. 25–57.

a mean son of a bitch: In his memoir, Power belittled the military’s role in peacekeeping, defending national security, and maintaining deterrence. “Putting aside all the fancy words and academic doubletalk,” he wrote, “the basic reason for having a military is to do two jobs — to kill people and to destroy the works of man.” See Thomas S. Power, with Albert A. Arnhym, Design for Survival (New York: Coward-McCann, 1964), p. 229.

“sort of an autocratic bastard”: Quoted in Coffey, Iron Eagle , p. 276.

The basic premise of SAC’s airborne alert: For the origins of this bold strategy, see “The SAC Alert Program, 1956–1959,” pp. 80–140, and “History of Strategic Air Command, June 1958 — July 1959,” Historical Study No. 76, Volume I, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), pp. 107–36.

The mission would “fail safe”: The idea of relying on fail-safe procedures to send bombers toward the Soviet Union was first proposed by RAND in a 1956 report. See “Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950’s and 1960’s,” A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, H. S. Rowen, U.S. Air Force Project RAND, R-290, September 1, 1956, (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY), pp. 59–62. For SAC’s adoption of fail safe, see “History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 January 1958 — 30 June 1958,” pp. 66–74.

“Day and night, I have a certain percentage of my command”: Quoted in “Alert Operations and Strategic Air Command, 1957–1991,” Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, December 7, 1991, p. 7. Power made the remark at a press conference in Paris, and the boast unnerved some of America’s NATO allies. See “Lloyd Defends H-Bomb Patrols by U.S.,” Washington Post and Times Herald , November 28, 1957.

Designers at the weapons labs had been surprised: Peurifoy interview. See also “A Review of the US Nuclear Weapon Safety Program—1945 to 1986,” R. N. Brodie, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND86-2955, February 1987 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 11.

“nuclear safety is not ‘absolute,’ it is nonexistent”: “A Survey of Nuclear Weapon Safety Problems,” p. 53.

The odds of a nuclear detonation during a crash or a fire: According to the Air Force, “There was a 15 percent probability of up to 40,000 pounds of nuclear yield in the event of one point detonation of a weapon requiring the insertion of an in-flight capsule.” The Air Force also claimed that “with the sealed pit weapon the plutonium hazard was not significant.” See “History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 January 1958 — 30 June 1958,” pp. 78–79.

“operationally unsuitable”: Those are the words of the official SAC history. See ibid., p. 82.

“degrade the reaction time to an unacceptable degree”: Quoted in ibid., p. 83.

“crew morale and motivation”: Quoted in ibid.

The typical air base had only seven dummy weapons: Cited in ibid.

The AEC refused to allow any fully assembled bombs: At a briefing on the proposed airborne alert in July 1958, Eisenhower was told that during SAC exercises, “Completely assembled or war-ready weapons have never been flown before.” See “Briefing for the President on SAC [Strategic Air Command] Operations with Sealed-Pit Weapons,” Briefing Paper, July 9, 1958 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 2.

likely to miss its target by about one hundred miles: On average, the V-2 went about four miles off-course during a two-hundred-mile flight. An American missile with the same “average error,” launched from Colorado and aimed at Moscow, would fly about five thousand miles — and miss the Soviet capital by roughly one hundred miles. For the V-2’s accuracy and relevance to the Air Force’s missile aspirations, see Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 99.

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