Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Brezhnev personalized the term “counterrevolution” and mounted a massive attack on Josef Smrkovský. 25His list of transgressions began with the interview on West German Radio (WDR). Brezhnev quoted him: “We are convinced that that which we are undertaking will set an example for the comrades of other socialist countries. That’s what he said! He assured the Federal Republic that that which they are doing will set an example for everyone. We will do and achieve that, and believe that it will be interesting for both German socialists and the socialists of other western countries, he said.” Addressing Dubček directly, the Soviet party leader commented “[and you] give him a good appraisal, honest etc.” Using the example of Smrkovský, he demonstrated at the same time the leadership weaknesses of the KSČ Presidium and Central Committee: “In Party practice it is not common that some coal minister or forestry minister replaces the Central Committee and gives interviews to the Federal Republic, indeed an anti-socialist, anti-communist interview for which one could pay millions of dollars…. How is it that the Central Committee did not know that such an interview exists?” Brezhnev’s next charge was Smrkovský’s relationship with the Soviet Union. “The same Smrkovský says: Oh well, what does it mean if the Soviet Union has lost 100,000 soldiers, but the Czechs have also lost, and why? The Party has made so many mistakes.” Again addressing the KSČ delegation, he passed judgment: “That means, dear comrades, behind your back this highly praised politician of yours carries out his anti-socialist, anti-Party activities.” Once more he quoted the WDR interview. From Brezhnev’s point of view, Smrkovský answered the question as to what was to be done in the ČSSR with a challenge: “Perhaps something that no communist party has done, namely the combining of socialism with freedom.” Brezhnev clarified that the CPSU regarded the events in the ČSSR not as an “experiment” but as a “premeditated scheme” to bring about a change of system. This view became very clear at the end of his speech:

We have the authorization of our Politburo, to express the hope to you who are seated here today that you at the top will be in a position to alter events and prevent a very dangerous development. We are prepared to give you moral, political and democratic assistance. I would be very pleased and happy—and so would our Party—if I could at the same time express the support of all other parties present here.

He remarked threateningly:

If that should not be possible, however, or if you consider that to be incorrect, then we are nevertheless unable to remain detached toward developments in Czechoslovakia. We are united with one another by means of friendship, by means of international commitments, by means of the security of the socialist countries, by means of the security of our states.

The KSČ’s political goal was formulated as follows: the KSČ should assert its monopoly on power in Czechoslovakia and strike down the “counterrevolution” using its own power. In order to achieve this aim, it could count on the assistance of the CPSU. In order to achieve it ultimately without and against the KSČ, the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops took place on 21 August. The restorative aim had already been formulated in Dresden.

What everyone expected from Dubček was repeated by Gomułka as head of the Polish delegation: “We are of the opinion that it is today still possible to face these dangers, I would say, to face these dangers in a peaceful way, nonetheless with an energetic counteroffensive that must in our opinion be undertaken by the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia against the counterrevolutionary forces.”

Dubček immediately received pledges of assistance from the PUWP, the SED, the HSWP, and the BCP. In addition, each of the parties communicated specific messages to the KSČ. The minutes convey the impression of a well thought-out performance. It began with the “confession” of the accused Dubček, the “plea” by Brezhnev, to which the SED, the BCP, the PUWP, and the HSWP acquiesced and with which a united course was constituted; it became the binding frame of reference. The PUWP and the HSWP then reminded the KSČ of the lessons of the counterrevolutionary experiences of the year 1956. Hungary’s party leader János Kádár delivered a historic analogy in order to underline Brezhnev’s judgment: “[T]his process is extremely similar to the prologue of the Hungarian counterrevolution at a time when it wasn’t yet a counterrevolution. This means that is the process that took place in Hungary from February 1956 to the end of October. And we ask that you give that some thought.”

The SED undertook to demonstrate by means of the German example the interaction between western interference and the stance of the internal “enemy” and to recall the struggle of the Socialist camp against imperialism. Ulbricht began with the special situation of the GDR and the ideological threat posed by West German reporting on events in the ČSSR. He spoke of the “heating up of the psychological war” and referred explicitly to Brezhnev’s remarks on Smrkovský’s WDR interview. The praise of the Czechoslovak press association (ČTK) for the politics of the SPD in their report on the SPD’s Nuremberg party congress was, for Ulbricht, interference in the domestic affairs of the GDR; on top of everything he saw in this report the “representation of the ideology of West German imperialism.” He announced to the KSČ that the SED would no longer remain silent regarding these things, but would publicly “refute the opposing arguments.” Following a lesson on the causes of the current situation, which he sought in the failure of ideological work within the KSČ, he described how the West was currently benefiting propagandistically from developments in the ČSSR: “In a situation where we are all interested in the Socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact states acting unanimously, now, where U.S. imperialism is in a difficult position with its global strategy, in this of all situations you start to discriminate against your own party, you give the enemy material for its campaign against Socialist countries, and West German imperialism naturally exploits that and conducts a massive campaign.” In his analysis of the new tactics of the enemy—he claimed to have learned from the failure of the Hungarian “counterrevolution”—he dealt with the importance of future developments involving freedom of the press. If freedom of the press existed as in the ČSSR, where a “platform for counterrevolution at the current stage” could be publicized unimpeded without this being prevented, then the freedom of the press would lead directly “to counterrevolution.” 26

Ulbricht demanded from Dubček that the KSČ in their Action Program “state concretely what happened in the past, what must be corrected, how the situation is assessed, and what dangers have arisen as a result of the revisionist approach of certain intellectuals. The Party leadership should turn to the workers.” Dubček and his leadership should say openly “which dangers exist.” He provokingly accentuated the question: “Will you also have the courage to say that there are counterrevolutionary forces under Western influence who are attempting to do their business?” With the accentuation on block loyalty and the conflict of systems, Ulbricht intrinsically represented the political interests of the SED relating to Germany and also attempted in this way to preclude special negotiations on the part of the ČSSR with the Federal Republic on the normalization of state relations.

The Dresden conference set the course for the further development of the Czechoslovak crisis. With the claim that the main tendency of developments had been leading since the KSČ’s January plenum to “counterrevolution,” the CPSU made their assessment of the situation. Supported by the SED, the PUWP, the BCP, and the HSWP, they demanded from Dubček and his leadership the restoration of the KSČ’s monopoly on power and with it the abandonment of the reform course, which was stigmatized in the person of Smrkovský. This political aim was never subsequently revised. Once the “healthy forces” within the KSČ could no longer realize this on their own, external military intervention was affected. In each phase, the SED executed this Soviet policy of intervention without restrictions.