Jeremy Scahill - Blackwater

Regardless of the controversy that later erupted over the various contractual relationships, the original contract between Blackwater/Regency and ESS, signed March 8, 2004, called for “a minimum of two armored vehicles to support ESS movements” [emphasis added] with at least three men in each vehicle because “the current threat in the Iraqi theater of operations” would remain “consistent and dangerous.” 74But on March 12, 2004, Blackwater and Regency signed a subcontract, which specified security provisions identical to the original except for one word: “armored.” It was deleted from the contract. “When they took that word ‘armored’ out, Blackwater was able to save $1.5 million in not buying armored vehicles, which they could then put in their pocket,” alleged another lawyer for the families, Marc Miles. “These men were told that they’d be operating in armored vehicles. Had they been, I sincerely believe that they’d be alive today. They were killed by insurgents literally walking up and shooting them with small-arms fire. This was not a roadside bomb, it was not any other explosive device. It was merely small-arms fire, which could have been repelled by armored vehicles.” 75

Before Helvenston, Teague, Zovko, and Batalona were sent into Fallujah, the omission of the word “armored” was brought to the attention of Blackwater management by Helvenston’s friend John Potter, who was supervising the ESS contract, according to the lawsuit. Potter “insisted that the sub-contract include armored vehicles, not only to comply with the primary contract, but more importantly to protect the security contractors who would be working in the area. However, obtaining armored vehicles would not only be an expense to Blackwater, but would also cause a delay in commencing operations. Thus, on March 24, 2004, Blackwater fired Potter as Program Manager and replaced him with another Blackwater employee, Justin McQuown,” 76the man Scott Helvenston identified as “Shrek,” with whom he had allegedly clashed in both North Carolina and Kuwait. 77

The suit alleged that there were six guards available for the Fallujah mission but that Blackwater managers ordered only the four to be sent “in direct violation of all of Blackwater’s policies and agreements.” 78The other two contractors were allegedly kept behind at Blackwater’s Baghdad facility to perform clerical duties. 79A Blackwater official later boasted that the company saved two lives by not sending all six men, the suit alleged. 80

Blackwater’s Andrew Howell later said, “The vehicle that they went out in that day was believed appropriate based on the mission by everyone involved or… I don’t believe that [the mission] would have been carried out at that point.” Regarding the allegation that there should have been six men on the mission instead of four, Howell said, “The mission they were on that day, at that point in time, given the threat as it was known on the ground in Iraq, the norm was not to have the third person.” 81But a Regency official later told Congressional investigators that “although these vehicles included an armor plate behind the back seat, that level of protection was below the armor protection kit called for by the contract” between the companies.

On March 30, 2004, the day before the Fallujah ambush, Tom Powell, Blackwater’s Baghdad operations manager, sent an e-mail to Blackwater management with the subject line “Ground Truth.” Powell wrote: “I need new vehicles. I need new COMs, I need ammo, I need Glocks and M4s. All the client body armor you got, guys are in the field with borrowed stuff and in harm’s way. I’ve requested hard cars [armored vehicles] from the beginning and, from my understanding, an order is still pending.” 82

The e-mail concluded, “Ground truth is appalling.”

Another Blackwater team sent out that day faced a similar situation to that of Helvenston and his comrades—short-staffed, under-armed, and lacking adequate preparation time—and that group likewise protested these conditions to company managers. After allegedly being threatened by Blackwater officials with dismissal, the men went on their mission and managed to survive. 83One of those men later said: “Why did we all want to kill [the Blackwater operations manager]? He had sent us on this f**ked mission and over our protest. We weren’t sighted in, we had no maps, we had not enough sleep, he was taking 2 of our guys cutting off ou[r] field of fire. As we went over these things we [k]new that the other team had the same complaints. They too had their people cut…. Why were they sent into the hottest zone in Iraq in unarmored, under powered vehicles to protect a truck? They had no way to protect their flanks because they only had four guys.” 84

The lawsuit also alleged that the men were not provided with a detailed map of the Fallujah area. A Blackwater official told Helvenston “it was too late for maps and to just do his job with what he had,” the suit alleged. “The team had no knowledge of where they were going, no maps to review, and had nothing to guide them to their destination.” 85According to Callahan, there was a safer alternative route that went around the city, which the men were unaware of because of Blackwater’s alleged failure to conduct a “risk assessment” before the trip, as mandated by the contract. The suit alleged that the four men should have had a chance to gather intelligence and familiarize themselves with the dangerous routes they would be traveling. Blackwater’s internal report, which Waxman was finally able to obtain, acknowledged that the Fallujah team had “no time to perform proper mission planning” and was sent out “without proper maps of the city.” 86This was not done, attorney Miles alleged, “so as to pad Blackwater’s bottom line” and to impress ESS with Blackwater’s efficiency in order to win more contracts. 87The suit also charged that Blackwater “intentionally refused to allow the Blackwater security contractors to conduct” ride-alongs with the teams they were replacing from Control Risks Group. In the CRG report on the incident, the company’s project manager wrote that Blackwater “did not use the opportunity to learn from the experience gained by CRG on this operation, this leading to inadequate preparation for taking on this task, unfortunately the outcome was the loss of four lives…. I believe that this incident could have been avoided or at least the risk minimised [sic] .” 88The suit contended that Blackwater “fabricated critical documents” and “created” a pre-trip risk assessment “after this deadly ambush occurred” to “cover-up this incident.” 89The day after the ambush, Erik Prince had directed his Baghdad managers “to perform an immediate internal audit and to keep the information close.” 90When that report finally made it to Waxman, it revealed that some Blackwater employees described the company’s Baghdad office as “flat out a sloppy… operation” and a “ship about to sink.” One Blackwater operative said, “Some of these lazy f**ks care about one thing, money.” 91

After these and other statements were revealed by Waxman’s committee, Blackwater issued its own report. “Stronger weapons, armored vehicles, ammunition, or maps would not have saved these Americans’ lives,” Blackwater declared. “[T]his event was a tragedy—for which only the terrorists are to blame.” 92The report repeated the discredited allegations about Iraqi police involvement in the ambush, said the four men had made the decision to proceed on the mission that day, and asserted, “Even if Blackwater had placed six men on the mission, the result would likely have been the same.” 93

Attorney Dan Callahan said that if Blackwater had done in the United States what it is alleged to have done in Iraq, “There would be criminal charges against them.” Blackwater refused to comment on the case, but company vice president Chris Taylor said in July 2006, “We don’t cut corners. We try to prepare our people the best we can for the environment in which they’re going to find themselves.” 94Justin McQuown’s lawyer, William Crenshaw, alleged that there are “numerous serious factual errors” in the lawsuit, asserting that McQuown lacked “involvement in the planning or implementation of that mission.” In an e-mail, Crenshaw wrote: “Let there be no mistake that the murders of the Blackwater team members in Fallujah were tragic. On behalf of Mr. McQuown, we extend our sincerest sympathies to the families of the deceased. It is regrettable and inaccurate to suggest that Mr. McQuown contributed in any way to this terrible tragedy.” 95