Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

36. See, for example, CIA intelligence information cable, “Preparations for Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia,” 26 July 1968, Doc. Nr. 96552.

37. CIA intelligence information cable, “Political Events and Personnel Changes in Czechoslovakia,” 27 March 1968, Doc. Nr. 242352, 7.

38. Unsigned CIA memorandum, “Subject: The Czechoslovak Situation (as of 1200 Hours),” 9 May 1968, Doc. Nr. 262105, 4.

39. Unsigned CIA memorandum, “Subject: The Czechoslovak Situation (as of 1200 Hours),” 2–3, 4.

40. Miller, The Cold War , 38, and Cynthia M. Grabo, “Soviet Deception in the Czechoslovak Crisis,” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1970): 29.

41. Miller, The Cold War , 60.

42. Grabo, “Soviet Deception,” 29.

43. ONE Special Memorandum 12-68, “Subject: Czechoslovakia: the Dubček Pause,” 13 June 1968, Doc. Nr. 95035, 2, and Richelson, Wizards of Langley , 170.

44. Miller, The Cold War , 38.

45. Miller, The Cold War , 38.

46. CIA intelligence information cable, “Preparations for Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia,” 26 July 1968, Doc. Nr. 96552, 1.

47. CIA intelligence memorandum, “The Situation in Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 PM EDT,” 30 July 1968, Doc. Nr. 265449, 1, and CIA intelligence memorandum “The Situation as of 4:00 PM EDT,” 26 July 1968, Doc. Nr. 265446, 2.

48. Miller, The Cold War .

49. Miller, The Cold War .

50. CIA intelligence memorandum, “The Situation in Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 PM EDT,” 30 July 1968, Doc. Nr. 265449, 1.

51. CIA intelligence memorandum, “The Situation in Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 PM EDT,” 31 July 1968, Doc. Nr. 265448, 2.

52. Richelson, Wizards of Langley , 169.

53. Richelson, Wizards of Langley , 170.

54. Miller, The Cold War , 39.

55. Miller, The Cold War , 38.

56. Richard M. Helms, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), 340–41.

57. Miller, The Cold War , 60.

58. Miller, The Cold War , 38.

59. Helms, Look over My Shoulder , 342.

60. CIA intelligence memorandum, “The Soviet Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia,” 21 August 1968, Doc. Nr. 326291, 3.

61. CIA intelligence memorandum, “The Soviet Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia,” 1–2.

62. CIA intelligence memorandum, “The Soviet Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia,” 2.

63. Miller, The Cold War , 61.

In late October 1968, that is, over two months after the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (20/21 August 1968), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was sending its instructions to Her Majesty Government’s major overseas missions about “Czechoslovakia: East-West Contacts.” 1The gist of the message was that the critical period was now over, and the missions could return to business as usual. Britain, along with the rest of its allies, would, therefore, continue to pursue its existing policy “based on both Defense and détente” vis-à-vis the Eastern Socialist Bloc. But there was a caveat in the above-mentioned telegram, “While showing willingness to do official business with them, you should avoid public expression of goodwill.” This probably meant that it would be better not to smile widely, or not to shake hands vigorously with Eastern Bloc officials, particularly in front of the media. Doing so would be playing into the hands of Soviet propaganda, for Moscow was already suggesting that the East-West relations were back to normal, implying that “nothing important has happened.” 2

This is not to suggest that avoiding “the public expression of goodwill” was as far as the British could go in the form of protest against the Czechoslovakian invasion. The United States, too, remained cautious, urging its allies to engage in “quiet diplomacy.” 3The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was not prepared to do anything militarily which might provoke the Soviet Union during the Czech crisis. For the United Kingdom, the crisis underlined Soviet weakness as much as the importance of maintaining the solidarity of the Western alliance, and this chapter explains why.

Despite the relatively low level of interest Whitehall had shown toward Eastern European countries during the Cold War, it must not be forgotten that it was the European theatre to which Whitehall gave first priority from the point initially of its strategic and defense importance to Britain after 1950. By that time, the Cold War had become a fact of life; the Iron Curtain had descended on Central Europe; and the North Atlantic Alliance had come into being. In March 1950, the Cabinet Defense Committee agreed that holding the Soviets “East of Rhine” was now “vital” to the defense of Britain. This entailed an important shift in Britain’s global strategy from the Middle East to Western Europe. With the shock of the Korean War, Britain increased its defense contribution to NATO even further, while launching an ambitious rearmament program. 4

This priority given to Europe coincided with Britain’s other and equally important decision. That was to seek multilateralism in fighting the Cold War in Europe, along with the United States, and within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. This was not to say that Britain’s Atlanticism came naturally after the end of the Second World War. In the immediate postwar years, the wartime special relationship with the United States was replaced by a rather more uneasy partnership. Following the abrupt ending by Congress of Lend Lease in August 1945, Britain began difficult negotiations with the United States for a loan. The passage of the McMahon Act through Congress in 1946 was another blow to Britain’s close atomic relations with the United States. It was only the growing pressures of the Cold War, as well as the West’s fear of Soviet expansionism in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Europe that helped to draw the United States and Britain closely together in establishing the North Atlantic Alliance. 5In the case of London, this was motivated by a practical, but nonetheless serious, consideration of what Britain could do on its own in keeping Soviet-led communism at bay in Europe. It is interesting to find how candidly this feeling of the limitations of Britain’s capacity to defend itself was expressed officially at one of the Cabinet Defense Committee (consisting chiefly of cabinet ministers of overseas and defense departments plus the chancellor of the exchequer, and the representatives of the chiefs of staff, chaired by the prime minister) meetings in the summer of 1949. It affirmed that “[we] have reached a stage where we can no longer avoid stating our intentions to Western Union. We know for certain that without United States active and early support the defense of Western Union is not practical unless or until a period of full scale rearmament is embarked upon.” 6

Since then, Britain’s policy for the defense of Europe remained remarkably consistent. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, London remained a keen supporter of the transatlantic alliance, although it preferred to be seen to be an “influential” member of that organization. At no time did Britain try to go it alone in Europe as General Charles de Gaulle’s France had done by withdrawing from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966. This is worth noting, for Britain was more independent in its formulation of the nation’s global policy outside Europe, where Britain, in the 1950s and 1960s, still held considerable responsibilities for ensuring the stability and peace of many countries and protectorates, such as in East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia. During Harold Wilson’s Labour government years, the Lyndon Johnson administration wanted the United Kingdom to send troops to Vietnam and/or to retain its military presence East of Suez as long as the United States was fighting in Southeast Asia. The U.S. requests were, of course, discussed and considered at cabinet level, but Britain did not feel able to comply with either of these pleas. Britain chose the timing and manner in which it would retreat from Singapore, Malaysia, and also from the Persian Gulf in 1967 and 1968 even if this meant doing so at the cost of upsetting Washington. 7