Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

13. TASS, 2 August 1968, 17–18-BE.

14. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 13, p. 47, transcript of the conversation between the FRG ambassador to Moscow, H. Allardt, and the head of the 3rd European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, G. Gorinovich, on 31 August 1968.

15. TASS, 5 August 1968, 34–35-BE.

16. TASS, 3 August 1968, 16–18-BE.

17. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 148, d. 16, p. 27, report of the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Prague, Y. Zhuravlev, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

18. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 147, d. 12, pp. 1–4.

19. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 148, d. 16, pp. 2–4.

20. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, p. 2, transcript of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Bonn, S. Tsarapkin, and his colleague, the Dutch ambassador to Bonn, de Beys, 26 January 1968.

21. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 148, d. 16, pp. 85–86, report of the 4th European Department of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, 25 March 1968.

22. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 148, d. 16, p. 160, report of the 4th European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 16 April 1968.

23. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 14, pp. 12–13, transcript of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Bonn, S. Tsarapkin, and the head of the Trade Union of Metal Workers, O. Brenner, 14 March 1968.

24. TASS, 11 April 1968, 35–36-BE.

25. TASS, 12 April 1968, 18-BE.

26. AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, 100, d. 6, p. 45, transcript of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Vienna, B. Podtserob, and his colleague, the Czechoslovak ambassador to Vienna, P. Novotný, 26 February 1968.

27. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 148, d. 16, pp. 120, 223–24, report of the Soviet ambassador to Vienna, B. Podtserob, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, April 1968.

28. TASS, 4 April 1968, 6-AD.

29. TASS, 17 April 1968, 40-BE.

30. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 147, d. 1, p. 23, quoted according to the text of the Soviet note of 20 July 1968.

31. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 147, d. 1, p. 25.

32. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 147, d. 2, pp. 14–15, text of the Czechoslovak note.

33. AVP RF, F. 138a, op. 49, 147, d. 1, p. 24.

34. TASS, 8 August 1968, 14-BE.

35. TASS, 5 August 1968, 34-BE.

36. TASS, 15 August 1968, 18-BE.

37. AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, 100, d. 6, p. 155, transcript of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Vienna, B. Podtserob, and his colleague, the Czechoslovak ambassador to Vienna, P. Novotný, 22 July 1968. In addition to this, Novotný passed on another piece of information to Podtserob: the West German ambassador, Josef Löns, had assured him that the last thing the FRG wanted was to interfere in the course of events in Czechoslovakia. In Bonn’s leading circles, the question of granting a loan to Czechoslovakia had been discussed. The idea was dropped, Löns said, because no one wanted to be accused of meddling in Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs. Comrade Novotný, however, added it was all very well for Löns to say this; the ruling circles in the FRG were in fact acting differently.

38. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 85, d. 19, pp. 8–12, note of the government of the FRG, 1 March 1968.

39. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 13, p. 13, transcript of a conversation between the Polish ambassador to Moscow, Paszkowski, with the head of the 3rd European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, A. Balatov, 17 April 1968.

40. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 85, d. 19, p. 19.

41. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 14, p. 34, transcript of the conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Bonn, S. Tsarapkin, with the federal minister of Scientific Research, G. Stoltenberg, 18 July 1968.

42. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 14, p. 31, transcript of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Bonn, S. Tsarapkin, with the Dutch ambassador, de Beys, 16 July 1968.

43. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 85, d. 19, p. 36, report written by A. Kovalev, A. Gromyko, and G. Gorinovich, 22 June 1968.

44. TASS, 2 August 1968, 14–15-BE.

45. TASS, 3 August 1968, 7-BE.

46. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 13, pp. 40–41, transcript of a conversation of the FRG ambassador to Moscow, Allardt, with the head of the 3rd European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 20 August 1968.

47. See N. I. Egorova and A. O. Čubarjan, eds., Cholodnaja vojna i politika razrjadki: Diskussionnye problemy (Moscow: Moskva, 2003), 181–82.

48. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 14, p. 45, transcript of the conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Bonn, S. Tsarapkin, with Berthold Beitz, a member of the board of directors of the Krupp conglomerate, 7 September 1968.

49. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 13, p. 55, transcript of the conversation between the second secretary of the FRG embassy in Moscow, Diepgen, with Ivan Sorokoletov, an official of the 3rd European Department of the Foreign Ministry, 20 September 1968.

50. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 13, pp. 57–58. AVP RF, F. 757, op. 13, 84, d. 13, pp. 61–62.

In early 1968, the Czechoslovak Communists surprised their sister parties in the Soviet Empire with their plans for reform. Relations with the ruling Communist parties were the job of the respective party leaders. Walter Ulbricht, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany ( Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED), was full of mistrust toward this “Prague Spring.” The changes interested him above all from a political angle: did they serve the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia’s ( Komunistická strana Československa or KSČ) monopoly on power or not? As the reforms of the KSČ pertained to the political system and the central administrative economy of the country, they did indeed affect core areas of its monopoly on power.

It was already clear to the SED leadership in March 1968 that these reforms were leading to a “counterrevolution.” This keyword was used by Communists to characterize a change of system in a Socialist society. In order to avoid such a change in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR), the SED took an active part in the Soviet politics of intervention to restore the dictatorship.

This chapter focuses on the political decision process in the SED party leadership and their actions in the interventionist coalition against the reformist Communists in Prague. The activities of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the National People’s Army (NVA) in connection with preparations for an invasion of Warsaw Pact troops in August are handled by other authors in this volume. 1

The SED itself acted in close coordination with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza or CPSU). This corresponded to its self-conception and the status of the German Democratic Republic ( Deutsche Demokratische Republik or GDR) as a satellite state of the Soviet Union. In 1968, the CPSU pursued first and foremost a political aim regarding the ČSSR: to restore the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia’s monopoly on power which was being eroded by the reforms. From the Soviet point of view, it was not a question of occupying the country, but only of protecting socialism in a “sister state.” Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev had already articulated this aim to Alexander Dubček at the Dresden meeting in March. In the notorious “letter of invitation” from Vasil Bil’ak and four other members of the Presidium of the KSČ from August to Brezhnev, this aim is precisely and openly formulated: “The very being of socialism in our country is in danger.” With this phrase, the Communist Party’s monopoly on power was rewritten, which the reformers in the Party consciously wanted to renounce. In order to sustain its monopoly on power, the dogmatic wing of the Party required assistance from abroad: “Only with your help can we rescue the ČSSR from the impending counterrevolution.” 2