Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Until mid-March, the GDR press remained silent on events in its neighboring country, although the issue increasingly attracted interest in the media of the Federal Republic, and the GDR population was also informed by means of electronic media as a result. The SED assessed these reports as part of the Federal Republic’s psychological war against the GDR. As Ulbricht had announced in Dresden, open polemics against the Prague reform Communists began at the end of March. Kurt Hager 27openly attacked Smrkovský at a convention of philosophers in the GDR and reproached him for his criticism of the KSČ being exploited by the Western media. 28Until 25 March 1968, an unwritten law between the Communist parties in power was in force: no public interference in the affairs of other Socialist states. The publication of Hager’s attack on Smrkovský in Neues Deutschland , the central organ of the SED, broke this rule. In his report on the speech, the Soviet ambassador in the GDR, Pyotr Abrasimov, announced tactical doubts about the date, yet the speech was, in fact, given on the eve of the Central Committee plenum of the KSČ. 29Its effect in the ČSSR was counterproductive for the intentions of the SED. The Czechoslovak media was outraged. In Berlin, the Czechoslovak ambassador appealed to the GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer. 30Winzer rejected the protest and explained to the ČSSR ambassador Václav Kolář in plain words the specific position of the GDR: “There is a West Germany, but no West Hungary, no West Bulgaria, and no West Czechoslovakia.” 31If, therefore, Czechoslovak politicians or authors made appearances in West German media in order to discuss the democratization of socialism in Prague, they were—in Winzer’s opinion—interfering in the domestic affairs of the GDR. As a result of this, the SED had to defend itself against “West German propaganda” directed at the GDR; this, therefore, amounted to no interference in the domestic affairs of the ČSSR.

Ulbricht reproached the Czechoslovak ambassador Kolář with the public rehabilitation of victims of repression supplying the “Western press” with material “for the struggle against the socialist world system. Why must you dig up the dead?” 32The demand made by the SED leadership that the number of “Western journalists” in the ČSSR be restricted and Czechoslovak citizens prevented from making unauthorized appearances in the media of the Federal Republic, was ignored there.

At the “April plenum” of the KSČ, the Action Program was passed and the attacked Smrkovský elected to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ. 33Dubček had kept his silence in Prague regarding the conference in Dresden; 34the results of the Central Committee plenum were now the opposite of that which the “sister parties” had demanded from him there: the position of the reformers within the party leadership was strengthened; the Action Program, the content of which had been devised by him, was passed. 35A public statement from the SED regarding the Action Program “Czechoslovakia’s Path to Socialism” did not exist. Internally, however, the Central Committee apparatus had analyzed the program and understood its character to be a compromise between the two wings of the party. The most important point for the SED was the statement on the leading role of the KSČ. They now no longer presented themselves as “the conscious and organized vanguard of the workers and negated Marxism-Leninism as science.” 36The SED expected hefty internal conflicts within the KSČ when it came to the implementation of the action program. Following the press campaign, the next stage of interference in the internal affairs of the ČSSR began: the SED strengthened the “healthy forces” in the KSČ and conducted to this effect “educational work on the ground” by means of delegation trips. In this relationship, the SED cadre in the ČSSR often did not have to search for long; they found conservative KSČ functionaries who supplied them with unsolicited information. 37

At the end of April, the Bulgarian Communist Party passed on their assessment of the state of the KSČ leadership to the general secretaries of those parties present at the Dresden conference, and attempted to arrange, according to personnel, the different opposing centers operating within the leadership. 38Ulbricht saw in this report a confirmation of his own analysis. Toward the Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin, he initially advanced the Dresden line: “We must win Dubček and help him to take measures in order to obtain control over the press, the radio and television; that is very important.” 39To a statement in the Bulgarian report to the effect that in Prague “no conclusions were drawn from the meeting in Dresden,” Ulbricht responded, “In all probability, a second Dresden consultation is unavoidable.”

The second “Dresden” took place on 8 May directly after the discussion between the CPSU and the KSČ in Moscow. 40The two most important results for the CPSU leadership were that the Czechoslovak delegation agreed to Warsaw Pact maneuvers in their country and that the differences in the Presidium of the KSČ became visible. 41This time, the Warsaw Five met without the KSČ. By the end of their conference, the building of an interventionist coalition had been decided. At Brezhnev’s suggestion, a “hotwire” was set up between the five parties. The CPSU, like the SED, set up a special task force in its Central Committee in order to prepare analyses of the developments in the ČSSR. 42

In Moscow, Brezhnev demanded that the “sister parties” sign a joint communiqué with a clear warning to Prague. Its core statement should be that the KSČ was not alone and could not decide on its course of action independently of the five parties. This, however, they had just done with their Action Program, in which Gomułka saw the “general line of counterrevolution” and which Brezhnev did not want to publish.

In contrast to Dresden, the military card was now openly brought into play. There was unanimity that the maneuvers agreed on between the High Command of the Warsaw Pact and the ČSSR would have to begin soon. The SED had insisted in advance to the still hesitant Soviet side that the National People’s Army ( Nationale Volksarmee or NVA) should take part in these maneuvers. 43Ulbricht combined the maneuvers with the aim of strengthening the position of the “healthy forces” in the KSČ with a demonstration of power.

The main problem for the Warsaw Five was still who within the KSČ party leadership should become their partner. During deliberations between the CPSU and the KSČ, Bil’ak alone from the Czechoslovak delegation had accepted the Soviet criticism. Ulbricht demanded, even when it was “only a minority group in the Presidium of the KSČ that advances the correct line, then I am in favor of us helping this minority group.” Opinions on Dubček were divided in this context; above all Kádár and Brezhnev had not yet given up on him. Both called attention to the popularity that Dubček enjoyed not only nationwide, but also internationally. As such, the question as to who in the KSČ leadership would be prepared to take on the struggle for the restoration of the Party’s monopoly on power was still open for the Warsaw Five. While Ulbricht suggested relying on the right wing of the KSČ—which ultimately happened—Brezhnev hoped until into August that Dubček could be won over to the idea of taking on this role himself.

At the end of the conference, Brezhnev drew the conclusion that was to become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty of the Socialist states: “By defending Czechoslovakia, we are defending the entire socialist camp, the entire international Communist movement. We must recognize our strengths and become active.” Toward Dubček and his delegation, the same message read as follows: “We are ready to give you help, if this becomes necessary. We are ready to do this, and in awareness of the mood of Comrades Gomułka, Ulbricht, Zhivkov and others, I can say that such a readiness is also at hand from them.” 44