Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

When turning to Europe, Britain found such independent action unthinkable. NATO continued to be seen to be a “vital element” and was “cardinal to the security of Britain.” 8This stance can be understood when viewed against Britain’s perceptions of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European countries. The Foreign Office’s Permanent Undersecretary’s Committee (PUSC, comprising its highest officials) set out, in January 1952, Britain’s long-term policy toward the Soviet Union. It appreciated that the USSR’s objective was the spread of communism worldwide under Moscow’s leadership, but at the expense of Western interests. The paper asserted that the present Soviet leadership was inspired not only by “traditional Russian ambitions but also by a fanatical and dynamic revolutionary spirit which utterly rejects the very idea of a lasting settlement with the non-communist part of the world.” 9Under the circumstances, Britain could only contain Soviet “encroachment by active and ceaseless vigilance over a long period of time, backed by armed strength.” The final and lasting settlement after this “uneasy absence of war” with the Soviet Union was likely to “follow a substantial modification in the outlook and structure of the present Soviet régime.” That is, regime change was the sine quo non for the end of the Cold War. 10

Referring to the liberation of the Eastern European countries, the document recognized the possibility that the satellites could be detached with Western help “from the Soviet Bloc by a series of ostensibly spontaneous uprisings.” As happened in Yugoslavia, the PUSC continued, “[T]he psychological effect of the liberation of any satellite from the Soviet yoke would… be far reaching throughout the Soviet orbit, and indeed, in the free world.” 11These ideas were somewhat similar to the subsequent U.S. Republican policy of liberating captive peoples in Eastern Europe; however, it was important to note that the PUSC saw little prospects for any successful liberation by Eastern European resistance groups unless they were backed up by Western armed forces. In fact, the committee foresaw quite accurately that “with the possible exception of Albania” (who would leave the Warsaw Pact in 1968), none of the satellite countries would, in the foreseeable future, be able to depart from the Soviet camp “unless the Western Powers were able to neutralize the Soviet army either by armed intervention on a sufficient scale or by diversionary action elsewhere or by the possession of such preponderant strength that the Soviet government would be unwilling to incur the risk of a general war.” In the committee’s view, therefore, the liberation of Eastern Europe could not be successful without substantial Western help, but none of the Western powers were ready to provide this at the cost of confronting the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the subsequent crisis in Hungary in 1956 brought the severe limitations of U.S. liberation policy home to the White House. The revolutionary Hungarian government led by Imre Nagy proclaimed Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the United Nations for help in defense of Hungarian neutrality. These developments placed the West in a moral quandary about what steps they should take toward Hungary. While President Dwight Eisenhower was clear that “it has never been our policy to incite captive peoples,” U.S. support for the liberation of Eastern Europe was greatly exaggerated worldwide, resulting in mounting criticism of U.S. and Western inaction over Hungary. 12The lesson learned from the 1956 Hungarian crisis was, in the words of Permanent Undersecretary David Gore-Booth (1965–1969), “not to offer false expectations.” 13

After the Cuban Missile Crisis and the successful conclusion, in August 1963, of a limited test ban treaty outlawing nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, a significant step by the three major nuclear powers toward managing and controlling nuclear weapons, East-West relations seemed to move toward détente, which was defined in the West as “the search for secure and peaceful East-West relations leading in time to a European security settlement.” 14The UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 15in 1964 noted that the Soviet Union, too, wanted a respite from the Cold War because of the economic strain of waging it, the costly arms race with the United States, growing difficulties with Communist China, and a lack of any “gains by their tough tactics in Berlin and Cuba.” However, the committee astutely observed that Soviet interest in détente was a matter of tactics rather than the reflection of a fundamental change in its basic policy. Thus the détente will be “subjected to interruptions,” concluded the committee, “whenever they [the Soviets] consider that their purposes can best be served by raising tension.” 16

For Britain, too, détente cut both ways: it was welcomed as far as it would make Europe a safer place by making its opponent more predictable, would help to reduce NATO’s defense expenditures, and would increase business and trade with the Eastern Bloc. However, détente could also work against the interests of Britain. It might threaten the solidarity of the NATO alliance, dividing the pro-Atlanticists and pro-Europeanists, while détente might lead the U.S. Congress to demand the return of U.S. troops from Europe. After 1965, U.S. national security interests gravitated toward the conflict in Vietnam, away from a relatively calmer Europe. The German question might also raise its ugly head when West Germany felt free to pursue its own national goals. 17

Despite these limitations, détente, if successful, was a much better alternative to the high Cold War of the previous decades. It was, therefore, British policy to seek détente and negotiations with Moscow when any opportunity arose, and this was certainly part of the vision embraced by the incoming Labour government led by Harold Wilson after October 1964. At the age of forty-eight, Wilson was a determined, pragmatic, and astute politician, with twenty years of experience in politics. Like his predecessors Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan, Wilson, too, wanted to play a major role in trying to prevent a superpower conflict and to secure a “friendly understanding” with Moscow. 18On the surface, the new prime minister had more than sufficient experience in dealing with the Soviet Union. As president of the Board of Trade between 1947 and 1951, Wilson was already known to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) as a politician enthusiastically promoting trade with the USSR. In the 1950s, he continued to be a strong advocate of encouraging trade with Moscow and was the first visitor in May 1953, in the aftermath of Josef Stalin’s death, to the capital from the British political establishment. When he became shadow prime minister, he visited the Soviet Union twice, once in 1963 and again in 1964, and presented his idea of convening regular summit talks with Moscow, along with the United States and, possibly, France. According to the Mitrokhin Archive, the KGB once attempted to convert Wilson into a Soviet agent. Perhaps more damaging to him was an unfounded rumor circulated in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Security Services (MI5) that Wilson was, indeed, a Soviet mole. 19

As the new Labour prime minister, he continued to aspire to a better relationship with the USSR, although his interests remained largely in the field of trade and technology. In reality, Britain was not able to exercise much influence on the Soviet Union. A number of attempts Wilson initiated to bring about a negotiated settlement in Vietnam in cooperation with the Soviet Union did not secure a sympathetic ear in Moscow. In February 1966, the British prime minister proposed the setting up of a hotline between London and Moscow, but this did not materialize until October 1967. By then, however, Charles de Gaulle’s France had already established a similar communication link with the Kremlin. 20The Anglo-Soviet summit talks in February 1967 began with negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet friendship treaty. The treaty was intended to “regulate commercial, cultural, educational and scientific exchanges,” but the negotiations soon became stalled in early 1968. 21