Richard Baxter - A Christian Directory, Part 4 - Christian Politics

Prop. III. We may not do that by blood or violence, which might be done by persuasion, or by any lawful, gentle means: violence must be used, even in defence, but in case of true necessity.

Prop. IV. When self-defence is like to have consequents so ill, as the saving of ourselves cannot countervail, it is then unlawful finis gratia , and not to be attempted.

Prop. V. Therefore if self-defence be unlikely to prevail, our strength being inconsiderable, and when the enemy is but like to be the more exasperated by it, and our sufferings like to be the greater; nature and reason teach us to submit, and use the more effectual (lawful) means.

Quest. VI. Is it lawful to take away another's life, in the defending of my purse or estate?

Answ. 1. You must again distinguish between such defence as the law of the land alloweth, and such as it forbiddeth.

2. Between what is necessary, and what is unnecessary.

3. Between a life less worth than the prize which he contendeth for, and a life more worth than it, or than mine own.

4. Between the simple defence of my purse, and the defence of it and my life together.

5. Between what I do with purpose and desire, and what I do unwillingly through the assailant's temerity or violence.

6. And between what I do in mere defence, and what I do to bring a thief or robber unto legal punishment. And so I answer,

Prop. I. You may not defend your purse, or your estate, by such actions, as the law of the land forbiddeth; (unless it go against the law of God;) because it is to be supposed, that it is better a man's estate or purse be lost, than law and public order violated.

Prop. II. You may not (against an ordinary thief or robber) defend your purse with the probable hazard of his life, if a few good words, or other safe and gentle means, which you have opportunity to use, be like to serve turn without such violence.

Prop. III. If it might be supposed that a prince, or other person of great use and service to the commonwealth, should in a frolic, or otherwise, assault your person for your estate or purse, it is not lawful to take away his life by a defensive violence, if you know it to be he; because (though in some countries the law might allow it you, yet) finis gratia it is unlawful; because his life is more necessary to the common good than yours.

Prop. IV. If a pilfering thief would steal your purse, without any violence which hazardeth your life, (ordinarily,) you may not take away his life in the defending of it. Because it is the work of the magistrate to punish him by public justice, and your defence requireth it not.

Prop. V. All this is chiefly meant, of the voluntary, designed taking away of his life; and not of any lawful action, which doth it accidentally against your will.

On the other side, Prop. I. If the law of the land allow you to take away a man's life in the defending of your purse, it removeth the scruple, if the weight of the matter also do allow it: because it supposeth, that the law taketh the offender to be worthy of death, and maketh you in that case the executioner of it. And if, indeed, the crime be such as deserveth death, you may be the executioner when the law alloweth it.

Prop. II. And this is more clear, when the robber for your money doth assault your life, or is like for aught you see to do it.

Prop. III. And when gentler means will not serve the turn, but violence is the only remedy which is left you, which is like to avail for your defence.

Prop. IV. And when the person is a vile offender, who is rather a plague and burden to the commonwealth than any necessary member of it.

Prop. V. If you desire not, and design not his death, but he rush upon it himself in his fury, while you lawfully defend your own, the case is yet less questionable.

Prop. VI. If a thief have taken your purse, though you may not take away his life after to recover it, (because it is of less value,) nor yet in revenge (because that belongeth not to private men); yet if the law require or allow you to pursue him to bring him to a judicial trial, if you kill him while he resisteth, it is not your sin; because you are but suppressing sin in your place, according to the allowance of the law.

Quest. VII. May I kill or wound another in the defence or vindication of my honour, or good name?

Answ. No: not by private assault or violence; but if the crime be so great, that the law of the land doth punish it with death, if that law be just, you may in some cases seek to bring the offender to public justice; but that is rare, and otherwise you may not do it. For,

1. It belongeth only to the magistrate, and not to you, to be the avenger.

2. And killing a man can be no meet defence against calumny or slander; for if you will kill a man for prevention, you kill the innocent; if you kill him afterwards, it is no defence, but an unprofitable revenge, which vindicateth not your honour, but dishonoureth you more. Your patience is your honour, and your bloody revenge doth show you to be so like the devil, the destroyer, that it is your greatest shame.

3. It is odious pride which maketh men overvalue their reputation among men, and think that a man's life is a just compensation to them for their dishonour! Such bloody sacrifices are fit to appease only the bloodthirsty spirit! But what is it that pride will not do and justify?

Though this be a subject which the guilty cannot endure to hear of, yet the misery of persecutors, the blood, and groans, and ruins of the church, and the lamentable divisions of professed christians, do all command me not to pass it by in silence; but to tell them the truth, "whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear;" though they were such as Ezek. iii. 7-9, 11.

Direct. I. If you would escape this dreadful guilt, understand well what persecution is. Else you may either run into it ignorantly, or oppose a duty as if it were persecution.

The verb persequor is often taken in a good sense, for no more than continuato motu vel ad extremum sequor ; and sometimes for the blameless prosecution of a delinquent; but we take it here as the English word persecute is most commonly taken, for inimico affectu insequor , a malicious or injurious hurting or persecuting another, and that for the sake of religion or righteousness. For it is not common injuries which we here intend to speak of. Three things then go to make up persecution. 1. That it be the hurting of another, in his body, liberty, relations, estate, or reputation. 2. That it be done injuriously, to one who deserveth it not, in the particular which is the cause. 3. That it be for the cause of religion or of righteousness, that is, for the truth of God which we hold or utter; or for the worship of God which we perform; or for obedience to the will of God revealed in his laws. This is the cause on the sufferer's part, whatever is intended by the persecutor.

There are divers sorts of persecutions. As to the principles of the persecutors: 1. There is a persecution which is openly professed to be for the cause of religion; as heathens and Mahometans persecute christians as christians. And there is a hypocritical persecution when the pretended cause is some odious crime, but the real cause is men's religion, or obedience to God. This is the common persecution, which nominal christians exercise on serious christians, or on one another. They will not say that they persecute them because they are godly or serious christians, but that is the true cause; for if they will but set them above God, and obey them against God, they will abate their persecution. Many of the heathens thus persecuted the christians too, under the name of ungodly, and evil-doers; but the true cause was, because they obeyed not their commands in the worshipping of their idol gods. So do the papists persecute and murder men, not as professors of the truth, (which is the true cause,) but under the name of heretics and schismatics, or rebels against the pope, or whatever their malice pleaseth to accuse them of. And profane, nominal christians seldom persecute the serious and sincere directly by that name, but under some nickname which they set upon them, or under the name of hypocrites, or self-conceited, or factious persons, or such like. And if they live in a place, and age, where there are many civil wars or differences, they are sure to fetch some odious name or accusation thence: which side soever it be that they are on, or if they meddle not on any side, they are sure by every party whom they please not, to hear religion loaded with such reproaches as the times will allow them to vent against it. Even the papists who take this course with protestants, it seems by Acosta are so used themselves, not by the heathens, but by one another, yea, by the multitude, yea, by their priests. For so saith he, speaking of the parish priests among the Indians, having reproved their dicing, carding, hunting, idleness. Lib. iv. cap. 15. p. 404, 405. Itaque is cui pastoralis Indorum cura committitur, non solum contra diaboli machinas et naturæ incentiva pugnare debet; sed jam etiam confirmatæ hominum consuetudini et tempore et turba præpotenti sese objicere; et ad excipienda invidorum ac malevolorum tela forte pectus opponere; qui siquid a profano suo instituto abhorrentem viderint; proditorem, hypocritam, hostem clamant : that is, He therefore to whom the pastoral care of the Indians is committed, must not only fight against the engines of the devil, and the incentives of nature; but also now must object or set himself against the confirmed custom of men, which is grown very powerful both by time, and by the multitude; and must valiantly oppose his breast, to receive the darts of the envious and malevolent, who if they see any thing contrary to their profane fashion (or breeding) cry out, A traitor, a hypocrite, an enemy. It seems then that this is a common course.