Алистер Смит - The Dictator's Handbook - Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics

2 See the UN literacy data by country, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=656.

3 See the US News and World Reports rankings, at http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/worlds-best-universities/2010/09/21/worlds-best-universities-top-400-.html.

4 See Kiron Skinner, Serhiy Kudelia, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Condoleezza Rice, The Strategy of Campaigning (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007).

5 For a comparison of leadership by one person in both a small- and large-coalition setting see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation,” Historical Social Research [Historische Sozialforschung] 32, no. 4 (2007): 203–221.

6 See Jorge Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978); Jorge Dominguez, “The Batista Regime in Cuba,” in Sultanistic Regimes, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 113–131.

7 See http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/25s3099.html.

8 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html, for comparisons of per capita income based on purchasing power parity in 2009, the latest year for which the data are available.

9 Quoted in James A. Robinson, “When Is a State Predatory?” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1999.

10 We have measured these distances wherever we could. If you want to estimate these distances yourself just use Google maps and associated tools for measuring shortest distance.

11 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

12 A recent study that examines the protection of property rights finds that larger coalition governments are significantly more attentive to protecting property rights than are governments that rely on smaller coalitions. See Mogens K. Justesen, “Making and Breaking Property Rights: Coalitions, Veto Players, and the Institutional Foundation of Markets,” Journal of Politics, forthcoming.

13 See David S. Brown and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, “The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity,” American Political Science Review 103 (2009): 193–213; and Brian Min, “Who Gets Public Goods? Efficiency, Equity, and the Politics of Electrification,” paper presented at the 2008 Meeting of the Working Group on Wealth and Power in the Post-Industrial Age, UCLA, February 8–9, 2008.

14 See Earthquake Management in Iran, Iranian Studies Group at MIT, January 6, 2004, available at http://www.vojoudi.com/earthquake/management/management_eq_mit_eng.htm.

15 Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 139–140.

Chapter 6: If Corruption Empowers, Then Absolute Corruption Empowers Absolutely

1 Henry (1387–1422) is much admired for his victory at Agincourt during the Hundred Years War. Unlike Genghis Khan, however, Henry V died young. He was only forty-five, but then he did not fall at the hand of some political foe; he died of dysentery while fighting in France.

2 William Shakespeare, Folger Shakespeare Library: Henry V , ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1995), Act 3, scene 3, 97.

3 Having lost his fortune, he hankered to return to Haiti, thinking he might once again assume power and extract wealth. He finally bit the bullet and went back to Haiti in January 2011, where he was immediately charged with corruption and other crimes. The urge for power is great—maybe even so great as to induce Baby Doc to undertake a most imprudent decision. Time will tell.

4 See World Bank data, at http://data.worldbank.org/country for Iran and Turkey.

5 For tax rates by income level, see http://www.taxrates.cc/html/turkey-tax-rates.html.

6 See David Leonhardt, “Yes, 47% of Households Owe No Taxes. Look Closer,” New York Times , Business Section, April 13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/business/economy/14leonhardt.html.

7 We amassed World Bank data on vouchers and district-by-district levels of economic productivity and poverty to see whether vouchers are given to help the needy maize growers or are given as political rewards to the smallest coalition electoral districts. In keeping with Tanzanian practices, we assessed productivity as the amount of maize produced on average across the long and short rainy seasons. The extent of district poverty was evaluated as the percentage of the population in each district identified by the World Bank as below the poverty line. Tanzania says the voucher program is to alleviate poverty; our rules to rule by say the voucher program is a private reward to loyal supporters in small coalition settings.

8 All quotations about the Dymovsky affair are from Clifford J. Levy, “Videos Rouse Russian Anger Toward Police,” New York Times , July 28, 2010, p. A1.

9 See Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs Press, 2005), 556.

10 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/olympics-crackdown-on-sponsorship-parasites-1612771.html.

11 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/panorama/transcripts/buyingthegames.txt.

12 “The Greatest Sideshow on Earth,” The Economist, July 22, 2010.

13 For background on Castellano see Selwyn Raab, Five Families (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005); Peter Maas, Underboss: Sammy the Bull Gravano’s Story of Life in the Mafia (New York: Harper Torch, 1997).

14 M. Cary and H. H. Scallard, A History of Rome: Down to the Reign of Constantine , 3rd edn. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1976), chapters 20 and 27.

15 See Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47.

16 See Michela Wrong: In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), 4.

17 See S. E. Finer, The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 724.

18 See http://www.economist.com/node/9465434.

19 See William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York : W. W. Norton & Co., 2003), 519–523.

20 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “The Political Economy of Corporate Fraud: A Theory and Empirical Tests,” Paper presented at NYU’s Stern Business School, September 2004.

Chapter 7: Foreign Aid

1 Ryszard Kapuscinski, The Emperor (Boston: Harcourt, 1983), 118 and 111.

2 See Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), chapter 19.

3 David Rieff, “Cruel to Be Kind?” The Guardian, Friday, June 24, 2005.

4 “Billions in US Aid Never Reached Pakistan Army,” http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,559962,00.html, Sunday, October 4, 2009.

5 See also Ebbs, “Battle to Halt Graft Scourge in Africa” New York Times , October 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/africa/10zambia.htm.

6 “Dirt Out, Cash In: Kenya’s Anti-corruption Campaign Is Wooing Back Donors,” Economist, November 27, 2003.

7 Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), 215.

8 Statement attributed to a senior US policy maker. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 555.

9 Ibid., 555–556.

10 “Turkey Holds Out for Extra US Aid over Iraq,” http://articles.cnn.com/2003-02-18/world/sprj.irq.erdogan_1_turkish-bases-bases-and-ports-turkey?_s=PM:WORLD, February 18, 2003. It is worth noting that Turkey has shown robust growth over the last few years, as seen by comparing these figures with the more contemporaneous ones used in chapter 6.