Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

8. Memorandum, “Pressures on Czechoslovakia,” Walter J. Stoessel Jr. to Mr. Read, 9 May 1968, and Lawrence Eagleburger to Stoessel, 10 May 1968, both in Folder 6, Box 179, NSC Country files Czechoslovakia, LBJL. Walter J. Stoessel Jr., who was the deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian Affairs in May and who assumed the post of ambassador to Poland right around the time of the intervention, had expected an intervention throughout the Prague Spring crisis months: “ ‘We’ had expected it so often over the duration of the crisis, and it had NOT transpired so often, that by the time it happened ‘we’ were indeed surprised ” (my emphasis). This is how Stoessel summarized State Department expectations vis-à-vis Tom Simons when he arrived in Warsaw for embassy duty. Personal e-mail communication from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons Jr. to author, October 22, 2008. Like the War Department in 1941 in the Pacific, the State Department anticipated an intervention throughout the spring and summer of 1968. This had a “lulling effect” (Simons) on Foggy Bottom. When the attack finally occurred it came as a shock to officials and people.

9. “Memorandum of Conversation” with Sir Patrick Dean, 17 July 1968, Folder “POL US—USSR 1/1/68,” Box 2665, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

10. Minutes, secretary of defense staff meeting, 29 July 1968. Box 18, Papers of Clark Clifford, LBJL (reprinted in appendix 9 of this volume).

11. Rusk’s statement is reported in a Central Committee resolution of 26 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #191 (for a translation of this document see appendix 5 of this volume). In the State Department memorandum of conversation of the 22 July meeting with Dobrynin, Rusk’s message is less clear and direct than in the one Dobrynin sent to Moscow—the Warsaw Pact is not mentioned and Rusk refers to the “bridge building” policies of the Johnson administration with Eastern Europe: “He said we had not wished to involve ourselves directly in this matter, that the U.S. had been attempting to develop better relationships with Eastern European countries as well as with the Soviet Union.” FRUS, 212–14 (here 213); see also Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 34.

12. Michael Prozumenshchikov argues that Rusk’s message, as reported by Dobrynin, “virtually gave [the Soviets] the green light for their planned moves in Czechoslovakia”; see his chapter in this volume. Ouimet, however, stresses the point that in the absence of more documentary evidence this cannot be construed as a “green light” to the Soviets, see Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine , 32–34.

13. See also the Wilke chapter in this volume.

14. Lyndon Baines Johnson, Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Popular Library, 1971), 486.

15. Ginsberg Memorandum for W. W. Rostow, 15 August 1968, Folder 3, Box 179, NSC Country File, Czechoslovakia, LBJL.

16. Ginsberg Memorandum for W. W. Rostow, 15 August 1968; for Helms citation, see Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United Sates and Eastern Europe (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 114.

17. Nathaniel Davis Memorandum “Czechoslovak Contingencies” (no date, but located in documents prior to the invasion), Folder 5, Box 179, NSC Country File, Czechoslovakia, LBJL (reprinted in appendix 6 of this volume).

18. Rusk thought so, since Dobrynin had assured him only three weeks earlier that no invasion was planned; see Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 351.

19. Handwritten “Message by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and delivered 19 August 1968, the day before the invasion of Czechoslovakia,” Folder 1, Box 57, Special Head of State Correspondence, NSF, LBJL, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #192.

20. For a fine summary of Johnson disarmament efforts, see John Prados, “Prague Spring and SALT: Arms Limitation Setbacks in 1968,” in Brands, Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson , 10–36 (esp. 24f).

21. Citation from Clark Clifford (with Richard Holbrooke), Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), 559; Johnson writes that opinions were divided about Soviet moves against Czechoslovakia “and I was not completely optimistic,” see Vantage Point , 487; W. W. Rostow’s Czech agenda item for the meeting is mentioned in John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow, 1991), 194.

22. Daily diary, 20 August 1968, Box 16, the President’s Daily Diary 1963–1969, and Dobrynin’s official note with the Kremlin’s public explanation for the invasion in appointment file (diary backup), Box 108, both in Papers of LBJ, LBJL; “Meeting Johnson,” Rostow with Dobrynin in Cabinet Room, 20 August 1968, FRUS, 236–41, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #193. See also Anatolii Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 179f; Johnson, Vantage Point , 486; George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 440. For a good summary and Johnson’s obliviousness, see Schwartz, Johnson and Europe , 216–20.

23. Notes of emergency meeting of the National Security Council, 20 August 1968, 10:15 p.m., in FRUS, 236–41; also reprinted in Jaromír Navrátil et al., eds., The Prague Spring 1968 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), #109.

24. Rusk, As I Saw It , 351.

25. Katzenbach memorandum for the president, 21 August 1968, Folder 6, Box 3, CCF, RG 59, NARA.

26. Department of State, Czech Task Force, 21 August 1968, Folder State Situation Papers, Box 182, NSC Country File, Czechoslovakia, LBJL; Rusk telegrams to embassies in Bonn and Vienna and all US NATO missions, 21 August 1968, Folder “8/21/68,” Box 1993, POL 27-1, RG 59, NARA.

27. W. W. Rostow memorandum for the president, 21 August 1968, Folder 3, Box 182, NSC Country File, Czechoslovakia, LBJL; CIA memorandum, “The Soviet Decision to Intervene,” and Thomas L. Hughes memorandum, “Impact of Soviet Move on Western Europe—First Thoughts,” both 21 August 1968, Folder 3, Box 182, NSC Country File, Czechoslovakia, LBJL.

28. McGhee memorandum for Rusk, 21 August 1968, Folder 1, Box 1, CCF, RG 59, NARA (reprinted in appendix 7 of this volume).

29. “Bohlen Briefing on Czech Situation,” Rusk to all NATO Headquarters, 22 August 1968, Folder 1, Box 1, CCF, RG 59, NARA. Rusk had reminded his colleagues of this colorful metaphor in the emergency NSC meeting on 20 August, namely that “Khrushchev called Berlin the testicles of the West and when he wanted to create pressure he squeezed there,” FRUS, 243.

30. The centrality of the German question and Soviet fears of a resurgent Germany throughout the Cold War is a surprisingly persistent theme in Leffler’s For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).

31. White House press release at 12:15 p.m., 21 August 1968, appointment file (diary backup), Box 108, LBJ Papers, LBJL; reprinted in PPP, 1968, II, 905.

32. For complete transcript, see notes of cabinet meeting, 22 August 1968, Folder “8/22/68,” Box 14, Cabinet Papers, LBJL; for summary notes, see FRUS, 48–49. Johnson’s presentation to the full cabinet is based on W. W. Rostow’s memorandum, “Czechoslovakia—Talking Points for Today’s Cabinet Meeting,” 22 August 1968, Folder “8/68,” Box 179, NSC Country File, Czechoslovakia, LBJL, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #203. Rostow wanted to maintain the chance for détente and wrote: “ The Cold War is not over , but we should also understand that we cannot simply return to it” (my emphasis). Johnson changed the second half of the sentence to “our relations with the Soviets are in transition.”