Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

In de Gaulle’s view, it was not Prague that spelled danger for détente, but Vietnam and the Middle East, by which, of course, he alluded to U.S. foreign policy. 30With reference to Germany, he now thought—as opposed to earlier statements—that the country had to remain divided under all circumstances and that it must not be allowed to form any kind of political alliance either because this would spark a war with the Soviet Union. 31The real cause of the crisis and the purpose of the invasion, as the French president saw it, lay in the Soviet Union’s resolution to intimidate the FRG, which would ensure its back was covered for the confrontation with China. De Gaulle saw no reason for a change of strategy, nor did he seek a rapprochement with the United States and/or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; he continued to stand by the strategy of nuclear deterrence, which was predicated on decisions taken in 1967 and tallied with the premises of his foreign policy. 32

The Prague crisis highlighted a central tenet of French politics according to which the greatest source of danger for peace was not the Soviet Union, but Germany. This is evidenced notably by the fact that both internal meetings of the leading political circles and talks with foreign diplomats and politicians in the weeks before and after the invasion were dominated by references to World War II. All the charges against Bonn that had accumulated since the beginning of the 1960s were again stated and widened in scope: the FRG had not observed due care in its dealings with Prague; 33it was not prepared to recognize the Oder-Neisse border; it was nursing ambitions to obtain nuclear armaments, and after the project of the Multilateral Force had been abandoned, 34Bonn had consistently tried to introduce a “European clause” into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in order to keep open the back door for the Bundeswehr being given nuclear potential. 35

The great currency crisis of 1968—the FRG stubbornly resisted the appreciation of the Deutschmark and, consequently, a depreciation of the French Franc appeared imminent, which was unacceptable to de Gaulle for reasons of national prestige—led to relations between the two countries coming under serious strain. The Bild-Zeitung ’s notorious banner headline—“Again Number One” (“ Wieder Nummer Eins !”)—was by no means helpful. In the margin of a report about a derogatory remark made by the German ambassador in Paris, Foreign Minister Debré made the note on 21 November: “Germans will be Germans” (“ Les Allemands seront toujours les Allemands ”). 36Great political significance attached to the currency crisis. The French public got the impression that Germany was trying to throw its economic weight around on the political stage. Debré was very reserved in all his dealings with Germany. During the crisis, he was torn between two contradictory fears. On the one hand, he felt that the FRG’s attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was incautious and provocative; on the other, he feared Central Europe would be carved up on the sly between Bonn and Moscow. 37De Gaulle, whose foreign policy included a rapprochement with the FRG and reconciliation with Germany as cornerstones, appeared disillusioned and pessimistic. On 27 September, he told Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in a tense conversation that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had its causes in the policies of the FRG. The Germans would be well advised, according to de Gaulle, to adopt a “very humble” attitude toward the East, in particular with regard to the border question, to its economic policy, and also in its relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). 38

As had already been repeatedly the case in the Fifth Republic, Moscow was the most important partner for Paris with regard to its German policy. On 24 August 1968, the Quai d’Orsay’s secretary-general, Hervé Alphand, told the Soviet ambassador in Paris, Valeriyan Zorin, that Paris condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovak territory. 39One week later, on 2 September, Debré told Zorin that even though France demanded a withdrawal of troops, Soviet-French cooperation was the only policy capable of putting an end to “German militarism.” 40His Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, received assurances from Debré on 5 October that Paris was intent on continuing the policy of détente. 41

Initially, de Gaulle’s diction in his dealings with the Soviets was more forceful than that of Debré. He told Ambassador Zorin as late as 19 November that the policy of détente was now in danger and that the cause was not Germany, but the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Paris wished to return to the policy of détente and was ready for talks on Vietnam and the Middle East, but not on Europe. De Gaulle, however, agreed to continue bilateral negotiations. 42

However, the overall situation was about to change dramatically very shortly. Between 21 and 24 November, the currency crisis and the resulting tug-of-war between Paris and Bonn reached their climax; de Gaulle unexpectedly came down against the depreciation of the Franc, which the government was preparing to adopt. On 28 November, Zorin, speaking on behalf of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, offered France assistance in dealing with the currency crisis; Kirilin, the head of the Soviet delegation in the Great Committee, the body dealing with Soviet-French economic coopera-tion, would shortly be dispatched to Paris. Deals worth billions of Francs to the French economy were on the horizon.

De Gaulle welcomed Kirilin’s prompt visit and the fact that the session of the committee was moved forward; it had actually been scheduled to take place several months later. 43The Great Committee was convened in Paris in January 1969 and decided to intensify trade relations between the two countries. At the meeting, Debré told Kirilin with his eye on Germany: “Let’s hope Moscow and Paris will never forget the lessons that history and geography can teach us and let’s hope they will always assist one another. Peace in Europe depends on it.” 44

De Gaulle and Foreign Minister Debré both undoubtedly responded with regret to the fact that Soviet hegemony continued and became even more deeply entrenched in Eastern Europe. De Gaulle, however, remained faithful to his perspective of bilateral détente between Moscow and Paris and even felt vindicated by the crisis, for “bloc politics” was incompatible in his eyes with a new order in Europe. Yet the crisis did affect his policy of détente in that it shifted the focus of his attention from ideology, that is, from the de-ideologization of the Eastern Bloc, to power aspects. It was no longer the national rebirth of the Eastern European countries and the decline of communism that served as key concepts, but a play of balance and counterweights. The policy of détente was continued, and the liberation of Eastern Europe was downplayed. With reference to Germany there was an unmistakable hardening in de Gaulle’s attitude. Earlier on, his views on reunification were, if ambiguous, at least not negative in principle. Now Paris rejected this possibility out of hand. The crisis had laid bare the latent animosities and misgivings that Paris harbored against Bonn.

As for the future of Czechoslovakia, de Gaulle on occasion took an optimistic view (as at a press conference in September), on other occasions also a pessimistic one (as vis-à-vis Ambassador Wormser). A view that interpreted the Prague Spring as a harbinger of things to come (also regarding a potential transformation within the Communist system) was not in evidence. The only way of overcoming communism, according to de Gaulle, was the resuscit ation of a national consciousness. Seen from Paris, there was no third way: there was either communism or the traditional national consciousness. This is the real meaning of de Gaulle’s “je m’en bats l’oeil” (“I couldn’t care less”). The opportunity of understanding the developments of 1968 as a point of departure for later transformation in the East that transcended the old demarcation lines went unclaimed. 45