Anthony Summers - The Eleventh Day

52 Five minutes after:CR, 23–;

53 “I thought”: Cape Cod Times , 8/21/02;

54 “We don’t know”/“We need”/urged/Marr at first:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF & re Boston, authors’ check of audiotape, CR, 460n137;

55 “Listen”:Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcript, Position 15,” B1, T8, CF.

56 9:21 call/​Scoggins/checked D.C./“First I heard”/Scoggins insisted:MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Scoggins has said he is “99% certain the person who made that call on the Telcon [about Flight 11 still being airborne] was Dave Cannoles.” The FAA’s Cannoles told 9/11 Commission staff that he did not recall doubt as to whether Flight 11 had crashed into the Trade Center. Another staff member, Doug Davis, thought the chief of staff for the director of air traffic at FAA headquarters, Mary Ellen Kraus, said Flight 11 was still airborne. Kraus denied it (“Losing Flight 77,” www.911myths.com, handwritten notes of Dave Canoles interview, 3/25/04, “Dave Canoles, FAA WOC,” B2, Dana Hyde files, CF, MFR of int. Mary Ellen Kraus, 4/27/04, “FAA HQ—Mary Ellen Kraus,” B6, T8, CF).

57 new “track”:Miles Kara, “Archive for the ‘Transponder & Ghosts’ Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, Traffic Situation Display (TSD) Demo, 4/13/04, “FAA HQ Floor Position Maps—Herndon,” B19, T8, CF;

58 “listening on a Telcon”:int. of Colin Scoggins at www.911myths.com;

59 “Shit!”:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, CR, 461n149.

60 9:30 fighters into air:CR, 27. Two planes on alert duty were ready and loaded with live missiles, while the third—the “spare”—had only its 20mm gun. The pilots were Major Lou Derrig, Captain Dean Eckmann, and—piloting the spare—Captain Craig Borgstrom (Spencer, 115–, 142–).

61 Nasypany figured:MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 23/04, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03.

62 NEADS ordered/tower sent:“Staff Statement 17,” CO, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03. The Commission Report offers three explanations for the change of course. One, that the scramble order had given no distance to the target, nor where it was. Two, that the pilots followed a “generic” flight plan designed to get them out of local airspace. Three, that the lead pilot and the local FAA controller assumed that the Langley tower’s instruction superseded the order received from NEADS. According to author Lynn Spencer, who interviewed members of the unit involved, Captain Dean Eckmann assumed the fighters were “being vectored eastward in order to fly around the traffic in their way. He doesn’t second-guess the instructions.… The jet’s targets are customarily out over the ocean.” There is, however, no mention of traffic on the Air Traffic Control tapes (CR, 27, Spencer, 143–; corr. Miles Kara, 2011).

63 NEADS finally learned:American Airlines executive vice president Gerard Arpey had been told at 9:00 A.M.that communications with American 77 had been lost. As reported in Ch. 4, the FAA controller at Indianapolis Center had his last routine contact with Flight 77 as early as 8:54 (CR, 8–);

64 “Let me tell”:9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF;

65 “Latest report”/“not sure”/“rumor”:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF;

66 “Get your fighters”:“Transcripts from Voice Recorder, Channel 14,” B20, T8, “NEADS Transcripts color-coded,” CF;

67 asked where fighters/“I don’t care”:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF;

68 Scoggins back/“Delta 1989”/“And is this one?”:Chronology of Events at Mission Coodinator Position, 9/24/03, “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Based on a Commission staff timeline, the authors have taken 9:39 as the time Scoggins warned NEADS about Delta 1989—even though the Commission Report uses a time of 9:41. (“Timeline of the Events of the Day,” www.scribd.com, & see MCC log, “Miles Kara trips,” B19, T8, CF, Farmer, 193– v. CR, 28).

69 Boston speculated:Miles Kara, “Archive for the Delta 1989 category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, & see Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF. In a chronology he gave the Commission of the day’s events, Scoggins noted that an “Open Telcon reports that DAL1889 [ sic ] is NORDO [no radio]” and described his own subsequent action as “call NEADS to advise” suggesting that his concern about 1989 was piqued only after hearing of it from others. In an interview much later, Scoggins said he thought Delta 1989 might have become suspect because it “missed a frequency transfer” or “didn’t make a transmission back” when given a frequency change (“Open Telcon”: Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position, 9/24/03, “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, & see Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF; later interview: “Q & A with 9/11 Boston Air Traffic Controller,” http://sites.google.com).

70 NEADS tracked:MFR 04016777, 10/28/03, Miles Kara, “Archive to the ‘Transponders & Ghosts’ Category, 9/11 Revisited,” www.oredigger61.org, Kara to Brinkley, 1/26/04, “Misc. Loose Documents re. Delta 1989,” B5, T8, CF, UA93 & Andrews Timeline, “Andrews AFB Logs—Timelines, UA93 & Andrews,” B4, Dana Hyde files, CF.

71 only plane able to tail:NEADS had also been able briefly to pinpoint and track Flight 77, even though the FAA alerted it to the problem with the airliner only at 9:34, only some three minutes before it struck the Pentagon (Miles Kara, “Archive for the ‘Transponders & Ghosts’ Category, 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.com);

72 “land immediately”/“Confirm”/“unreliable”/Cleveland panic/pilots feared/“you’re a trip”/ assured/“bomb area”/“bad movie”:Dave Dunlap (copilot) memoir, “September 11, 2001,” www.3dlanguage.net, DAL 1989 Order of Events, “FAA Subpoena Compendium, Delta 1989 Timeline,” B15, T8, CF, int. John Werth, MFR 04017313, 10/2/03;

73 Scoggins, “might not be”:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF, Summary [slugged as Timeline of Events of the Day], “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, Farmer, 211.

74 trying to get fighters:MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 23/04, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” & ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 101n391. NEADS asked two additional bases to provide fighters—Selfridge, in Michigan, and Toledo, in Ohio. Contrary to reports at the time, it appears that they were unable to help during the Delta episode. The Selfridge Air National Guard fighters were in the air, but had expended all their ammunition on a training exercise. They did not land until 10:29. Two Toledo F-16s were to take off, but—according to Colonel Marr—only after the Delta 1989 episode was over and after United 93 had been shot down (“The Unthinkable Had Happened,” 2007, www.candgnews.com, The Wolverine , Fall 2006, Spencer, 178–, Toledo Blade , 12/9/01, MFR 03012970, 10/27/03).