Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

The second was the importance of the Czech economy. Czechoslovakia was among the most industrially developed of the Warsaw Pact countries, yet it had suffered the most from twenty years of Communist rule. In 1948, Czechoslovakia was better off than West Germany. By 1968, per capita output was about two-thirds that of the Federal Republic, quite apart from major differences in quality. Moscow was aware that popular opinion in Czechoslovakia blamed the old-line party hierarchy for its relative decline. 10“Economic pressure is a major force for political change in Eastern Europe,” noted one U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum; without meaningful reform, Czechoslovakia’s problems “may become acute in the next two or three years….” 11

To the CIA, the Czech economic crisis meant that the Soviet leadership was concerned with the stability and reliability of the Czech military contribution to the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets thus were likely to be receptive to anything that promised a solution to Czechoslovakia’s internal problems. They also realized that the first result of a premature attempt to intervene decisively in Czechoslovakia would likely be the demoralization of the Czech military. At the same time, they were concerned that the “contagion” of Czech democratization not spread and that the Czechs themselves would go too far in creating an open society. All these factors seemed to add up to a Soviet decision to watch, wait, and hope for the best, while preparing for the worst. 12

As the snows of winter melted, it became possible to hypothesize that Dubček’s “socialism with a human face” would find a place in the Warsaw Pact. On 23 March, Czechoslovakia was the main topic of discussion at a Warsaw Pact summit in Dresden. The CIA reported that Moscow had used the occasion to put a limit on how far Dubček could go, but that

[i]f the new leadership in Prague proceeds carefully and step-by-step good progress can be made…. [I]n view of its political economic and military importance to the USSR and the Soviet bloc, the CSSR cannot start an antisocialist or anti-Soviet policy. The USSR would not allow this… [but] there [is] no anti-socialist or anti-Soviet movement involved in the new political evolution of the CSSR… only a strong movement for democratization and liberalization of the system. 13

Consequently, the Soviet leadership “did not consider Dubček as someone willing to start an anti-Soviet line.” 14

This conclusion was supported by the KSČ Party Action Program, published on 10 April. The CIA noted that it was “restrained in tone, realistic and relatively free of cant… disappointing to the radical reformers in some aspects.” 15Armed with this evidence of Dubček’s moderation and the Kremlin’s tolerance, by the end of April, the CIA had concluded that the leaders of the Soviet Union appeared to have “grudgingly accepted” the Czech reforms. The only limits placed on Czech reforms were the continued primacy of the KSČ and Czechoslovakia’s honoring its military and economic commitments to the USSR. 16An unsigned CIA memorandum argued that the Soviets could have applied economic pressure had they wanted to halt Dubček’s reforms and cited as evidence a Czech radio broadcast:

Let us not forget that… our cars run on Soviet gas, two out of three rolls are baked from Soviet flour, and our gigantic metallurgical combines would come to a standstill within a few days after Soviet ore shipments stopped. Nothing of the sort is happening here, as is common knowledge: cars are running, rolls are baked, and so forth. 17

In general, the CIA’s analysis seems to have accurately characterized attitudes inside the Soviet Politburo. Correctly deducing that the Soviet leadership was split over the need for intervention, the Agency reported that—at least for the time being—the Kremlin had accepted the Czech reforms as the lesser of two evils. 18Although there was strong evidence of Soviet “anxieties” over the Czech reforms, Dubček continued to prove himself to be adept at balancing reforms inside Czechoslovakia with continued adherence to doctrines of communism and pledges to uphold Czechoslovakia’s military commitments to the Warsaw Pact. 19There thus seemed reason to hope that, although Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia would increase over “the long hot summer,” the Soviets “will take no ‘harder,’ i.e., military measures.” 20

What could not be known was that the Politburo’s confidence in Dubček was being eroded from within. As the Mitrokhin Archive makes clear, KGB chief Yuri Andropov was playing a growing role in the decision-making process over Czechoslovakia. Andropov was not a voting member of the Politburo and is not even mentioned in some studies of the Czech crisis. 21But Andropov’s position as head of the KGB gave him a powerful voice inside the Kremlin. Andropov cared little for Dubček’s protestations of solidarity or (one suspects) even for Prague’s expressions of continued loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. To Andropov, an open society anywhere would serve as a conduit for penetration by Western intelligence services. He thus flooded Czechoslovakia with KGB agents tasked with active measures designed to discredit the Dubček regime and with the fabrication of evidence showing a counterrevolutionary conspiracy. This material was both fed back to Politburo members to goad them into action and put forward as justification for the application of “extreme measures.” 22

At least in part because of Andropov’s effort to marshal support for direct military intervention, relations between Moscow and Prague deteriorated steadily over the next few months. The Politburo remained reluctant to sanction military action, but late in April, the CIA reported that “[d]evelopments since the Dresden meeting indicate that the Russians and the Eastern Europeans were dissatisfied with the results of the conference and remained concerned about Czechoslovakia’s course.” 23By mid-June, Czechoslovakia was reported to be in an “uneasy truce” with Moscow. 24Dubček reportedly was now playing for time, hoping that he could implement enough reforms quickly to present the Kremlin leadership with a fait accompli. Nonetheless, “[a]t some stage in the game,” the Agency reported, “the Soviets will… become aware that their earlier hopes for a return to anything like the status quo ante in Czechoslovakia were without foundation. It is the Czech hope that this realization will have come too late and that the Soviets’ reactions will be minimal.” 25

It was now clear to Agency analysts that the Politburo viewed developments in Czechoslovakia with growing dissatisfaction. 26Indecision still reigned in Moscow, but the only thing now preventing the Soviet Union from intervening militarily was concern over the broad impact of yet another violent repression of an Eastern European bid for autonomy. 27On 17 July, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) warned the director of Central Intelligence: “We know of no way of foretelling the precise event in Czechoslovakia which might trigger… extreme Soviet reaction, or of foreseeing the precise circumstances which might produce within the Soviet leadership an agreement to move with force.” 28But the Soviets believed that Communist authority in Czechoslovakia was seriously threatened. 29“The possibility will exist for some time that the Soviets will choose to intervene rather than permit Czechoslovakia to… move decisively toward… an open disavowal of Communism or of the Warsaw Pact.” 30Still the Soviet leadership had not decided what to do. 31Very much still depended on Dubček and Czechoslovakia. “Some appropriate concessions” from Dubček would remove the need for military action. So would a conservative overthrow of Dubček. 32

The crisis seemed to have reached a climax at the end of July when Soviet leaders journeyed to Čierná nad Tisou, on the Czech border, to meet with the Czech Politburo. The bilateral negotiations were covered by a blanket of secrecy, but on 31 July, TASS reported that the talks at Čierná had an atmosphere of “frankness and comradeship,”—this, reported the CIA, was Soviet code for tough talk but no action. 33Ominously, however, that same day Dubček’s family was reported as leaving Czechoslovakia for Yugoslavia. 34