Alexander Foote - Handbook for Spies

Similarly, if the Centre wished to communicate with a resident director, a postcard carrying microphotographs would be sent in the bag to the military attaché's office in a country adjacent to that in which the resident director concerned lived. This postcard the military attaché sent to an accommodation address in the resident director's country where it was collected by a courier and delivered to the chief cut-out, who in turn delivered it to the resident director. In all cases the occupiers of the accommodation or "cover addresses" concerned were entirely ignorant of the identity of the resident director, the military attaché, or even of the cut-outs who collected the mail. They usually believed that they were merely acting as accommodation addresses for the local Communist Party by whom they had probably been recruited.

Apart from this system of microphotographic communication, the networks also used a courier system. The resident director would send one of his trusted cut-outs to various fixed rendezvous in neighbouring countries where the cut-out would meet a courier from the Centre. This system, if slightly slower, was obviously better for the tranmission of bulky documents or samples of apparatus.

These two systems worked very well in times of peace, when postal communications were easy and rapid and, generally speaking, there was no systematic censorship of mail. In time of war, when communications were disrupted, at best subjected to long delay, and at worst never arrived at all, the system was clearly impracticable, and, saves over short distances, broke down. Even when it worked, all correspondence was liable to severe scrutiny by wartime censorship with the consequent risk of compromise.

As a result there was a radical reorganisation of communications systems, and now the main system in use is short-wave wireless transmission. This system is obviously infinitely quicker than the accommodation address and the numerous cut-outs and, provided normal precautions are observed, is equally safe.

In wartime it was vital that the Centre receive information as quickly as possible. Most of the information transmitted by networks concerned operational matters, and these would have been useless even if they had been subject only to the normal peacetime postal delays. As a result wireless transmission was instituted as the normal means of communication between the resident director and the Centre; and all resident directors are now required to undergo a course in radiotelegraphy and construction in Moscow before taking up the direction of a network abroad. Directors so qualified can send off urgent information as soon as it is encoded, without having to contact the normal wireless operator. If the director is forced to flee the country he can then build a new transmitter and is thus in a position to contact the Centre without the delays which a "place of conspiracy" or the contacting of a military attaché is bound to entail.

Though resident directors are now required to be so technically efficient, this newly acquired art has not taken away from the importance of the networks' wireless operators. Even if the director can transmit, it is obviously highly undesirable that in normal circumstances he should go to the set and do it himself- or worse still have the set in his house and transmit from there himself and thus imperil the whole network. As a result there is need for reliable wireless operators who will probably know the chief cut-out but will not know the identity of the director himself.

The ideal operator, like a resident director, is not a native of the country in which he is working. Through being a foreigner it is easier for him to hide his nocturnal and clandestine activities than if he were a permanent resident with many friends and relations all idly curious as to how he spends his time. In equally ideal circumstances this ideal operator will install himself and his transmitter in a top-floor flat of a large building situated in a built-up area. This makes it harder for direction-finding apparatus to locate him than if he were in an isolated place.

In peacetime the operator would probably have no more than two days a month when he was bound to establish two-way contact with the Centre. In addition there would also be several days each week when the Centre would be listening, at prearranged fixed times, in case he should call. Also on certain fixed days the operator himself would be required to listen in in case the Centre wished to call him.

In my network the Centre used a fixed call sign, though the call signs used by our sets varied according to a prearranged schedule. In order to establish communication a fixed call wave was used. For example, if

I wished to call the Centre I would tap out my call sign in Morse on my fixed call wave, say 43 metres. The Centre would be listening and reply on its fixed call wave, perhaps 39 metres. On hearing the Centre reply, I would then switch to my working wave length, say 49 metres, and then with a different call sign send over my material. The Centre would similarly switch wave lengths and call signs, and move over to their working wave length. This system, though it may sound complicated on paper, was simple to operate in practice and cut to the minimum the possibility of radio monitoring.

All messages, of course, were always in cipher and the cipher was one that could be read only by the Centre and the resident director. In the case of our net things were slightly different since, as well as Rado, the resident director, I also held my own cipher, and as I had my transmitter in my flat I was able to answer any questions from the Centre often in a matter of hours. Modern ingenuity has also reduced the risk of having a transmitter on the premises. In the old days transmitters were bulky pieces of apparatus which could not easily be hidden. Now they are made so that they do not occupy more space than the average portable typewriter and are capable of disguise in various forms. Any good modern receiving set is perfectly suitable for picking up messages from the control station. So much for communications.

The foregoing account is an attempt to describe how the network is designed to work under ideal conditions, if it follows strictly the lines laid down by Moscow. Obviously circumstances must alter cases and the network must be adapted to fit in with local conditions, but the general plan is constant and, as will be seen, corresponds very closely with the network in Switzerland. Any variations were due to the exigencies of war and occasionally to the human factor- such as the frailties of the resident director himself. A comparison of the two diagrams showing the organisation in theory and in practice shows the similarity.

It may be argued that the above description of the ideal Soviet network bears little or no resemblance to the espionage organisation uncovered in Canada. There the whole case centred round the Soviet Legation in Ottawa itself, and the legation was directly concerned with espionage against Canada. This goes entirely contrary to the canons of classical Soviet espionage. There is, I think, an easy explanation for this, one which accounts for this variation from the normal - and also, I believe, for the comparative ease with which the network was uncovered. If the network had been properly run even the defection of Gouzenko should not have exposed the whole network. But in fact the network was an ad hoc affair set up in rather a hurry.

The reasons for this are not far to seek. At the outbreak of war the main Soviet espionage effort was switched to Germany and her satellites, and the networks working against the British Empire and the United States were allowed to lie fallow. With the German attack on Russia it became even more imperative to mobilise all espionage resources for the current struggle. Also it was obviously politically undesirable for there to be any chance of a worsening of relations between the Allies as might result from the uncovering of a Russian espionage ring working against one of Russia's own allies. As a result the Soviet spy rings working against the Allies were closed down or allowed to lie dormant.