Bruce Mesquita - Prediction - How to See and Shape the Future with Game Theory

A SAMPLE OF DATA, WITH THE CALCULATION OF THE

WEIGHTED MEAN POSITION

Stakeholder

Influence

Salience

Position

I * S * P

I * S

Cho Myong Nok

4.61

90

0

0

415

Kim Chol Man

3.07

90

0

0

277

Kim Il Chol

4.61

90

0

0

415

Kim Yong Chun

4.61

90

0

0

415

North Korean Field Commanders

1.54

75

0

0

115

Paek Hak Nim

3.07

90

0

0

277

Yi Ul Sol

3.07

90

0

0

277

Yi Yong Mu

3.07

90

0

0

277

Chang Song U

3.69

90

0

0

332

Chon Pyong Ho

4.61

90

10

4150

415

J. Choso Ren

1.01

80

10

806

81

Stakeholders 12–51

. . .

. . .

. . .

812400

16528

Pacific Command

12.00

90

95

102600

1080

Dept. of State

22.00

95 95

198550

2090

Dept. of Defense

26.00

95

100

247000

2470

President Bush

40.00

90

100

360000

3600

United Nations

3.57

90

100

32143

321

ISP/IS

=59.8

1757649

29384

Appendix II

DATA USED TO ENGINEER A

COMPLEX LITIGATION

Stakeholder Bloc

Stakeholder

Influence

Salience

Position

Community

Affected Individuals

15.71

80.00

90.00

Community

Community Government

11.22

25.00

25.00

Community

Local Media

8.98

60.00

75.00

Community

National Media

6.73

25.00

25.00

Community

Plaintiff’s Attorneys

5.61

80.00

100.00

Community

Union

5.61

80.00

85.00

Community

Local Experts

1.12

10.00

25.00

Congress

Ranking Democrat

8.82

40.00

75.00

Congress

Senior Democrat

7.94

30.00

25.00

Congress

Local Democrat

5.29

30.00

25.00

Congress

Ranking Republican

3.53

30.00

25.00

Congress

Local Democrat

2.65

30.00

60.00

Congress

Senior Republican

1.76

30.00

60.00

Defendant

Board of Directors

8.06

50.00

25.00

Defendant

Senior Executive

7.26

80.00

25.00

Defendant

Senior Unit Executive

7.26

80.00

25.00

Defendant

Executive

7.26

75.00

25.00

Defendant

General Counsel

3.63

75.00

25.00

Defendant

Unit President

3.63

60.00

25.00

Defendant

Unit General Counsel

2.82

80.00

25.00

Defendant

Senior Outside Attorney

1.61

80.00

25.00

Defendant

Senior Attorney

1.21

55.00

25.00

Defendant

Unit CEO

0.40

60.00

25.00

Defendant

Group Vice President

0.40

50.00

25.00

Defendant

Corporate Committee

0.40

25.00

25.00

Defendant

Corporate Ombudsman

0.40

25.00

25.00

Defendant

Outside Attorneys

0.32

80.00

40.00

Defendant

Lead Outside Attorneys

0.32

75.00

25.00

Dept. of Justice

Deputy Attorney General

20.29

20.00

60.00

Dept. of Justice

Assistant Attorney General

16.23

50.00

75.00

Dept. of Justice

Section Chief

12.17

75.00

85.00

Dept. of Justice

Attorney

11.16

85.00

100.00

Dept. of Justice

Attorney

9.13

75.00

100.00

Dept. of Justice

Attorney

1.01

60.00

75.00

Federal Gov’t

OSHA

13.64

65.00

25.00

Federal Gov’t

Agency

13.64

25.00

25.00

Federal Gov’t

ABC Region

2.73

20.00

80.00

State Gov’t

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

4.55

20.00

75.00

State Gov’t

Section Chief

3.18

20.00

75.00

State Gov’t

Staff

2.27

20.00

75.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

U.S. Attorney

27.03

35.00

50.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

Office with Expertise

21.62

35.00

80.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

First Assistant

21.62

35.00

50.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

Assistant U.S. Attorney

12.16

60.00

60.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

FBI

8.11

20.00

60.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

FBI Agents

5.41

40.00

60.00

U.S. Attorney’s Ofc

ABC Agents

4.05

50.00

80.00

Initial Forecast

60.00

Notes

Introduction

1. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation,” Historical Social Research [ Historische Sozialforschung ]32, no. 4 (2007): 203–21.

2. Vernon Mallinson, “Some Sources for the History of Education in Belgium,” British Journal of Educational Studies 4, no. 1 (November 1955): 62–70.

3. See, for instance, Joseph Conrad, Youth, and Two Other Stories (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1903); Barbara Emerson. Leopold Ii of the Belgians : King of Colonialism (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1979); Peter Forbath, The River Congo (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); and Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Boston: Mariner Books, 1999).

4. The discussion that follows is based on the logic and evidence provided in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003). See especially chapter 7 See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 2 (February 2009): 167–97.

5. Petty dictators typically also have a pot of money that can be spent at their sole discretion. Democratic leaders have far less authority over spending. Discretionary funds can be used to benefit the citizenry or can be socked away in a secret bank account. One way to recognize civic-mindedness is to see how many benefits the public has compared to expectations, given the type of regime. Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew and China’s Deng Xiaoping, for instance, seem to have been genuinely civic-minded. They implemented effective public policies while sustaining the loyalty of their essential supporters. Kim Jong Il, Robert Mugabe, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in contrast and to varying degrees, seem not so civic-minded. See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow, Logic of Political Survival .

6. Stanley Feder, “Factions and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,” in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA’s Private World : Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal , 1955–1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), and James L. Ray and Bruce M. Russett, “The Future as Arbiter of Theoretical Controversies: Predictions, Explanations and the End of the Cold War,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 4 (October 1996): 441–70.