Anthony Summers - The Eleventh Day

75 I believe:ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “Channel 5”;

76 NEADS told nothing:ibid., 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, MCC Log, “Miles Kara Trips,” B19, T8, CF, CR, 30;

77 controller heard/reported promptly:int. John Werth, CR, 28, FAA Memo, “Full Transcription: Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position, 9/11/01,” B1, NYC files, CF;

78 Uh, do we want to think?/FAA staffer reported/“does not believe”:ibid., MFR 04018154, 11/24/03, CR, 461n167.

79 132 NEADS knew nothing:MCC/T Log, “Miles Kara Trips—MCC Log,” B19, T8, CF. Ironically, this was the one time during the morning that U.S. forces might have been in a position to intercept one of the hijacked flights. In the words of Commission staffer Kara, “it was only because of a proactive error by Boston air traffic controller Colin Scoggins [suggesting that Flight 11 might still be aloft] … that the nation’s air defenders had any real chance to defend against Flight 93.” The flap over the nonexistent Flight 11 got fighters from Langley in the air, where they established a Combat Air Patrol over Washington by 10:00. It was a patrol at that stage, however—an impotent patrol. It had no rules of engagement, no knowledge of the real flight that was missing, United 93 (“Archive for the Andrews Fighters Category,” www.oredigger61.org);

80 “we were always”:int. of Colin Scoggins (under his Internet name of Cheap Shot), “Q&A with Boston Center Air Traffic Controller,” http://sites.google.com.

81 “We believe”:Spencer, 286;

82 “watching United”:“Conversation with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold,” www.codeonemagazine.com, 1/02.

83 magical feat/no one reported:The FAA’s call alerting the military to United 93’s situation was at 10:07, and the airliner had crashed at 10:03. Seven minutes later, NEADS was told that the plane was down. (9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, MCC Tech logbook, “Miles Kara FAA HQ 3 of 3,” B19, T8, CF).

84 Arnold concedes:Testimony of Larry Arnold, 6/17/04, CO, MFR 04016749, 2/3/04, Vanity Fair , 9/06 & see re officers conceding same MFR 04016769, 1/23/04.

85 conflated Delta 1989:Miles Kara, “Archive for Delta 1989 Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger.com—with which the authors concur, int. John Werth, & see MFRs 04016769, 1/23/04, 04016749, 2/3/04. Colonel Marr, the NEADS battle commander, also offered inaccurate information about NEADS and Flight 93. The Air Force’s official 9/11 history, published as Air War over America in January 2003, quoted him as saying he and colleagues called in fighters from the airbase at Selfridge “so they could head 93 off at the pass … get in there, close on him, and convince him to turn.” The request to Selfridge was made, however, at about 9:43, before NORAD knew anything about Flight 93. The request was made, rather, in connection with Delta 1989, which—as discussed in the text—had not in fact been hijacked (“so they could”: Staff Monograph, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 100n391; Selfridge request: 1989: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, Staff Monograph, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 101n391).

86 Sudoku/shoddy work:Miles Kara, “NORAD’s Sudoko Puzzle, a Failure to Tell the Truth” & “Archive of the ‘May 23, 2003 Hearing’ Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org.

87 Marcus pointed:Marcus to Schmitz & Mead plus attachments, 7/29/04, “Referral of False Statements by Government Officials to FAA & DOD Inspectors General,” CF; Kara, for his part, told the authors that in his view the press release in question had been a “rush to judgment” by NORAD, that NORAD had simply wanted to “get out in front of FAA before the upcoming White House meeting to sort things out”; the tape malfuntion referred to, Kara said, did indeed occur (corr. Miles Kara, 2011);

88 “didn’t get together”:Testimony of Ralph Eberhart, 6/17/04, CO;

89 “NORAD’s public chronology”/“whoever at FAA”:“Sen. Dayton’s ‘NORAD Lied’ Transcript,” www.scoop.co.nz;

90 “At some”:Farmer, 4–.

CHAPTER 13

1

Wolfowitz:

Online NewsHour, 9/14/01,

www.pbs.org

;

2

“horrendous decision”:

Meet the Press

, NBC, 9/16/01;

3

“I recommended”:

Office of the Vice President Internal

Transcript, Telephone Interview of the Vice President by

Newsweek

, “Farmer—Misc.,” B9, NYC files, CF;

4

“You bet”:

WP

, 1/27/02;

5

“emphasized”:

CR, 40, 464n214;

6

2010 memoir:

Bush, 129–.

7

“The operational chain”:

Dept. of Defense Directive 5100.1, 9/25/87. The authors have here referred to the directive effectuating the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the relevant law on 9/11. Other Defense Department regulations in force in 2001 stated—on the matter of military cooperation with civilian authorities (like the FAA)—that the defense secretary had to approve “any request for potentially lethal support,” and that “only the President” could request the use of the military to respond to domestic terrorism. It was “understood” in 2001, the 9/11 Commission stated, that a shoot-down order would have to come from the National Command Authority—“a phrase used to describe the President and the Secretary of Defense.” Dr. David Griffin, the prominent skeptic, has suggested that the military did not in fact require authorization—that they could act at once in cases requiring “immediate responses.” The authors’ reading of the regulation Griffin cites is that in certain circumstances and “where time does not permit” prior approval, the military could indeed take “necessary action.” The sort of action it could take, however, is very specifically described and does

not

include the use of force (“understood”: CR 17, 43; Griffin:

New Pearl Harbor Revisited

, 265n12; regulation: DOD Directives, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” 3025.1, 1/15/93, 3025.15, 2/18/97, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions, “Aircraft Piracy [Hijacking] and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” 3610.01, 7/31/97, 3610.01A, 6/1/01).

8

generals understood/exercise:

Testimony of Larry Arnold & Craig McKinley, 5/23/03, CO, CR 457n98;

9

“derelict balloon”/Only President:

MFR 04016749, 2/3/04, Testimony of Larry Arnold, 5/23/02, CO, CR 457n98;

10 Cheney furious:Shenon, 267, 411–, but see Kean & Hamilton, 261;

11 clear hint:CR, 40–, 464n213–216;

12 “We just didn’t”:Shenon, 265;

13 “The official version”:Farmer, 255.

14 “My recommendation”:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2, B3, NYC files, CF;

15 Nasypany began asking: Vanity Fair , 9/06;

16 “I don’t know”:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, FAA Memo, Full Transcript, Aircraft Accident: UAL175; New York, NY, 9/11/01, “AAL 11, UAL 175: FAA Produced documents, Transcripts used in interviews,” B2, NYC files, CF;