Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

The French embassy in Moscow was more accurate in its assessment of the situation. It was headed by two outstanding personalities: Ambassador Olivier Wormser and Minister Henri Froment-Meurice. The two nurtured no illusions regarding a so-called liberalization of the Soviet Union, nor did they entirely toe the line of de Gaulle’s foreign policy. 15They were well aware of the difficulties Moscow was up against: on 21 August 1968, their analysis of TASS’s announcement of “fraternal assistance” had already led them to the conclusion that the Soviet government was not going to mount a serious attempt to justify its decision by citing an “invitation” issued by the Czechoslovak government or the party leadership. 16On 23 August, they mentioned in a telegram on the occasion of an international scientific meeting in Moscow the openly displayed despair of the Soviet intelligentsia. 17The conclusion they expressed in an internal telegram on 27 August was a very cautious one: Moscow’s reactions were defensive and hesitant; the invasion had been carried out to silence internal criticism which was aimed at the leadership’s lack of response to developments in Czechoslovakia. On 5 September, they registered their disagreement with a view that was repeatedly voiced in the West, namely that the USSR was entering into a new expansionist phase. In the view of the two French diplomats, Soviet policies were generally defensive in character also vis-à-vis Bucharest or Belgrade. 18The Kremlin, as they saw it, was above all concerned with defending its cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe. It was also unacceptable for Moscow that reforms should progress more quickly in Eastern Europe than in the USSR itself.

On 14 September, the French embassy noted in its internal communications that Moscow was attempting to shift responsibility for the Czechoslovak crisis to Bonn, which constituted a crucial change in the overall assessment and had far reaching effects on Paris, as will be shown below. The significance of the Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited sovereignty” within the “socialist camp” was fully understood from the beginning both at the Moscow and the Warsaw embassies, which reported extensively on the matter and on the basis of reliable information. 19The message of the events was clear for most diplomats and observers: de Gaulle’s notion of a de-ideologization within the Eastern Bloc and the rebirth of the nations was either mistaken or premature at the very least. 20

The assessment of the situation by the Quai d’Orsay coincided largely with that of the Moscow embassy and was, on the whole, correct. Already on 11 July 1968, the Eastern Europe Department had concluded that after the hardening of Moscow’s attitude at the beginning of July an invasion could no longer be excluded, even if grave consequences should be attached to it. Moscow would not tolerate liberalization in Czechoslovakia, even with the proviso that the country would remain inside the Communist fold and a member of the Warsaw Pact, for this would be too dangerous for the maintenance of the status quo in the USSR itself. 21After the invasion, the fact that liberalization in Eastern Europe had been stopped for good was used to justify the invasion. The USSR had given precedence to shoring up its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe at the expense of East-West détente and had been motivated to adopt this course of action by the fear of escalating reform pressure within the USSR itself. This development spelled the end of the optimism that had been prevalent above all between 1964 and 1966 at the Quai d’Orsay as to the reformability of the Soviet system. 22It should also be noted that no one at the Foreign Ministry thought the FRG was to blame for developments in the ČSSR. 23This charge was first formulated by the ambassador in Bonn, François Seydoux, and was taken up above all by the top representatives of the state and by leaders of the Gaullist Party. Those diplomats who had studied the Soviet Union and the Communist system most closely concluded that a liberation of Eastern Europe was impossible at the time (the Prague Spring was perceived by hardly anyone as a harbinger of things to come); the politics of détente played a subordinated role for Moscow, and the Kremlin evinced no interest in the security model for Europe favored by France, which had Germany’s neutralization at its center. Instead, it concentrated on maintaining the ideological and power political status quo in Eastern Europe.

The French government condemned the invasion immediately and unequivocally, demanded the prompt withdrawal of troops, and restated its aversion to “bloc” politics. 24Paris equated the invasion of Czechoslovakia with the landing of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic in 1965. 25The example of the ČSSR was viewed in Paris as a corroboration of the French policy which was aimed at reducing the role of the two hegemonic powers and/or blocs.

This policy was also considered the only possible solution for Europe on a larger scale. It was, therefore, only logical for Paris to assert that France intended to pursue its policy of “détente, understanding and cooperation” with regard to the East as far as possible. Outwardly, Paris demonstrated restraint as to possible consequences of the invasion. Before the Foreign Policy Committee of the National Assembly, Foreign Minister Michel Debré referred to the invasion as “a traffic accident on the road to détente,” which caused a certain amount of consternation. 26

De Gaulle saw his views vindicated. He emphasized in a press conference on 9 September 1968 “Soviet hegemony” and praised the Czechoslovaks’ resistance and the courage they had shown in confronting the occupiers. Embodying “the character of Europe,” they were also living proof how sound the foundations were on which French policy was based.

Vehement public criticism of the FRG came from Michel Debré because the FRG refused to accept its Eastern frontiers and was trying to expand eastward economically. It now became apparent that Paris was attempting to blame the crisis in Europe on the FRG. Once the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 15 October 1968 on the stationing of Soviet troops in the ČSSR had been signed, France stopped pressing for a withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops in their meetings with Soviet diplomats. By December 1968, this U-turn in French policy had become impossible to overlook. From January 1969, it was business as usual in this respect in Paris, and the crisis was noticeably downgraded. The weightiest argument that remained and was repeatedly formulated in the public debate was that the invasion had vindicated the French policy of détente as the only possible option.

In its internal assessment, the French government showed great restraint and caution. A circular note to the embassies of 31 August contained the following guidelines: there would be no change in economic and cultural matters in France’s attitude toward the countries of the Eastern Bloc; politically a “certain temporary distance” was to be observed. 27In a number of meetings with representatives of other countries on 10 and 12 October, 15 November, and notably with U.S. representatives 19 November, leading French politicians asserted that the Soviet Union’s stance was a purely defensive one, which was exclusively oriented to preserving the status quo and that the fear of more of the same (directed against Yugoslavia or Romania) was almost certainly unfounded. 28

In de Gaulle’s view, the crisis had no bearing on France whatever. On 3 December, he told the French ambassador in Moscow, Wormser, “What we have here is a communist family quarrel. Under these circumstances, dear Ambassador, you will understand that I don’t care a fig about Czechoslovakia” (“ La Tchécoslovaquie, dans ces conditions, je m’en bats l’oeil ”). 29The meaning of this statement, couched in the humoristic musketeer language characteristic of de Gaulle, and expressed as an answer to Wormser’s discreetly diverging views, was obvious: the invasion did not call the overall plan of French foreign policy into question. The time for this plan was simply not yet ripe because there were no serious liberalizing tendencies discernible in Prague, nor a genuine striving for national independence and de-ideologization.