Brian Williams - Predators

Then, just before January 13, 2006, word came that Zawahiri had been invited to a compound in Damadola where known terrorists had met before. On this occasion he was to celebrate the Muslim feast of Eid al Adha and have a “terrorism summit.” 50Libbi had told his interrogators that such meetings had happened in the locale before. There were “strong indications that was happening again,” and “all the intelligence signatures” said that Zawahiri himself would be there for the meeting. 51It also emerged that some of the men said to be in attendance would be important al Qaeda operatives who had been tracked by the ISI since they had entered Pakistan from Afghanistan. 52

It was exactly the opportunity the CIA had been waiting for. The new CIA head, Porter Goss, personally gave the order to launch a barrage of drone missiles into the compound and was also said to have notified White House officials of the impending attack. 53According to one report, four drones took part in the subsequent strike, probably the largest flight of Predators involved in an attack to that date. As many as ten missiles were fired into the buildings thought to be housing Zawahiri and his comrades, according to Pakistani sources (this would indicate that as many as five Predators were actually involved in the attack since each Predator can carry only two Hellfire missiles). 54Once again CIA screens in Virginia lit up with explosions as the Predators sent back live feed from the FATA to their handlers.

Then reports that several high-ranking al Qaeda members had been killed began to come in. But even as the American government triumphantly proclaimed that it had killed several top terrorists, it became clear that something had gone horribly wrong. 55Although the Pakistanis initially claimed that the Americans had missed Zawahiri by no more than an hour or two, it turned out that the cautious al Qaeda number two had not attended the meeting in the first place. Instead he had decided at the last minute not to visit the compound and had sent four of his representatives in his stead. 56The representatives were there when the strike occurred. According to one Pakistani source, eleven “extremists,” including seven foreigners, were killed in the attack. 57

And they were not the only ones. One survivor, Shah Zaman, who lost two sons and a daughter in the attack, said, “I ran out and saw planes. I ran towards a nearby mountain. When we were running we heard three more explosions and I saw my home being hit.” 58After the smoke cleared, it became apparent that between thirteen and thirty people had been killed in the Hellfire missile barrage, among them Zawahiri’s four representatives, said to be Egyptians. 59Their bodies were taken away by al Qaeda militants before they could be identified. The rest of the victims appeared to have been civilians (although ethicists were to ponder how innocent a civilian was if he or she was giving sanctuary or meeting with known terrorists). Regardless, as many as fourteen of the civilians killed in the drone strike were said to have come from the same family, and they included five children and women.

As word got out that three separate compounds with civilians in them had been destroyed in Damadola, the Pakistani government (whose agents had of course tracked the four important al Qaeda targets to the houses) gave a rather guarded statement: “According to preliminary investigations there was foreign presence in the area and that, in all probability, was targeted from across the border in Afghanistan.” 60This weak explanation both continued the myth that the drones were “invading” Pakistani airspace (when they were in all probability based in Shamsi and Jacobabad in Baluchistan Province) and pointed out that the Americans had actually been trying to target foreign terrorists, not Pakistani civilians.

The explanation did nothing to mollify average Pakistanis, who were infuriated by the summary execution of their compatriots by a foreign intelligence service that was notorious in the country. Interestingly, on this occasion the Pakistani government did not bother trying to cover up the CIA strike or deny that it had happened. The cat was now out of the bag; the CIA was actively killing suspected terrorists and even innocent bystanders on Pakistani soil.

The resulting uproar was not entirely unexpected considering the Pakistani public’s deep distrust of America. Some ten thousand people rallied in the port of Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city. There they chanted “Death to America” and “Stop bombing against innocent people.” 61Hundreds also gathered in the capital of Islamabad, as well as in Lahore, Multan, and Peshawar, the capital of the Pashtun-dominated North-West Frontier Province. Many burned U.S. flags and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, while others torched the office of a U.S.-backed aid agency. In the FATA itself a group of approximately eight thousand tribesmen chanting “God is great” protested the strikes. 62The CIA had caused a major public relations disaster with a key strategic ally, all for the sake of killing four unknown al Qaeda operatives.

Not one to miss an opportunity, the intended target of the strike, Zawahiri, quickly released a video response to the attempt on his life. Gloating about his survival, Zawahiri addressed President Bush directly: “Butcher of Washington, you are not only defeated and a liar, but also a failure. You are a curse on your own nation and you have brought and will bring them only catastrophes and tragedies. Bush, do you know where I am? I am among the Muslim masses.” 63

Zawahiri was not the only one reacting; the Pakistani government was terribly embarrassed by the incident. As Pakistani protestors demanded the resignation of President Musharraf, the Pakistani government strongly condemned the strike to the U.S. ambassador. Pakistani information minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed called the air strike “highly condemnable” and said the Pakistani government wanted “to assure the people we will not allow such incidents to reoccur.” 64

The Damadola strike also appeared to have galvanized an antidrone sentiment among the antiwar movement in the United States as well. One American reverend wrote a blog post for CounterPunch titled “Remember Damadola”:

America’s moral decline is seen in the widespread mainstream acceptance of the murder of women and children and other persons by our government in our name. How little the lives of distant and different human beings seem to count reveals how much we are falling from grace…. President Bush expressed no sympathy to the families and friends of the dead Damadola villagers. No apology to their loved ones, nor to the people of Pakistan. No restitution offered. No explanation given to morally concerned American citizens about the killing of innocent human beings. 65

In fact no apology was forthcoming from the U.S. government. On the contrary, one Pentagon official said, “The message to [the Pashtuns of the FATA] is, ‘You have to take a new measure now: your families are not safe if you protect the terrorists.’” 66And despite all the public clamor in Pakistan and the growing antidrone movement in the United States, President Musharraf remained committed to his newfound alliance with the Americans who had by this time paid his country $10 billion in aid. (This total would ultimately rise to more than $20 billion.)

An interesting report in Time magazine from the period provides insight into the relationship between the Americans and the Pakistanis after the Damadola strike:

Although the missile strike provoked a round of protests in Pakistan’s tribal areas that forced President Pervez Musharraf to distance his government from the operation, cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan in the hunt for bin Laden has quietly deepened. A Peshawar-based Pakistani intelligence official speaking on condition of anonymity says Washington has an understanding with Islamabad that allows the U.S. to strike within Pakistan’s border regions—providing the Americans have actionable intelligence and especially if the Pakistanis won’t or can’t take firm action. Pakistan’s caveat is that it would formally protest such strikes to deflect domestic criticism. 67